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ABSTRACT
 
There are likely more than 45 million slaves in the world today. Economist Kevin 
Bales defines slaves as people whose freedom and autonomy have been denied, who are 
paid nothing above subsistence, and who are maintained in these conditions through 
violence or the threat of violence. I am especially concerned with exploring the nature of 
the various relationships that everyday citizens share with these modern slaves, and 
establishing what, if any, obligations such citizens have to act on behalf of modern 
slaves. 
Contemporary philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre asserts that humans are 
storytelling beings caught up in real stories (i.e. narrative quests) that involve both 
ourselves and numerous others. As such, our lives are inextricably intertwined with the 
lives of these others. Therefore, we cannot go about our lives with little or no thought 
toward how our actions and decisions impact the lives of others. 
Consequently, living in shared communities requires that we consider and care 
about justice within those communities. Another contemporary philosopher, John Finnis, 
distinguishes two specific types of justice: distributive and commutative. Distributive 
justice deals with distributing resources, opportunities, profits, advantages, and 
responsibilities to individuals, with the ultimate purpose of benefiting the common good. 
Commutative justice considers what is required for individual wellbeing in communities 
where individuals and groups must live and work alongside one another, and establishes 
vii	
standards for such relationships. It also helps to determine what should be done when one 
person or group of people has been mistreated by another person or group. This can 
include, but is not limited to, ides of correction, restitution, or restoration. 
 The ultimate goal of discussing distributive and commutative justice is to argue 
that the narrative quests of individual global citizens are intertwined with the stories of 
countless slaves across the globe. Some slaves may be our immediate neighbors, and 
some slaves may be distant others. Yet we still find ourselves linked by numerous threads 
that tie our stories together. Our duties in justice, both distributive and commutative, 
demand that we work on behalf of those who are enslaved. But what does justice require 
that we practically do to help such people? In the end, I make several suggestions that 
will help us work toward achieving greater justice for the world’s slaves. 
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PREFACE
In the winter of 2008, I participated in a conference organized by the North 
American Association of Christians in Social Work (NACSW). I also signed up for a pre-
conference workshop led by Anna Rodriguez, the founder of the Florida Coalition 
Against Human Trafficking. At that point I was vaguely aware of the existence of slavery 
in our modern world, but I was still under the false assumption that slavery was only a 
problem in far-away places, like Southeast Asia, India, and Africa. I believed that the 
workshop was going to teach me more about slavery “over there.” Instead, I was rocked 
to my core to learn of the reality of slavery all around me, in my own country, and in my 
own backyard. That experience left a mark on me. I went about my own work at a group 
home for adolescents who were in state custody in South Carolina, but I never forgot the 
stories I heard from Ms. Rodriguez. When I decided to pursue a Ph.D. in philosophy and 
ethics several years later, I was initially unsure what I would care enough about to spend 
years researching for a dissertation. And then it hit me – modern slavery is very much a 
contemporary ethical issue. Perhaps I could write something philosophical that would 
also speak into one of the biggest human rights crises of our time. This is the culmination 
of that work. The kind of philosophy I care about intersects and informs the real world. I 
hope that the words here will make a difference for those currently enslaved, both close 
to home and far away. And I hope that those of us who are free will cry out “Abolition!” 
as we fight for freedom for the world’s modern slaves. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
"You may choose to look the other way 
but you can never say again that you did not know." 
- William Wilberforce 
 
In 1833 the British Parliament passed the Slave Emancipation Act, voting to 
abolish slavery throughout the British Empire.1 On December 6, 1865, the United States 
of America ratified the thirteenth amendment to the Constitution, which reads, "Neither 
slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party 
shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject 
to their jurisdiction."2 On December 10, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly 
adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.3 Article four of this declaration 
establishes, “No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall 
be prohibited in all their forms.”4 One might think that these resolutions are evidence that 
slavery has finally been relegated to the history books. Unfortunately, this could not be 
																																								 																				
1 “Emancipation,” The National Archives, accessed May 29, 2018, 
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pathways/blackhistory/rights/emancipation.htm. 
2 “13th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: Abolition of Slavery,”1865, accessed May 29, 2018,  
https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=40.  
3 “History of the Document,” United Nations, accessed May 30, 2018, 
http://www.un.org/en/sections/universal-declaration/history-document/index.html. 
4 “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” United Nations, 1948, accessed March 9, 2016, 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/. 
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further from the truth. In fact, there are more slaves in the world today than at any 
previous point in human history.5  
This realization has shaken me to the core, and it has impacted my life in 
numerous ways – some small and some large. And while I have spent the past ten years 
of my life caring and learning about this devastating reality, I have spent the past three 
years especially consumed with several questions I believe to be of utmost importance: 
“How is modern slavery our problem?” and “What are we obligated to do to help modern 
slaves?” I am especially concerned with exploring the nature of the relationships that 
everyday citizens share with modern slaves, and establishing what, if any, responsibilities 
and obligations such citizens have to act on behalf of modern slaves.  
 A logical first step in any such project is to define terms and explain key concepts. 
To this end, I begin Chapter Two by laying out the current status of slavery today, 
establishing just how massive and widespread the problem of slavery actually is. I then 
work out a definition of slavery that depends not on legal ownership of one person by 
another, but rather on functional control. Because slavery is illegal everywhere, there is 
often no paperwork declaring that one person legally owns another.6 Therefore, it is 
important to establish what criteria must be met for a person to be considered a slave in 
our modern context. Economist and influential modern abolitionist Kevin Bales has 
developed a relatively narrow definition of slavery. Bales insists that in order for 
someone to be considered a slave, three core factors must be met, including: (1) the use 
of violence (or its threat) to control the slave, (2) the loss of free will (which is further 
																																								 																				
5 Melissa Hogenboom, “A tipping point in the fight against slavery,” BBC News, October 19, 2012, 
accessed May 30, 2018, http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-19831913.  
6 Kevin Bales, Understanding Global Slavery: A Reader (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 
40, 114. 
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defined as the loss of freedom of movement or the freedom of autonomy to guide one’s 
own life decisions, etc.), and (3) economic exploitation (to the point that the slave often 
receives no compensation for his or her work, and definitely receives no compensation 
above mere subsistence).7 Even given a strict definition of slavery, one anti-slavery 
organization estimates that there are more than 45 million slaves in the world today.8 
 After explaining the scope of the problem and defining slavery in our modern 
context, I then introduce and explain the four main types of modern slavery, which 
include chattel slavery, debt bondage/bonded labor, contract slavery, and forced labor.9 I 
adopt the understanding that ‘human trafficking’, a term which is often used 
interchangeably with ‘modern slavery’, is in fact a method or conduit that is used to bring 
people into slavery. It is true that many people become slaves after being trafficked (i.e. 
moved) throughout the globe. But it is also true that there are millions of people who 
languish in slavery having never been trafficked.10 Also, ‘sex slavery’ or ‘sex trafficking’ 
are not additional types of slavery. Rather, many people are enslaved through chattel 
slavery, debt bondage, contract slavery, and forced labor for the purpose of sexual 
exploitation.11 After dealing with a few potential criticisms regarding the definition and 
explanation of modern slavery, especially surrounding modern slavery statistics, I close 
Chapter Two by explaining that in order to fully understand why the battle against 
																																								 																				
7 Bales, Understanding Global Slavery, 91. (Elsewhere, the “economic exploitation” category is also 
described as an “appropriation of labor power.” See page 57).  
8 “Modern Day Slavery: The Facts,” International Justice Mission, accessed March 2, 2017, 
https://www.ijm.org/slavery.  
9 Kevin Bales, Zoe Trodd, and Alex Kent Williamson, Modern Slavery: A Beginner’s Guide (Oxford: 
Oneworld Publications, 2009/2011), 33-35.  
10 Jean Allain and Kevin Bales, “Slavery and Its Definition,” Global Dialogue 14, no.2 (August 3, 2012): 2, 
accessed on November 10, 2017, SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2123155. 
11 Kevin Bales and Zoe Trodd, To Plead Our Own Cause (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 
2008), 91-97. (This recounts the story of a survivor who was forced to be a sex slave through both contract 
slavery and debt bondage).  
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slavery is still raging, and what we are required to do about it, we must first lay some 
foundational building blocks. 
Chapter Three begins this foundational work by introducing three key concepts, 
ultimately leading to a discussion of two general types of justice. These three concepts 
include John Finnis’s “practically reasonable people,” Finnis’s “common good,” and 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s “narrative quest.” Practically reasonable people will accept certain 
responsibilities and commitments, including the responsibility to “favour and foster the 
common good of one’s communities.”12 This then leads to MacIntyre’s understanding of 
communities as places where community members share a future with others in which 
their own stories, or “narrative quests,” impact and affect the stories of numerous 
others.13 Therefore, we cannot live our own lives in isolation, but rather we must 
understand that our stories are intertwined with the stories of others, and we must ensure 
that our shared world is one in which justice is pursued for all.    
The remainder of Chapter Three is focused on explaining the first general type of 
justice – distributive justice. According to Finnis, distributive justice addresses problems 
that arise regarding “distributing resources, opportunities, profits and advantages, roles 
and offices, responsibilities, taxes and burdens – in general, the common stock and the 
incidents of communal enterprise, which do not serve the common good unless and until 
they are appropriated to particular individuals.”14 This obviously leads to questions 
regarding how to determine what constitutes a just distribution of resources, 
opportunities, and advantages. Multiple theories of distributive justice answer these 
																																								 																				
12 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 161, 
165. 
13 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 215-216. 
14 Finnis, 166.  
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questions in very different ways. I explore several such theories, including theories which 
appeal primarily to general welfare, freedom and rights, needs, and virtue. Ultimately, I 
adopt Finnis’s view, which privileges needs over other possible criteria for distribution,15 
while also stressing the importance of developing integrity and virtue. I also find merit in 
the Kantian concept of human dignity, and the modern concept of universal human rights, 
as values we should privilege. Finnis believes that it is important to value the right things, 
which in this case means that we value providing for the basic needs of those in our 
communities, and their inherent dignity as human beings, above other less pressing things 
that we could value. 
I close Chapter Three with a discussion of what boundaries matter when it comes 
to seeking distributive justice for those in our various communities. I especially consider 
questions regarding proximity – namely should we devote more time and energy and 
resources toward our neighbors who are closer to us (considering both location and 
strength of relationships), or should proximity not matter seeing as how we live in an 
ever-widening global community, and some global needs are incredibly dire? These are 
highly debated questions in the conversation between cosmopolitans and patriots. My 
ultimate conclusion is that, while particularist relationships are real, and there is good 
reason to believe that under most circumstances I have a greater obligation toward people 
with whom I have special relationships (e.g. family members), there are some instances 
where injustices committed against global citizens are so egregious (e.g. enslavement and 
starvation) that our attention and response to them should be privileged. I assert that in 
such instances, where the demands of universal morality are gravely violated, we should 
become ‘conditional cosmopolitans’, acting and reacting from a position of privileging 
																																								 																				
15 Finnis, 174. 
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and valuing the fundamental rights and needs of global citizens above particularist 
relationships.   
In Chapter Four, I explain the second general type of justice – commutative 
justice. According to Finnis, commutative justice deals not with distributing common 
resources and privileges among individuals in communities, but rather with assuring that 
people treat those with whom they have relationships in ways that are fitting and fair.16 
This includes consideration of corrective justice, which is concerned with how to ensure 
remedy and restoration when people have been treated unjustly. But commutative justice 
is much wider in scope than corrective justice, because it includes consideration of proper 
interactions between people before any injustice has been committed, with the goal of 
preventing future injustices.17 
Of specific interest in this chapter is the question regarding to whom we share 
relationships, and what our responsibilities are toward those with whom we share various 
relationships, especially when we have participated in some way in harming them (or 
failing to help them).  I draw distinctions between being guilty/culpable/at-fault-for 
committing injustice(s), and being responsible (but not guilty) of contributing toward 
injustice(s). I am most interested in this second category, because it seems that there are 
instances in which individuals or groups of people may not intend or wish to harm other 
individuals or groups, but nevertheless their actions (or their failures to act), either alone 
or in concert with the actions or failures of others, do harm those with whom they have 
various relationships.18 Often such instances result in responsibility without moral blame, 
																																								 																				
16 Finnis, 178. 
17 Ibid., 180. 
18 Herbert Morris, On Guilt and Innocence: Essays in Legal Philosophy and Moral Psychology (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1976), 113. 
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and they also often carry expectations of remedy or restoration despite their moral 
blamelessness.19  
Of course, if commutative justice is about treating those with whom we have 
relationships in ways that are fitting, fair, and just, we must consider who these “others” 
are with whom we share such relevant relationships and responsibilities. As MacIntyre 
reminds us, we play parts in the stories or countless others, and we should “understand an 
action as something for which someone is accountable, about which it is always 
appropriate to ask the agent for an intelligible account.”20 But again, who are these others 
to whom we are accountable? Finnis points out that our ‘neighbors’ include individual 
people we know, multiple people (or groups of people) that we know, and many 
individual people that we do not know (but who are nevertheless members in our own 
various communities).21 Many people in this latter category may be impacted by 
structural injustices that govern our shared communities and systematically disadvantage 
some while simultaneously advantaging others.22 Furthermore, in our modern global 
community, we share these various relationships with individuals and groups both near 
and far. When we can be shown to be guilty of injustice toward our neighbors, we are 
assuredly obligated to provide restitution, remedy, and restoration for them. But even 
when we are morally blameless, yet responsible for contributing to injustice, we are often 
obligated to provide restoration for victims of injustice as well. But the nature of these 
																																								 																				
19 Finnis, 183. 
20 MacIntyre, 209.  
21 Finnis, 183-184. 
22 Iris Marion Young, Responsibility for Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 52. 
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obligations is generally broad and indeterminate, leaving multiple possibilities open to 
those who would uphold these duties and obligations.23 
The purpose of carefully defining modern slavery, and of providing detailed 
discussions of distributive and commutative justice, brings us to Chapter Five, the 
penultimate chapter, and the pinnacle of the argument of this project. Chapter Five 
explains how the existence of modern slavery violates the requirements of both 
distributive and commutative justice, and it answers the question “How is modern slavery 
our problem?” I recognize and admit that I spend a great deal of time setting up the 
framework for this argument in Chapters 2-4, but I believe this is necessary in order to 
show the multiple ways in which modern slavery does, in fact, violate justice.24  
In order to understand one of the primary ways that injustice in distribution leads 
to slavery, I examine the link between distributive injustice and poverty, and in turn the 
link between poverty and slavery. In the words of modern abolitionist David Batstone, 
“…denying the central role of poverty in modern-day slavery is like denying the central 
role of gravity in rainfall.”25 I argue that the monetary cost of eradicating poverty from 
the globe is relatively small if resources were more justly distributed, and the cost of 
eradicating slavery from the globe is even smaller. As Finnis believes, common stock 
resources are allocated to individuals for the purpose of using those resources for the 
greater good of one’s communities, and not for hoarding excesses for oneself. When 
individuals refuse to put these resources to work for the good of their communities, they 
																																								 																				
23 Elizabeth Ashford, “The Inadequacy of our Traditional Conception of the Duties Imposed by Human 
Rights,” Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 19, no.2 (July 2006), 232. 
24 I also admit that this work by no means deals exhaustively with the connection between violations of 
justice and modern slavery. Rather, it is intended to be an introduction to these ideas, as my research 
indicates that the specific argument herein is a novel one (at least in the philosophical literature). I 
undoubtedly leave much room for future exploration of many of the ideas introduced in this present work.  
25 David Batstone, Not for Sale: The Return of the Global Slave Trade – And How We Can Fight It (New 
York: HarperCollins, 2010), 290. 
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are no longer fit to be entrusted with them.26 If such resources were distributed justly, 
slavery would likely be non-existent. Modern slavery is our problem because we benefit 
from unjust distributions, and we can and should use our excesses to benefit the common 
good.   
In order to understand the primary ways in which commutative injustice leads to 
slavery, I focus on the ways that consumer habits, especially among citizens of the 
developed West, contribute to the slavery of millions. As one modern anti-slavery 
organization explains, “Many everyday products are made by slaves, or with slavery-
tainted parts or raw materials -- such as cars, computers, chocolate, cell phones and 
clothing.”27 I provide extensive data and resources to build the case that modern 
consumers are unavoidably linked to slave labor as a result of our purchasing habits. 
Furthermore, a great number of individuals are also linked to slavery through their 
involvement in the commercial sex industry, including those who participate in sex 
tourism, those who purchase sex from prostitutes, and those who view pornography. 
Many of the “sex workers” in the multi-billion dollar commercial sex industry are, in 
fact, slaves.28 Therefore, those who support this industry are linked in multiple ways to 
ensuring the continued existence and profitability of modern slavery. 
Modern slavery is our problem because some of us are guilty of committing 
commutative injustices against our neighbors who are slaves. Some of us have knowingly 
taken advantage of our positions of privilege and power to oppress those with whom we 
have varied relationships. This is especially true in the case of involvement with the 
																																								 																				
26 Finnis, 172. 
27 “Trafficking and Slavery Fact Sheet,” Free the Slaves, accessed May 4, 2015, 
https://www.freetheslaves.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/FTS_factsheet-Nov17.21.pdf. 
28 Siddharth Kara, Sex Trafficking: Inside the Business of Modern Slavery (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2009), 15.  
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commercial sex industry. And even for those of us who are not guilty of commutative 
injustice(s), many (if not most or all) of us are responsible for contributing to injustice(s) 
against numerous neighbors who are slaves.  We may hate the idea of supporting systems 
that rely on slave labor. Yet, our inherited world is one that includes such systems, and 
we use them and benefit from them. We may not all be guilty, but we are responsible, and 
in many instances this responsibility carries certain obligations for us to act on behalf of 
these neighbors, the world’s modern slaves.  
This leads to Chapter Six, the final chapter, which attempts to answer the vitally 
important question, “What are we obligated to do to help modern slaves?” In light of all 
of the preceding work, many will be left wondering, “What practical steps can and should 
we take to work toward restoration for these oppressed neighbors?” In reality, there is not 
a list of definitive “dos and don’ts” when it comes to satisfying the demands justice 
places on us in regards to our neighbors who are slaves. Our duties in distributive and 
commutative justice are “wide duties,” allowing for multiple and varied responses from 
those of us who are obligated to take corrective and restorative measures.29  
Still, I make suggestions of several different ways that global citizens can fight for 
justice for modern slaves. One category of suggestions involves collective efforts and 
institutional reforms. These are things we can do together in concert with others, raising a 
collective voice and wielding collective power to advocate for changes in social and 
																																								 																				
29 Finnis, 173; Sarah Clark Miller, The Ethics of Need: Agency, Dignity, and Obligation (New York: 
Routledge, 2012), 61.  
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political policies and structures.30 We can support Non-Governmental Organizations who 
are already situated to fight slavery throughout the world.31  
A second category of suggestions involves individual efforts we can make toward 
fighting slavery. We can educate ourselves and others regarding the presence of slavery 
in our world. Many global citizens are completely ignorant to slavery’s continued 
existence and it’s modern manifestations.32 We can change some of our purchasing 
habits, and we can demand more options that are sourced by free workers.33 We can give 
money to organizations that already have boots on the ground ready to fight, but are 
waiting for resources to fund their efforts.34 And these are only a few suggestions of 
things individuals can do to fight slavery.   
The ultimate point I hope to convey is that slavery exists on a massive scale. The 
demands of justice – both distributive and commutative – show that slavery is very much 
not permissible. It is a moral blight on humanity. Furthermore, even in instances where 
we are not guilty of causing these injustices, we are often responsible for them, and we 
are likely obligated to do things to answer the demands of justice on behalf of our 
brothers and sisters around the world who are still, in the twenty-first century, slaves. 
And as the quote from William Wilberforce at the beginning of this chapter proclaims, 
"You may choose to look the other way but you can never say again that you did not 
know."35
																																								 																				
30 Thomas Pogge, “Reply to the Critics: Severe Poverty as a Violation of Negative Duties,” Ethics and 
International Affairs 19, no. 1 (2005), 80. 
31 Bales, Understanding Global Slavery, 78, 81. 
32 Ibid., 4. 
33 Bales, Trodd, and Williamson, Modern Slavery: Beginner’s Guide, 156. 
34 Bales, Understanding Global Slavery, 81. 
35 William Wilberforce, “William Wilberforce’s 1789 Abolition Speech,” The Abolition Project, accessed 
May 29, 2018, https://www.st-andrews-anglican-calgary.ca/downloads/WilberforceSpeech1789.pdf. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
MODERN SLAVERY: DEFINITIONS AND DETAILS 
 
I. Does ‘Slavery’ Really Exist Today? 
One current estimate suggests that there are more than 45 million slaves in the 
world today.1 Another recent estimate suggests that there are between 21 and 36 million 
modern slaves.2 The slave industry generates roughly $150 billion annually.3 Seventy-
eight percent of modern day slavery is constituted by labor slavery, while the remaining 
twenty-two percent is constituted by sex slavery.4 Fifty-five percent of current slaves are 
women and girls, forty-five percent are men and boys, and children constitute twenty-six 
percent of all slaves worldwide.5  
 Now let us pause for a minute before proceeding. When we claim that slavery 
exists in our modern world, what do we mean? As one modern anti-slavery work states, 
our “fascination with the particular from of nineteenth-century chattel slavery hides the 
																																								 																				
1 “Modern Day Slavery: The Facts,” International Justice Mission, accessed March 2, 2017, 
https://www.ijm.org/slavery.   
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larger story of human bondage…”6 Many Americans and Europeans are extremely 
familiar with the slavery of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries within 
our own borders and amongst our trading partners. However, we are also keenly aware, 
as we were taught in our history classes since childhood, that slavery and the slave trade 
were “prohibited in all their forms” long ago.7 This lures us into a false sense of progress, 
often times wholeheartedly believing that slavery is, in fact, a relic of history. If only this 
were the case. Investigative reporter Benjamin Skinner expertly documents the ease in 
which one can leave New York City, fly to Port Au Prince Haiti, and purchase a child to 
serve as a domestic slave in the span of about five hours.8 And one does not need to 
travel by plane at all in order to find sex slaves through online ads and websites, or at 
massage parlors or truck stops in our own developed cities. But alas, this still does not 
answer the burning question regarding how to define slavery in a modern context. What 
do we mean when we use the term ‘slavery’, or when we refer to some grossly exploited 
people as ‘slaves’? It is to this question I now turn.  
II. How Do We Define Modern Slavery? 
It is vitally important that we define what we mean by ‘slavery’ in a modern 
context. This proves to be more difficult than one might imagine. At the turn of the new 
millennium, even getting those in power to use the term ‘slavery’ was a battle. In the first 
ever Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report, which was released by Colin Powell and the 
US State Department in 2001 and detailed the reality of modern slavery worldwide, 
																																								 																				
6 Kevin Bales, Zoe Trodd, and Alex Kent Williamson, Modern Slavery: A Beginner’s Guide (Oxford: 
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Secretary Powell never actually used the word ‘slavery’.9 The term seems to have such 
deep historical connotations, especially in the United States, that many modern 
bureaucrats believe that applying the term ‘slavery’ in the modern context “would 
trivialize the suffering of African Americans…”10 Ironically, refusing to apply the term in 
the modern context seems to trivialize the suffering of millions of the world’s 
contemporary citizens, some of whom are, and some of whom are not “African-
American” but yet languish underneath severe oppression and exploitation.  
Two scholars working in the field state: “…we seem to have lost sight of what the 
term ‘slavery’ means…despite the fact that for more than eighty-five years there has been 
a consensus in international law as to the legal definition of slavery.”11 This consensus 
comes from an international definition of slavery that was established in 1926,12 
confirmed in 1956,13 and replicated in substance in the 1998 Statue of the International 
Criminal Court. The 1926 definition reads as follows: “Slavery is the status or condition 
of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are 
exercised.”14  
At first glance this definition may seem vague, and is itself the reason that many 
have more recently attempted to define slavery in different ways. The use of the 
terminology “attaching to the right of ownership” seems to make this definition less 
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applicable to most instances of modern slavery, because legal ownership is not how most 
modern slavery operates. Because slavery today is illegal almost everywhere, it has 
become hidden from view. There are often no legal papers declaring that one person is 
the owner of another, as was the case in antebellum chattel slavery.15 Modern slavery is 
not about legal ownership, but rather about functional control (or functional ownership). 
However, keeping this in mind, an Australian equivalent of the United States Supreme 
Court determined the following:  
…while the 1926 definition applied in de jure situations – that is: where a person 
legally owns another – it also applied in de facto situations where a person 
exercised the powers attaching to the right of ownership instead of exercising the 
right of ownership over a person. In other words, that a person could be in a 
condition of slavery without legal ownership, if it could be shown that they were 
treated like a slave in fact, if not in law.16  
 
By allowing de facto application of this definition, it covers many instances of modern 
slavery in which a person is not legally owned by another, but is practically and 
functionally owned by another.  In the words of Allain and Bales, “…we are currently 
living through a ‘neo-abolition era,’ one that goes beyond its historical predecessor which 
focused on ending legal slavery; to a contemporary movement meant to end slavery in 
fact.”17 In what follows I will discuss precisely how to identify instances of slavery that 
include functional ownership.  
 Even despite this ruling which deems the 1926 definition largely applicable today, 
Allain and Bales point out, “The definition [of slavery] has been often bogged down, 
since at least the 1930s, by individuals and organisations trying to expand the notion of 
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slavery to fit their agenda and thus benefit from the visceral power of a claim that what 
they were railing against is ‘slavery’.”18  
  Thus we are still left needing a clear, succinct definition of what would constitute 
an instance of modern slavery. Economist and sociologist Kevin Bales, who has devoted 
his life’s work to impacting the blight of modern slavery, has done extensive work to 
arrive at a fairly narrow definition of what constitutes slavery. He establishes three core 
factors which must be present for an instance of exploitation19 to be counted as slavery. 
These factors include: (1) the use of violence, the threat of violence, or psychological 
coercion to control the slave,20 (2) the loss of free will (which is further defined as the 
loss of freedom of movement or the freedom of autonomy to guide one’s own life 
decisions, etc.), and (3) economic exploitation (to the point that the slave often receives 
no compensation for his or her work, and definitely receives no compensation above 
mere subsistence). This is also sometimes explained as the appropriation of labor powers, 
because victims’ ability to use their own labor for their own gain is stolen, or 
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appropriated, from them.21 There are many forms of exploitation that would not meet all 
three of these criteria, and in those cases Bales would say that slavery is not present.  
We can see here that by defining slavery rather narrowly, it becomes difficult to 
overgeneralize and to call things ‘slavery’ that, while exploitative and perhaps immoral, 
should not be classified as such.22 Many of those who estimate the number of modern 
slaves are using fairly stringent criteria to determine this number, which means that when 
we talk about there being thirty-six or even forty-five million modern slaves (give or 
take) we are referring to people who are controlled by another through violence for no 
economic compensation above subsistence. We are not talking about people who are 
“enslaved” to addictions, or “enslaved” to consumerism, or even those “enslaved” by 
miserly wages that are lower than they perhaps should be, but nevertheless provide for a 
standard of living above subsistence. Many such people may experience exploitation, but 
they are not slaves.        
This does bring up some questions regarding exploitation more broadly, and why 
slavery always exemplifies exploitation whereas exploitation does not always constitute 
slavery. Furthermore, we should ask the question, “What is wrong with exploitation 
anyway?” In its simplest conception, “To exploit someone is to take unfair advantage of 
them…to use another person’s vulnerability for one’s own benefit.”23 Of chief concern 
for our purposes here is exploitation in its normative sense, which involves unfair 
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advantage taking that is seen as clearly wrong.24 Exploitation can be transactional – “a 
discrete transaction between two or more individuals” – or it can be structural – “ a 
property of institutions or systems in which the ‘rules of the game’ unfairly benefit one 
group of people to the detriment of another.”25  
But now we must also consider what it means to “benefit unfairly.” One 
possibility is that this unfairness involves benefitting one person at the expense of another 
(i.e. “benefitting A at B’s expense”).26 But it seems to be the case that some instances of 
exploitation are mutually advantageous to both parties.27 Consider a sweatshop worker 
who is a day away from starving to death. If she accepts a job in a factory where she 
works sixteen-hour days in exchange for one meal a day, this still seems to be an 
advantage over imminent death. In this instance the worker benefits (by receiving enough 
food to prolong her life), and the factory owner benefits (by receiving extremely cheap 
labor). If we want to still claim that this is exploitation, how can we side-step the problem 
that mutual advantage might impose?  Zwolinski and Wertheimer offer one solution, 
claiming the following: “Relative to a baseline of no transaction at all, exploitation often 
makes its victim better off. But relative to a baseline of a fair transaction, exploitation 
leaves its victims worse off…the victim of exploitation gains less than she 
should…[exploitation] makes its victim worse off than she should have been, had she 
been treated fairly.”28 While this seems to make sense, some feel that accounts of 
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exploitation based on fairness are unsatisfactory, and therefore they turn to another 
explanation.  
Many contemporary scholars working in the space of exploitation have moved 
away from defining exploitation on the basis of fairness, and instead have turned toward 
more Kantian ideas based on respect for persons.29 Ruth J. Sample defines exploitation as 
“interacting with another being for the sake of advantage in a way that fails to respect the 
inherent value in that being.”30 In such accounts the focus is shifted away from fairness, 
and toward ensuring that people are treated with dignity and respect. As Zwolinski and 
Wertheimer state, “When we encounter others whose basic needs are unmet, we should 
help them because of the inherent value they possess as a human being. But the exploiter 
sees in the unmet basic needs of others not a cry for help but as an opportunity to 
profit.”31 Jeremy Snyder affirms this view, but also adds that duties to meet the basic 
needs of others are contingent upon those who would help having the ability to do so 
without jeopardizing their own flourishing. So a factory owner must pay a living wage to 
her employees as long as she can do so without consequently removing herself from the 
competitive marketplace. A situation becomes exploitative when such an employer lives 
in excess or luxury or opulence while her employees live in deficiency or poverty. For 
such a person to avoid exploiting others she must live between poverty and luxury, while 
looking toward meeting the basic needs of those who fall below the poverty threshold.32 
Doing this exhibits respect for human beings and their basic needs qua human being(s).  
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We still must ask, though, how we can determine when an existence of 
exploitation crosses the threshold into slavery. Perhaps the key lies in understanding 
another concept, that of coercion. Zwolinski and Wertheimer assert, “Coercion 
characteristically involves threats by which the coercer proposes to make her victim 
worse off unless she does as the coercer demands.”33 This is essentially summed up in 
Bales’ first criterion for an instance of slavery: the use of violence (or its threat) to 
control.34 Coercion often leads victims to believe that if they do not do as they are told, 
they will be harmed or killed, or someone they love will be harmed or killed. But whereas 
coercion promises harm, exploitation “often involves offers by which the exploiter 
proposes to make her victim better off if she does as the exploiter proposes.”35 Consider 
again our example above of the sweatshop owner. If she threatens a victim by saying, “If 
you do not work for me for sixteen hours each day in exchange for one meal, I will kill 
your daughter,” this is best understood as an instance of coercion. On the other hand, if 
she makes an offer to a starving adolescent, “Come work for me sixteen hours each day 
in exchange for one meal, and you will prolong your life,” this is an instance of 
exploitation because the victim gains something, albeit something that is less than fair 
and/or does not exhibit dignity and respect toward the victim as a human being. 
A relevant difference between exploitation and coercion seems to be that 
exploitation involves taking unfair advantage of an existing defect, while coercion 
involves creating a defect from which some benefit can then be derived.36 Perhaps this 
then answers our question regarding why we might label some injustices as “exploitative” 
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and yet not classify them as slavery. Slavery, under the definition we have adopted, 
involves both exploitation (using another’s existing vulnerabilities to gain an unfair 
advantage) and coercion (threatening to make a victim’s situation worse and/or creating 
an unfair advantage for oneself).37    
III. Types of Modern Slavery 
A. Chattel Slavery 
There are four prevalent forms that today’s slavery takes.38 The first is chattel 
slavery. This is the type of slavery many people instinctively think of when they hear the 
term “slavery,” because it most closely approximates old slavery. In chattel slavery, “…a 
person is captured, born, or sold into permanent servitude, and ownership is often 
asserted.”39 Because slavery is illegal almost everywhere, this is the least prevalent form 
of modern slavery, and is found mostly in Northern and Western Africa.  
This is, of course, a radical departure from most historical manifestations of 
slavery. The practice of slavery is “as old as human history and predates both laws and 
money.”40 The ancient Babylonian Code of Hammurabi, which dates to about 1790 BC, 
lays out the oldest recorded legal system. In this system, the legal status of slaves was 
detailed, and the thirty-five laws in the code regarding slavery made clear that slaves 
were not considered to be real human beings.41 The practice of laying out legal codes, 
guidelines, and laws governing the ownership of slaves and their status as property 
continued through history. Only recently has it been the case that legal ownership of 
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slaves has been prohibited, causing this shift away from chattel slavery and toward other, 
often more covert forms of slavery.     
B. Debt Bondage/ Bonded Labor 
The second form is debt bondage slavery, which is also known as bonded labor. 
This is the most common and extensive form of slavery today.42 By the end of 2011 there 
were eighteen to 20.5 million bonded laborers in the world, with 84 percent to 88 percent 
of them living in South Asia.43 Bonded laborers pledge themselves against a loan of 
money, “but the length and nature of the service is not defined, and their labor does not 
diminish the original debt…the debtor can never earn enough to repay the debt by his/her 
own labor…if families try to leave, the slaveholder’s men retaliate with beatings, rape, 
and forced eviction.”44 Debts are fraudulently maintained and increased, so that the 
bonded laborer becomes more indebted instead of less so. Often times these debts pass 
from father to son to grandson.45 In his book dealing exclusively with bonded labor in 
South Asia, Siddharth Kara details this exploitative and coercive system:  
In its most essential form, bonded labor involves the exploitative interlinking of 
labor and credit agreements between parties. On one side of the agreement, a 
party possessing an abundance of assets and capital provides credit to the other 
party, who, because he lacks almost any assets or capital, pledges his labor to 
work off the loan. Given the severe power imbalances between the parties, the 
laborer is often severely exploited. Bonded labor occurs when the exploitation 
ascends to the level of slavelike abuse. In these cases, once the capital is 
borrowed, numerous tactics are used by the lender to extract slave labor. The 
borrower is often coerced to work at paltry wage levels to repay the debt. 
Exorbitant interest rates are charged…and money lent for future medicine, 
clothes, or basic subsistence is added to the debt. In most cases of bonded labor, 
up to half or more of the day’s wage is deducted for debt repayment, and further 
deductions are often made as penalties for breaking rules or poor work 
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performance. The laborer uses what paltry income remains to buy food and 
supplies from the lender, at heavily inflated prices. The bonded laborers rarely 
have enough money to meet their subsistence needs, so they are forced to borrow 
more money to survive.46 
 
Now, for those of us who do not live in extreme poverty, when we need money 
we can often take out a legitimate loan from a legitimate credit lender at a specified and 
reasonable interest rate. The terms of the loan are fairly agreed upon by both parties. Our 
assets are offered as collateral against the loan, and if we fail to uphold the loan 
agreement the collateral can be collected from us. So if I wish to buy a car, I take out a 
loan for said car.  If I then fail to make payments on the car, it can be confiscated from 
me because it is the collateral against the loan for which I agreed. 
For millions of incredibly impoverished people who find themselves in desperate 
need of money, these legitimate lending options are not available to them for at least two 
reasons. First, there are no legitimate, credible lenders available to them. Many 
impoverished people live in distant, rural locations and are removed from institutions 
such as banks and credit unions. If they need loans, their only options are those who live 
in their immediate vicinity and who are wealthy enough to provide loans. Kara states, 
“Bonded laborers are almost always socially isolated, and they tend to be located a great 
distance from markets, which renders them reliant on lender-slaveowners to monetize the 
output of their labor…”47  
Second, these desperate people do not have any collateral against which they can 
borrow money. They have no assets except for their own labor. Therefore, when they 
seek out loans, the only collateral they can place against the loans are themselves and 
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their labor.48 This is how the cycle that Kara detailed above begins. Once individuals take 
out these informal, exploitative loans, their lender-slaveowners monetize their labor 
inequitably in order to extend their bondage.49 It becomes nearly impossible to pay back 
debts when illegitimate deductions are constantly made from wages, and when laborers 
are forced to purchase goods from company stores at inflated prices. It is not uncommon 
for bonded laborers to be charged annual interest rates of between fifty to one hundred 
percent.50 Exacerbating this problem is the reality that many bonded laborers are 
uneducated and illiterate,51 which means they cannot keep track of their own debts and 
credits, and they cannot prove that documents detailing their agreements with lenders (if 
these ever existed at all) were fraudulent or have not been upheld with the agreed upon 
terms. Kara points out that when these agreements are written out, “the illiterate bonded 
laborer signs the agreement with a thumbprint, relying solely on the lender to describe the 
terms of the agreement.”52 
Why do people agree to these exploitative loans? Common reasons include 
consumption needs (e.g. food, clothing, etc.), income-generating activity (e.g. business 
loans, loans for farm equipment, loans for building/crafting projects, etc.), repayment of a 
previous loan, funding a wedding (i.e. to pay a dowry or other required fee in order to  
marry), purchasing medicine or paying for other illness-related costs, and for funding 
funerals.53  
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Kara anticipates that some might question the legitimacy of debt bondage/bonded 
labor as a form of real slavery because it may appear that the bonded laborer enters into 
the agreement voluntarily. But Kara points out that a well-established tenet of contract 
law provides that duress to a person nullifies any resulting contract. Furthermore, Kara 
states that the only reason a person ever enters into debt bondage is due to a lack of any 
reasonable alternative, which he believes satisfies the condition of duress. Those who fall 
victim to debt bondage usually experience duress to their person (personal safety), duress 
to goods (threat to seize property or evict), and/or economic duress. Kara points out that 
“consent is vitiated in the presence of any of these forms of duress…”54 The United 
Nations provides that “consent of the victim is irrelevant where illicit means are 
established…”55 meaning that even if victims give some sort of initial consent, or make 
some agreement with their slaveholders, if illegal or illicit means are used to gain their 
consent, or once they are exploited beyond the terms of their agreement, their consent is 
irrelevant and they are considered victims.  The idea that duress or fraud or any other 
illegal method used to enslave vulnerable people renders them victims (as opposed to 
willing and complicit parties in their own exploitation) is a well-established and widely 
accepted international understanding.   
Why are bonded laborers so prevalent? In simplest terms, they are maximally 
profitable. Globalization has encouraged transnational competition to decrease 
production costs and increase profit margins. One of the easiest ways to do this is by 
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decreasing operating expenses, namely labor costs. As Kara states, “Thus throughout 
history, producers have tried to find ways to minimize labor costs. Slavery is the extreme 
outcome of this impetus. Slaves afford a virtually nil cost of labor, which in turn reduces 
total operating costs substantially, allowing the slaveowner to maximize profit.”56      
In his book, Kara recounts the story of a slave he met in India named Ajay. I will 
include Ajay’s story here, because he helps to paint the picture for us of what many 
bonded laborers endure.  
I took the loan of Rs. 800 ($18) for my marriage to Sarika. My father and mother 
died when I was young, so it was up to me to arrange our wedding. I promised 
Sarika after we finished our pheras [ceremony and vows] that I would make her a 
happy life. I felt so proud. I was only seventeen at that time. What did I know? 
Since the time of our wedding, we worked in these fields for the landowner, who 
loaned me the money. When he died, we worked for his son. From the beginning, 
we were promised wages each day of a few rupees. I felt my debt would be repaid 
in two years at most, but the landowner made so many deductions from our 
wages, and each year we had to take more loans for food or tenancy. Sometimes, 
the landowner would tell me at the end of the season that I owe him this amount 
or that amount, but I could never know what the real amount was. He did not 
allow us to leave this place for other work, even when there was no work here to 
do. My brothers and I have worked in this area all our lives. My two sons will 
inherit my debt when I am gone. When Sarika became very ill three years ago, the 
landowner refused to give me a loan for medicines. There was no doctor here, and 
he would not send us to a medical clinic. He said my debts were too high and I 
was too old to repay this expense. I pleaded with him to save Sarika, but he told 
me only God can determine her fate. I was desperate, but I did not know what to 
do. Sarika did not want our sons to take more debts for her medicine, so she 
forbade me from telling them when she was ill. How could I deny her wish? Our 
lives are filled with so much pain. I did not give Sarika a good life. For many 
years, I wanted to take my life. I told Sarika I had cursed us, but she said that the 
suffering in our lives was not so great as others. I told her she should have 
married a rich man and been happy. Maybe then she would still be alive. I am old 
now, and I can no longer work. The landowner has little use for me. My life is 
almost over. I wait only for the end. No one in this country cares about people like 
us. We live and die, and no one but ourselves knows we have drawn breath.57  
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C. Contract Slavery 
 
The third form of modern slavery is contract slavery. This form of slavery is 
growing rapidly, and is the second most common form of slavery today. Contract slavery 
“hides behind modern labor relations: contracts guarantee employment…but when 
workers arrive, they are enslaved.”58 Recruiters target vulnerable populations of people 
with promises of good jobs or educational opportunities. They convince those desperate 
to improve their lives to leave the safety and familiarity of home with promises of 
legitimate economic opportunities elsewhere. Once victims are vulnerable and powerless, 
their travel and identity documents are confiscated. Without legal paperwork, and far 
from home, they are treated violently and are convinced that they must accept their new 
lives as slaves.59 Any contracts signed at the beginning of the process are discarded, lost, 
or changed, and the victims in this scheme are powerless to resist.  
Of course there are instances where legitimate debts are incurred and are paid off 
within a reasonable amount of time, and under fair and agreed upon terms. These are not 
instances of slavery. Both debt bondage and contract slavery are marked by fraud, 
deception, physical force, psychological coercion, and general illegality of methods and 
actions.   
Kevin Bales and Zoe Trodd lay out a classic example of contract slavery in their 
book To Plead Our Own Cause, which includes slave narratives from some of today’s 
modern slaves. They recount the story of a Vietnamese woman named Vi, who was 
enslaved in American Samoa after agreeing to a seemingly legitimate labor contract.  
In 1999 Vi was one of about 250 workers brought from Vietnam on a labor 
contract. A South Korean businessman named Kil Soo Lee had bought a garment 
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factory called Daewoosa…and required sewing machine operators. Vi was 
recruited by a Vietnamese government-owned enterprise called Tourism 
Company 12 and was told she was heading for the United States. Like the other 
recruits, she paid $5,000 to cover the cost of airfare and work permits and signed 
a three-year contract in exchange for monthly paychecks of $400, plus free meals 
and housing and return airfare. But on arrival in American Samoa, the recruits 
were forced to work to pay off smuggling fees. Lee confiscated their passports to 
prevent them from escaping, and he quickly stopped paying them altogether, 
though he kept charging them for room and board. He withheld food, ordered 
beatings, and forced them to work fourteen to eighteen hours per day. Female 
employees were sexually assaulted, and those who became pregnant were forced 
to have abortions or return to Vietnam.60  
 
Vi further recounts her own story by explaining that she had to borrow the money 
to pay Tour Company 12 and the official in charge of recruitment. She worked nineteen-
hour days for no pay, and did not have money for food, amenities, or soap. She was so 
malnourished that she lost thirty-five pounds in a year and weighed only seventy-eight 
pounds. Thirty-six people shared a room, and she had to share a tiny bed with another 
worker. Mr. Lee would lay with whomever he wanted, and he would take women into his 
office to have sex with them. He consistently groped and kissed female workers in front 
of everyone. Movement at Daewoosa was restricted, and American Samoan guards 
searched (and groped and strip-searched) workers if they left and returned to the 
compound. Beatings and threats were used to intimidate and keep workers from 
revolting. Two workers who became involved in lawsuits against Mr. Lee disappeared 
and were never found. Even after being rescued, moving to the United States, and herself 
becoming involved in helping to prosecute Mr. Lee, Vi was indebted to her exploiters and 
sent money back to Vietnam to pay off her fraudulent debts. She reported, “Since my 
arrival in the United States, I have sent every dollar earned back to Vietnam to pay my 
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debt. However, this has barely made a dent because the interest rate is so high, 50 
percent.”61   
Vi’s story teaches us several things. First, many people who fall victim to contract 
slavery are recruited by seemingly legitimate labor recruiters or agencies. In Vi’s case, 
she was recruited by a government-owned enterprise. Many of these people believe they 
are traveling abroad legally and have secured gainful employment at their destination. 
They are not aware that many of their documents (which they paid for, or are indebted 
for) are fraudulent. And regardless of the legal status of their documents (sometimes they 
are legitimate and legal), whatever documents they do have are confiscated and withheld.  
Second, we can see that in many cases of contract slavery, an element of debt 
bondage is intertwined. In the midst of Vi being recruited, transported across the world, 
having her documents confiscated, having the fruits of her labor appropriated, and being 
exploited for sexual services, fraudulent debts were also maintained on her behalf, 
amassing exponential interest, and demanding her attention even after she was freed from 
American Samoa. So why did she continue to pay these debts? Most likely the reason is 
that she left her parents and her daughter back in Vietnam, and since the company who 
recruited her was protected by the government, it is highly possible that if Vi did not 
satisfy her debts then her family would pay the price. 
 Contract slavery, or a contract slavery/debt bondage hybrid, is a prevalent form 
of slavery in the United States. My own first introduction to modern day slavery in my 
own country took place at a workshop in Orlando, Florida in 2008. Anna Rodriguez, the 
founder of the Florida Coalition Against Human Trafficking, explained to attendees that 
numerous slaves are brought into Florida from around the world. Florida’s proximity to 
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Central and South America and the Caribbean islands, and its geographical feature of 
being a peninsula, make it an easy entry point for slave traffickers. Many workers are 
brought into Florida, believing that they have legitimate work lined up. But once they 
arrive, their documents are confiscated, and their “contracts” are ignored. They are told 
that they owe a debt for their transportation. Some of these victims stay in Florida and 
work as domestic laborers in businesses and homes. Ms. Rodriguez told us of a woman 
who worked twenty-hours a day as a domestic house slave for three years, being forced to 
sleep on a concrete slab in the back yard, all the while being eaten alive by the abundant 
Florida insects.  
Many other workers do not stay in Florida, but are brought up through Atlanta, 
Georgia, and accrue a second debt for this leg of transportation. If they are not kept in 
Atlanta, they can be sent anywhere in the country, accruing yet another debt. They are 
placed in restaurants and hotels and salons and massage parlors and homes and numerous 
other placements, being told they must work off their debts. Often times their debts are 
fraudulently maintained, and if they do manage to pay off their debts, they are fired from 
their jobs. They can then be transported elsewhere with the promise of another job, but in 
the process they accrue additional debts. This cycle can continue for long periods of time, 
extracting weeks or months or years of work for no pay. Victims often have language 
barriers and/or a fear of law enforcement officers, which keeps them from seeking help if 
they ever have an opportunity to do so.62 
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D. Forced Labor 
The forth form of slavery is forced labor. This refers specifically to “slavery that 
is practiced not by a person, but by a government or some other ‘official’ group.”63 Some 
governments enslave people who have not been given due process and who have not been 
convicted of a legitimate crime, and then force these people to work in labor camps 
against their will. China’s “laogai” (reform-through-labor) camps are an example of 
forced labor. These camps were created by the Chinese Communist Party and are used to 
produce major consumer goods. Those who work in these camps are mostly from 
minority religious and ethnic groups, and they are paid no wages.64 
One such former prisoner is Sam, who was once a graduate student at Georgia 
State University (in Atlanta, Georgia). He worked as a tax auditor in China for nine years. 
He was arrested and jailed in China for handing a letter to the State Appeal Bureau in 
Beijing to express his opinion about Falun Gong (a Chinese spiritual practice which is 
persecuted). In a testimony he provided, he explained,  
Here I will not mention how the Chinese government persecuted family church 
members, Tibetan monks, and Falun Gong practitioners. I only want to let you 
know how some products from China are made and why they are so cheap. In 
prison I was forced to work on export products such as toys and shopping bags 
without pay…The cell was only about three hundred square feet in size, with 
twenty prisoners and one toilet inside…Now the same kind of tragedy is 
happening to my wife. She was sentenced to forced-labor camp for three years 
without any trial and without a lawyer only because she handed out flyers in the 
street to clarify the truth about Falun Gong…she mentioned that she was forced to 
do embroidery work for export. The hard work, malnutrition, and torture made 
my wife almost lose her eyesight.65 
 
Another former prisoner, Ying, reported that during her time in two different 
Chinese labor camps she was forced to produce large quantities of disposable chopsticks, 
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cosmetic products, knitted sweaters, knitted woolen gloves for European export, 
crocheted cushions and hats, large quantities of slippers, and stuffed animals such as 
rabbits, bears, dolphins, and penguins. She was imprisoned for being a Falun Gong 
practitioner.  
Despite outright denial from the totalitarian North Korean government regime, the 
existence of numerous prison labor camps in North Korea is confirmed by satellite 
imagery and vast human testimony. A combination of starvation, rape, torture, and harsh 
working conditions in these camps make long-term survival difficult.66 A UN Special 
Commission has reported that hundreds of thousands of political prisoners have perished 
in these camps over the past five decades.67 These are just a few examples of forced labor 
that satisfy our definition of slavery in a modern context.  
E. What About Human Trafficking? 
Under the conception of slavery I have put forward thus far, the practice of human 
trafficking, or trafficking in persons, is not itself a separate type of slavery. Furthermore, 
it is not another term that can be used interchangeably with modern slavery. Rather, 
human trafficking is merely a process through which some people come to be enslaved. 
As Bales and Alain state: “…it should be made plain that trafficking is not slavery, but a 
process by which slavery can be achieved.”68 As such, human trafficking refers to the 
movement of people for the purpose of enslaving them. It is a method, or conduit, that 
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brings some people into slavery. At the turn of the new millennium, the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime developed the “Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children” which is 
more commonly referred to as the “Palermo Protocol.”  The Palermo Protocol provides 
the definition of human trafficking, or trafficking in persons, that is most widely used 
today. Article 3(a) reads:  
"Trafficking in persons" shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, 
harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other 
forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or 
of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits 
to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the 
purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation 
of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or 
services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of 
organs;69 
 
This clearly specifies human trafficking as “a crime related to a chain of 
movement of a person into situations of ‘exploitation’, as a result of violence or other 
means.”70 When we recognize human trafficking as an activity specifically involving the 
movement of people, we realize that only about 2.5 million people today are enslaved 
after being trafficked. Rather, the vast majority of today’s slaves are sedentary, meaning 
that they have not been moved. Instead they are enslaved in their own villages, towns, 
territories, and countries.71  
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Although Bales, his collaborators and co-authors, and some other researchers in 
this space72 are very careful to make the point that ‘human trafficking’ and ‘modern 
slavery’ are not merely two different terms with synonymous meanings, others are not so 
careful. There seems to be fairly widespread conflation of these two terms, especially in 
the United States. For example, the US Department of State webpage says, “’Modern 
slavery,’ ‘trafficking in persons,’ and ‘human trafficking’ have been used as umbrella 
terms for the act of recruiting, harboring, transporting, providing, or obtaining a person 
for compelled labor or commercial sex acts through the use of force, fraud, or 
coercion.”73  Furthermore, each year since 2001 the State Department of the United 
States of America has released a Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report.74 On numerous 
occasions, the introductory material of these reports has used the terms ‘human 
trafficking’ and ‘modern slavery’ interchangeably.75 The state department further claims 
that “Human trafficking can include, but does not require, movement.”76  
The conflation of these terms in such a globally influential document, as well as 
the disagreement amongst various parties regarding whether or not trafficking must 
involve movement, serve to confuse the relevant differences between ‘slavery’ and 
‘trafficking’. Consequently we must figure out how to deal with this disagreement. My 
solution is to hold to this distinction between ‘modern slavery’ and ‘human trafficking’, 
and to operate from an understanding that ‘modern slavery’ is the umbrella term that 
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includes all forms of slavery as defined at the outset of this chapter, and to use the term 
‘human trafficking’ as Bales and his co-authors do to refer to the literal movement of 
people for purposes of exploiting them for labor or sex. In my interactions with several 
lawyers working on slavery issues in the international community, they have affirmed 
that this is a helpful and important distinction to make. However, I also recognize that a 
great number of people working in the modern anti-slavery movement do not make this 
distinction, and as I continue to work in this space I must proceed in light of this 
knowledge. In my own work, I preserve this distinction and use ‘modern slavery’ 
broadly, and ‘human trafficking’ more narrowly.  
F. And What About Sex Slavery?  
The forms of slavery mentioned above also do not specifically single out sex 
slavery, or trafficking in persons for the purpose of sexual exploitation, as a separate type 
of slavery. This is not because this type of slavery does not exist. As was previously 
mentioned, sexual slavery constitutes approximately 22 percent of all slavery 
worldwide.77 The reason this type of slavery is not listed as a fifth form of slavery is that 
it usually falls within one of the four established categories. For instance, much sex 
slavery is seen as a form of debt bondage, where victims accrue fraudulent debts which 
they are forced to work off, but are never freed even after “paying back” their debts many 
times over. Or sometimes sex slavery falls within the parameters of contract slavery, 
where women and children are offered supposedly legitimate jobs only to later find out 
that they were tricked and are now powerless to free themselves from forced sexual 
exploitation. Often times an instance of sex slavery might involve both debt bondage and 
contract slavery. Consider the story of Nu, a Thai woman who was enslaved in Japan. In 
																																								 																				
77 “ILO Global Estimate of Forced Labor 2012”; “Trafficking and Slavery Fact Sheet.” 
		 36 
her story you will find classic evidences of contract slavery (e.g. making an agreement 
with an agent to secure legal documents and legitimate work, passport/document 
withholding, changing agreement upon arrival) as well as debt bondage slavery (e.g. 
being told upon arrival that she owed massive debts, having more fraudulent debts 
constantly added, being forced upon threat of injury or death to repay her debts). 
Furthermore, in Nu’s story we see evidences of the three necessary criteria established 
above for something to be classified as ‘slavery’ – violence or its threat, appropriation of 
labor power/economic exploitation, and loss of free will.   
When I reached puberty the son of the family I lived with…raped me several 
times and began sending me out occasionally with clients…I came to Bangkok at 
the age of fifteen…A hairdresser friend suggested that I find a well-paying job 
outside the country that also took care of my food and accommodation…She said 
that if I didn’t know how to go about things, she would introduce me to an agent 
who would help me secure work in Japan…The agent interviewed me…I told him 
that I had no relatives…He asked me to undress…[he] examined my body for 
“damage,” and internally probed me with his bare hands…I was told that I would 
be working as a waitress in a bar earning approximately $200 per month and that I 
was not bound to go out with clients but could if I chose to earn more. Agent’s 
fees and other expenses were to be paid after I received my first wage. From the 
time the agent began working on my travel documents to the time of my departure 
– which was a little over two weeks – I was kept in a small hotel room…I learned 
later that I traveled to Japan on a tourist visa and someone else’s passport affixed 
with my photograph…I was told that I would be escorted from Bangkok airport 
by a Thai family…My “father” kept my passport with him…At Narita airport in 
Japan, my “father” took care of the immigration procedures…we were met by a 
Japanese man with three young Thai women in his charge…We were brought by 
taxi to a karaoke bar…the owner was a Japanese, married to a Thai mama-san 
[Madame]…I was asked to undress and the owner began pressing and massaging 
various parts of my body…the owner even slept with me before hiring me. I 
really felt horrible – like a piece of flesh, being inspected, bought, and sold…As 
soon as the others left, the mama-san told me that I had to pay off a debt of over 
one million yen [$8,000]. My food, rent, and other expenses would be added to 
this amount…Clients paid the mama-san directly for taking the women out during 
the debt repayment period. The mama-san warned me not to try to run away, as 
should would be very tough…I was shocked and realized that the only way for me 
to pay off my debt was to go out with as many clients as possible…Our living 
quarters housed thirty girls between the ages of fourteen and thirty…Most were 
already in prostitution in Thailand before they came to Japan, but like me did not 
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know they would have to go out with clients, pay off a huge debt, and live in total 
confinement…Most of us consumed drugs or gulped down alcohol before leaving 
for work…We often got sadistic and kinky clients…They would beat us before 
intercourse with sticks, belts, or chains till we bled…If girls came back 
traumatized after going out with a sadistic client…they would be beaten…That is 
why we routinely used drugs before sex, because then we didn’t feel the pain that 
much…When debts were paid off, the mama-san returned our passports, and we 
were free to either leave or stay for a month or two and earn something…I 
finished repaying my debt in ten months. I had some money from tips, but not at 
all enough to buy my return ticket. I worked for two months more in the bar…I 
then began to solicit in front of one of the motels…One day I happened to walk 
into a Thai restaurant and found a pamphlet…I rang the number and found myself 
talking to a Japanese nun…She made the necessary arrangements and sent me to 
an NGO in Thailand. I returned with savings of 30,000 baht [$685] after five 
years of struggle. No one in the world can get over sleeping with one man after 
another who does not love you.78  
  
IV. Criticisms and Questions 
One obvious question that merits attention regards the range of estimated numbers 
of modern slaves. One of the primary awareness campaigns leading the charge for the 
abolition of modern slavery, EndIt Movement, claims that an estimated 20 million to 45.8 
million people are trapped in slavery today.79 This is a pretty large range. Why are these 
estimates so inexact? There is a simple answer to this question, which we glossed over 
earlier. Remember that the illegality of modern slavery has not resulted in its 
disappearance, but only in its covertness. Much modern slavery is conducted in the 
shadows, through underground channels, and is hidden from view. Many victims of 
modern slavery are threatened and are terrified of coming forward. As was mentioned in 
the story of Vi above, sometimes victims who speak out against their abusers go missing. 
In reality, these estimates, as horrific as they may seem, are likely very conservative. The 
probability that many are languishing in slavery whom we do not know about and never 
will know about is high. Slaves today are cheap and numerous, which makes them easily 
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disposable.80 When they are no longer profitable, or when they rebel, or when they 
become physically or mentally broken down, they can easily disappear into oblivion.  
Also keep in mind that when we refer to ‘slaves’, we are referring to people who 
satisfy a fairly strict list of criteria. Combining this recognition with the reality of the 
hiddenness of modern slavery should go a long way to alleviate our skepticism and 
increase our understanding regarding the uncertain range of data involved in numbering 
today’s slaves.        
Another pushback that may arise hinges on the fact that in many instances of 
modern slavery, there is at least some element of initial consent on the part of the victim. 
We have already dealt with this criticism in our discussion of debt bondage/bonded labor. 
However, it does not hurt to point out that these same arguments stand for victims of 
other forms of slavery as well. Regardless of the methods used to trick victims, any 
potential consent is irrelevant when duress, force, fraud, coercion, or other illegal means 
are used to obtain that consent or are used once the victims are powerless to resist.  
V. Conclusion 
 More information about and better understanding of modern slavery emerges 
daily. Those who enslave are creative and savvy. But modern abolitionists are tireless. 
They strive to learn and to fight. The battle to make slavery illegal has already been 
fought and won. But the battle to eradicate slavery from the face of the earth is very much 
in process. In due time we will return to this battle in an effort to better understand why it 
is still raging, and to discuss what we are obligated to do about it. But in order to get 
there, we need to lay some groundwork. We will now turn toward laying our first 
foundational brick, which is the concept of distributive justice.  
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CHAPTER 3
 
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
 
I. Introduction 
Thus far I have painted a picture of the present status of modern slavery across the 
globe. Moving forward, my ultimate goal in the rest of this work is to explore the nature 
of the relationships that everyday citizens share with these modern slaves, and to 
establish what, if any, responsibilities such citizens have to act on behalf of modern 
slaves. I wish to address several broad questions, including: “How is modern slavery our 
problem?” and “What are we obligated to do to help modern slaves?” But first, I must 
establish some foundations.   
My strategy for answering these questions is to appeal to two different categories 
of justice – distributive justice (this chapter) and commutative justice (Chapter Four). 
Then I will apply these categories of justice to the issue of modern slavery (Chapter 
Five). John Finnis provides an exemplary framework for such a discussion of distributive 
and commutative justice in chapter seven of his book Natural Law and Natural Rights,1 
and so I will use his concepts as the foundation of these two chapters.  
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II. Life in Communities:  
Practically Reasonable People, The Common Good, and the Narrative Quest 
 
A. Practically Reasonable People 
Before we can fully delve into Finnis’s ideas regarding justice, we must 
understand a crucial concept in his work. This important concept is Finnis’s idea of 
‘practically reasonable’ people. He explains that such people are “consistent; attentive to 
all aspects of human opportunity and flourishing, and aware of their limited 
commensurability; concerned to remedy deficiencies and breakdowns, and aware of their 
roots in the various aspects of human personality and in the economic and other material 
conditions of social interaction.”2  
The idea is that anyone who is a practically reasonable person will accept certain 
responsibilities and commitments. They will care about consistency, both in themselves 
and others. Practically reasonable people will place value on human flourishing, and will 
take steps to encourage flourishing within themselves and others. They will work to fix 
breakdowns and to improve deficient and defective systems. Furthermore, practically 
reasonable people recognize that they should be and are members of communities3 
(however that might be construed), and thus should be concerned with the execution of 
justice within those communities. Practically reasonable people are not islands to 
themselves, but rather they are aware of the deep roots they share with others, including 
their shared economies, material conditions, and social interactions. 
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B. The Common Good  
Another crucial concept in Finnis’s work, and an important foundational building 
block for our discussion of justice, is that of the ‘common good’. Finnis rightly points out 
that justice is relational. He identifies the three elements of the complex concept of 
justice as other-directedness, duty, and equality.4 These three elements, per Finnis, are 
“necessary and sufficient for an assessment to be an assessment of justice.”5 As regards 
“other-directedness,” justice necessarily entails a plurality of individuals, and deals with 
their interactions with one another. It makes no sense to speak of justice in the absence of 
human relationships.6 If one person can demand justice, it is of or from or pertaining to 
another person (or people) that such a demand is made.  
Similarly, the element of “duty” is also relational. It deals with “what is owed…or 
due to another, and correspondingly what that other person has a right to.”7 However, 
justice does not pertain to all dealings or relationships between people, but rather “only 
those relations and dealings which are necessary or appropriate for the avoiding of a 
wrong.”8 There are certain things that must not be done (to people), and justice has the 
duty of upholding these individual rights.  
The third element of justice is “equality,” but this does not necessarily mean 
numerical equality. Proportionality, equilibrium, and balance are better exemplars of this 
idea.9 Feeding a toddler and a grown man “equally” might not mean giving each of them 
three pieces of pizza. Feeding them equally might mean feeding them proportionally, or 
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helping them to each gain equilibrium in regards to their hunger. This might involve 
feeding the toddler one piece and the grown man three pieces of pizza.    
The point here is that ultimately, relational justice is concerned with how 
communities can work together to achieve the common good. Talk of justice necessarily 
involves consideration of communities, relational duties within those communities, and 
the striving for equality amongst members of those communities. According to Finnis, 
“Justice, as a quality of character, is in its general sense always a practical willingness to 
favour and foster the common good of one’s communities, and the theory of justice is, in 
all its parts, the theory of what in outline is required for that common good.”10 
Talk of a ‘common good’ may sound disturbingly utilitarian or Marxist or 
Communist to some. But rest assured that Finnis’s concept of the ‘common good’ is not 
at all utilitarian (i.e. demanding that individuals must be sacrificed at times in order to 
achieve the greatest good for the greatest number).  Neither is it Marxist, at least in the 
sense that it advocates the opposite of depriving individuals of private ownership.11 
Finnis reminds us that “the common good is fundamentally the good of individuals.”12 
The common good values individuals, and it concerns the good of individuals living in 
communities with countless other individuals.  
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C. The Narrative Quest 
 So if it is the case that practically reasonable people recognize their memberships 
in various communities, and they understand the responsibilities these memberships 
entail to favor and foster the common good, a third concept can help to tie these ideas 
together and to give us a coherent picture of the relational nature of justice. In chapter 
fifteen of his book After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre introduces the concept of the 
narrative quest. MacIntyre spends a great deal of time in this chapter explaining that the 
unity of a human life should be viewed as a narrative – a story with a beginning, middle, 
and end.13 I have written elsewhere that when MacIntyre speaks of a unity of life, I 
envision the existence of a consistency throughout a person’s life that results in some 
type of theoretical thread being woven throughout that life, from beginning to end, in a 
way that simply makes sense and is coherent.14 MacIntyre argues that human 
communication is incoherent when abstracted from its place in a narrative, and that 
human action is made intelligible only when situated within a narrative.15 MacIntyre 
states, “It is because we all live out narratives in our lives and because we understand our 
own lives in terms of the narratives that we live out that the form of narrative is 
appropriate for understanding the actions of others. Stories are lived before they are 
told…”16 
And this leads us to the crux of our discussion of living in communities. The view 
of the narrative quest for MacIntyre is not one that involves individuals pursuing their 
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own narrative quests parallel to one another, but rather a view that involves the 
overlapping and intersecting of many narrative quests. He therefore states: 
Someone may discover (or not discover) that he or she is a character in a number 
of narratives at the same time, some of them embedded in others…Each of us 
being a main character in his own drama plays subordinate parts in the dramas of 
others, and each drama constrains the others.17 
 
As a practically reasonable person, not only must I be concerned with living my 
own life in a consistent and coherent manner, but I must also consider when, where, and 
how my narrative story intersects with the narrative stories of others. To the extent that I 
have some control over the unfolding of my own story, I must be mindful of how my own 
actions may affect, both positively and negatively, the stories of others. People are not 
islands, and their actions produce ripple effects that move their own lives and that touch 
and move the lives of those around them. We often don’t know how things will turn out 
because stories are unpredictable, but we can know that in some way we share a future 
with others.18 The way we interact with one other in our communities is a determining 
factor of what kinds of communities we build. The way we live amongst our neighbors 
matters! Again, appealing to MacIntyre,  
We live out our lives, both individually and in our relationships with each other, 
in the light of certain conceptions of a possible shared future, a future in which 
certain possibilities beckon us forward and others repel us, some seem already 
foreclosed and others perhaps inevitable…I can only answer the question ‘What 
am I to do?’ if I can answer the prior question ‘Of what story or stories do I find 
myself a part?’ We enter human society, that is, with one or more imputed 
characters – roles into which we have been drafted – and we have to learn what 
they are in order to be able to understand how others respond to us and how our 
responses to them are apt to be construed.19 
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I cannot determine what I am supposed to do in a given situation without 
considering what role I play in my own story and the stories of those around me. The 
narrative quest is not just the quest of individuals, but of communities of people living 
out their stories and playing roles in the stories of each other. As such we must consider 
one another as we work and play and learn and live in a shared world. And this brings us 
to the importance of ensuring that our shared world is one in which justice is pursued for 
the sake of us all. 
III. Distributive Justice 
A. Introduction to Distributive Justice 
Thus far I have established that practically reasonable people accept certain 
responsibilities and commitments, and among these are specific commitments to foster 
the common good of all people within a shared community. Furthermore, we all live out 
narrative stories, and our stories touch and are touched by the stories of others. How I live 
my life has implications for others, because I am a part of their stories, and they are a part 
of mine. Taking these points into consideration, we can now examine what is needed in 
our communities if they are to be considered just.  
In an effort to show how communities can work toward their common good, 
Finnis distinguishes between two broad classes of problems. In chapter 3, I will discuss 
the first class of problems, which deal with “distributing resources, opportunities, profits 
and advantages, roles and offices, responsibilities, taxes and burdens – in general, the 
common stock and the incidents of communal enterprise, which do not serve the common 
good unless and until they are appropriated to particular individuals.”20 These problems 
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require a theory of distributive justice to help determine how such ‘common stock’ 
resources should be allocated and distributed so as to work toward the common good. 
B. Common Stock and Incidents of Communal Enterprise 
So what exactly are ‘common’ resources? Finnis describes two different sorts of 
‘common’ subject matter. First, a subject-matter is ‘common’ if it is not a part of an 
individual person, or has not been made by anybody. Such resources are available for the 
benefit of anyone or everyone. Examples Finnis gives of these ‘common’ resources 
include: “solar energy and light, the sea, its bed and its contents, land and its contents, 
rivers, air and airspace, the moon…”21 These types of resource are considered common 
stock resources.    
Second, a subject-matter is ‘common’ if it is the result of people working together 
and collaborating to improve their position. This could involve several neighboring tribes 
banding together to ward off an attack from a mutual enemy, or several countries 
working together to survive a famine. In such instances, multiple parties must collaborate 
in order to decide what to do, how to do it, how to fund the joint enterprise, and other 
numerous relevant details.22 Furthermore, often times such collaboration yields tangible 
products, such as “a city wall and stock of weapons; a sea wall or dyke; a drainage 
system and hospitals; a harvest in communal granaries, etc.”23  Finnis refers to these 
types of collaborative effort as incidents of communal enterprise, and the tangible 
products they yield can also be considered a type of common stock.  
Natural resources and products that compose the common stock, as well as 
collaborative efforts that result in incidents of communal enterprise, are essentially 
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‘common’. Yet they provide no benefit to anyone if they are not appropriated by or 
allocated to specific individuals or groups.24 A plot of fertile soil is of no benefit to 
anyone if it just lies fallow because no one has been granted the right to plant in it. A 
joint famine relief plan is futile if the fruits of the enterprise are not distributed to 
individuals who need them. And this leads us to the problem of distributive justice: “to 
whom and on what conditions to make this necessary appropriation.”25 Who gets what 
when it comes time to divvy up the elements of the common stock and the results of 
communal enterprises?    
IV. What Do We Owe to Others? [What is a Just Distribution?] 
To ask whether a society is just is to ask how it distributes the things we 
prize – income and wealth, duties and rights, powers and opportunities, 
offices and honors. A just society distributes these goods in the right way;  
it gives each person his or her due. The hard questions begin when we ask 
what people are due, and why. 
 
- Michael J. Sandel, Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do? 
 
A. Introductory Remarks 
In the above quote, Harvard professor and political philosopher Michael J. Sandel 
articulates the difficult task ahead when it comes to deciding how we should divide up 
what is owed to different people. What method(s) should we use to determine who should 
get what and why? How one answers this question is largely dependent on which 
theoretical framework one adopts. Is it most important to consider the general welfare of 
groups or societies? Or should we give priority to rights, freedom, and autonomy? Should 
fairness be our chief consideration, and if so how do we figure out which arrangement(s) 
are most fair? Should our actions be primarily guided by needs? And to what extent is 
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justice bound up with ideas of virtue, values, and the good life?26 I will consider many of 
these options, and ultimately I will conclude that while several of these theories provide 
helpful components, the view that combines some element of needs with virtues and 
values is most helpful, and this is the kind of view that Finnis himself endorses.  
B. Appeals to Welfare (Utilitarianism)  
 One philosophical camp advocates that when determining how to distribute 
goods, services, experiences, et cetera, the main consideration should be the welfare of 
the aggregate group. This utilitarian camp argues that the most just arrangement is that 
which produces the greatest amount of utility. This ideology was first articulated in the 
mid-eighteenth century by Jeremy Bentham, who believed that “the highest principle of 
morality is to maximize happiness, the overall balance of pleasure over pain.”27 The 
principle of utility, according to Bentham, rests on doing whatever produces pleasure or 
happiness and avoiding whatever results in pain or suffering.28 So on the utilitarian view, 
the arrangement that produces the most just distribution is that which results in the 
greatest utility, which is further defined as that which produces the greatest overall 
amount of happiness/pleasure and avoids the greatest amount of pain. According to 
Bentham, “Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, 
pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to 
determine what we shall do.”29     
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 Sandel points out that one obvious weakness of Bentham’s version of 
utilitarianism is that it seems to discount individual rights. Utilitarianism is very willing 
to sacrifice the happiness of a few in order to attain greater happiness or satisfaction for a 
greater number. Individual preferences and needs are considered, but if an individual’s 
preferences or needs conflict with the overall utility or happiness of the larger group, they 
are discounted. As Sandel remarks, “…this means that the utilitarian logic, if consistently 
applied, could sanction ways of treating persons that violate what we think of as 
fundamental norms of decency and respect…” 30 He gives as one example the ancient 
Roman practice of throwing Christians to the lions in the Coliseum. Sandel questions 
whether such a practice could be condemned if enough Romans derived enough pleasure 
from the violent spectacle.31  
 Another weakness of Bentham’s utilitarianism is that it presumes that one can 
measure all values on a single currency of value. But it is not clear that this is possible. 
Many would argue that values cannot be compared in a cost-benefit analysis, which 
attempts to translate all costs and benefits into monetary terms in order to compare 
them.32 It seems difficult at best, and unequivocally wrong at worst, to put a price on 
people’s lives and experiences. 
 The nineteenth century thinker John Stuart Mill set out to answer these criticisms 
and to rescue utilitarianism from its seeming inhumanity.  In his book On Liberty, Mill 
defends individual freedom by claiming that “people should be free to do whatever they 
want, provided they do no harm to others.”33 He believes that this claim can still rest on 
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the utilitarian calculus because he is concerned with maximizing utility in the long term, 
and he believes that preserving individual liberty will lead to the greatest happiness over 
time.34 But Sandel points out that this “leaves rights hostage to contingency,” because it 
is always possible that a society could arise which could achieve “long-term happiness by 
despotic means.” If such a situation arose, Mill would not have grounds to condemn such 
a society from a strictly utilitarian framework.35 
Furthermore, the utilitarian framework does not have a basis to condemn the 
violation of a person’s rights based on that person’s individual standing as a human 
being. Violations of rights can only be condemned if they have negative effects on the 
general welfare,36 so it seems as if Mill hasn’t actually rescued utilitarianism from its 
heartlessness, or afforded individuals intrinsic worth.  Mill attempts to avert this 
conclusion by also arguing that an individual’s character matters, and that exhibiting 
good moral character is desirable. But again, nobleness of character seems to be 
important because of its positive effects on the general welfare. Mill states the following:  
…and if it may possibly be doubted whether a noble character is always the 
happier for its nobleness, there can be no doubt that it makes other people happier, 
and that the world in general is immensely a gainer by it. Utilitarianism, therefore, 
could only attain its end by the general cultivation of nobleness of character, even 
if each individual were only benefited by the nobleness of others, and his own, so 
far as happiness in concerned, were a sheer deduction from the benefit.37 
 
So it seems that noble moral character either needs to be desirable and valuable in 
and of itself, which precludes it from being a utilitarian tenet, or it is only a tool to be 
used in the pursuit of the general welfare. But if this is the case, character is subject to 
contingency just as individual rights are. 
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In response to the criticism against utilitarianism that it attempts to measure and 
compare values in a cost-benefit analysis, and this is not possible, Mill outright denies 
this impossibility. He argues that not all pleasures are equal, and that some kinds of 
pleasures are more valuable than others. He states, “It is quite compatible with the 
principle of utility to recognize the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable 
and more valuable than others.”38 But it seems as if the valuing of some pleasures over 
others is not at all compatible with the principle of utility. It is incompatible to claim that 
“…pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends…all desirable 
things…are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means to the 
promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain,”39 and yet to also place a higher value 
on some kinds of pleasure over others. At the point that such distinctions are made 
between so-called higher and lower pleasures, one is making value judgments that do not 
rest on a theory of pure utility. If one is to be a consistent utilitarian, Bentham’s 
observation that a child’s game is as good as poetry40 is the most consistent stance to 
take.  
Determining what we owe to others, or what a just distribution of goods and 
services would be from a utilitarian perspective, leaves us with little option for preserving 
individual liberty and freedom. To be consistently utilitarian, decisions of distribution 
must be based purely on the general welfare, and on what will bring about the greatest 
general happiness for the greatest number. Our twenty-first century conception of 
intrinsic, undisputed human rights (such as those identified in the United Nations 
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Declaration of Human Rights41) cannot stand under the utilitarian calculus. Therefore, if 
appeals to freedom and rights are important, perhaps the next several theoretical 
approaches will seem more attractive. 
C. Appeals to Freedom and Rights  
 1. Kant’s categorical imperative. Immanuel Kant believed very strongly that 
people should not be seen as mere means to an end. In his work Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals he set out to establish quite the antitheses of the utilitarian 
calculation. Whereas utilitarians view individuals as means to the end of the greatest 
overall happiness, Kant argues that people are not means to an end, but on the contrary 
individuals are ends in themselves.42 As such, individuals have inherent value that 
supersedes their utility. Furthermore, all of these individuals who are “ends in 
themselves” make up a “kingdom of ends,”43 a community of people with value and 
dignity who are afforded consideration and respect not based on their utility, but based on 
their rationality.44 Kant believes that humanity, because of its capacity for morality, “does 
not merely have a relative worth, i.e. a price, but an inner worth, i.e. dignity.”45  
Even in this extremely brief appeal to Kant, we can see how subsequent thinkers 
are given a foundation to build an idea of individual rights and human dignity. Individual 
persons are more than mere tools to be used and disregarded if/when such disregard 
might serve the ‘greater good’. Individual persons are ends in themselves, and they 
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constitute communities of individuals who become kingdoms filled with people who are 
ends in themselves. 
2. Libertarianism (laissez-faire camp). Whereas utilitarians might favor 
redistribution on the grounds of maximizing utility or happiness, libertarians argue that 
taking from some and giving to others, even for good cause, is coercive. Libertarians 
believe that such redistribution violates individual rights that people should have “to do 
with their money whatever they please.”46   Attempting to force equality actually 
conflicts with liberty. The central libertarian claim “is that each of us has a fundamental 
right to liberty – the right to do whatever we want with the things we own, provided we 
respect other people’s rights to do the same.”47 
 Economists Milton and Rose Friedman point out that when we talk about 
‘equality’, we must specify precisely what we mean. They indicate that at the inception of 
the United States of America, “equality meant equality before God; liberty meant the 
liberty to shape one’s own life.”48 Following the civil war, the conception of equality 
shifted to mean “equality of opportunity,” meaning that people should not be prevented 
“by arbitrary obstacles” from using their own gifts and talents to pursue their own ends.49 
Under both of these conceptions, equality and liberty are compatible with one another. 
All people possess equal standing under God as precious individuals with unalienable 
rights. No one is arbitrarily kept from being given equal opportunities to succeed because 
of birth, nationality, race, religion, or any other characteristic apart form ability.50 People 
are seen as autonomous beings, capable of determining their own life paths. They are not 
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mere instruments to promote the purposes of others,51 but rather they are ends in 
themselves. 
 The Friedmans point out that in our modern era, a very different meaning of 
equality has emerged. When some people speak of equality now, they mean “equality of 
outcome.”52 This concept does not argue that everyone should be identical, but it does 
argue that fairness is the goal, and carries the mantra “Fair shares for all.”53 The 
Friedmans argue that this type of mindset reduces liberty because it inevitably requires 
taking from some who have more than their “fair” share and redistributing those shares to 
those who have less. Furthermore, they argue that there is no objective standard for 
determining what precisely is “fair,” and therefore there is no good way to determine 
when some might have too much and others not enough. Who decides such matters, and 
how should they be decided?54 Philosopher Robert Nozick, a staunch libertarian, echoes 
this concern when he states, “There is no central distribution, no person or group entitled 
to control all the resources, jointly deciding how they are to be doled out.”55 
 Nozick’s view, which is labeled “entitlement theory,” states that there are only 
three ways that money/objects/property/possessions/etcetera can come to be justly held. 
First, something can come to be justly held through original acquisition, meaning that the 
holder is the first to possess something that was previously unpossessed or unheld. 
Nozick calls this the “principle of justice in acquisition.”56 Second, a person who justly 
holds something is free to transfer that possession to another. This usually happens 
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through voluntary exchange, or through the giving of gifts, and is called “the principle of 
justice in transfer.”57 Third, nothing can be justly held (i.e. no one is entitled to a holding) 
except through repeated applications of these first two principles of justice in acquisition 
and justice in transfer.58 
 Nozick is extremely critical of what he refers to as patterned principles of 
distribution. A patterned principle of distribution is expressed in any system that singles 
out a natural characteristic and advocates for distributing based on that factor. So some 
might argue that distributive shares should be allocated based on merit, or I.Q., or effort, 
or need. But Nozick believes that redistribution according to certain patterns, whatever 
they may be, is unjust. If we take from people things which they hold justly either 
through acquisition or transfer, we are stealing from people who have done no wrong. He 
states the following:  
Whoever makes something, having bought or contracted for all other held 
resources used in the process (transferring some of his holdings for these 
cooperating factors), is entitled to it. The situation is not one of something’s 
getting made, and there being an open question of who is to get it. Things come 
into the world already attached to people having entitlements over them.59  
 
One potential problem for Nozick, which he acknowledges but then does not 
adequately answer, deals with the historical aspect of justice in holdings (comprised of 
justice in acquisition and justice in transfer). He admits that not all situations are 
generated according to these principles, and therefore the resulting holdings are not justly 
held. Nozick states, “Some people steal from others, or defraud them, or enslave them, 
seizing their product and preventing them from living as they choose, or forcibly exclude 
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others from competing in exchanges.”60 To be fair, Nozick does believe that in some 
instances rectification should be made for past injustices. However, he does not attempt 
to determine when such rectification should take place, or what such rectification should 
entail.61  
It is common knowledge to many Americans that the land we now call ours was 
once not ours at all, but belonged to numerous tribes of Native Americans. We were not 
the original acquirers of the land, nor did we pay these tribes through fair contracts and 
agreements in order to acquire the land through just transfers. When Nozick points out 
that justice in holdings is historical, he also points out that whether or not something is 
justly held “depends upon what actually has happened.”62  
It is not as if each of us comes into the world today devoid of attachments. Rather 
we come into the world as members of already established groups who live in certain 
places under certain types of government or rule. We are benefited by or harmed by the 
actions and decisions, acquisitions and transfers of those before us. It is not so easy to 
say, “I am entitled to this land,” or “I am entitled to this fortune” because, if we trace 
back the justice of those acquisitions and transfers, I wager that many of us would not be 
excited with the results we would find. MacIntyre gets at this idea when he states:      
But it is not just that different individuals live in different social circumstances; it 
is also that we all approach our own circumstances as bearers of a particular social 
identity….Hence what is good for me has to be the good for one who inhabits 
these roles. As such, I inherit from the past of my family, my city, my tribe, my 
nation, a variety of debts, inheritances, rightful expectations and obligations. 
These constitute the given of my life, my moral starting point.63 
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Furthermore, we can appeal here to Finnis’s view of common stock resources and 
products. Finnis points out that original acquisition of common stock resources – things 
that do not really belong to anyone, but are not useful unless and until they are allocated 
to individuals – are ultimately meant to benefit the common good of the community. 
Acquisitions are made, and private holdings are encouraged, not for the purpose of 
hoarding for oneself, but for the purpose of increasing value and productivity for the 
benefit of the common good of the members of one’s community.64  
MacIntyre and Finnis are examples of those who would challenge the libertarian 
notion that we can do whatever we want with the money (and other possessions) we have. 
After all, perhaps we do not have tight-fisted entitlements to nearly as many things as we 
would like to think. If much of what I have either isn’t rightly mine, or was allotted to me 
with the purpose of my using it to benefit both myself and others, then perhaps the 
libertarian calculation falls short of what would be required by distributive justice.  
 3. Egalitarianism (fairness camp). Another group of thinkers, known as 
egalitarians, would agree with libertarians that we should not necessarily be striving for 
equality. However, the conclusions of these two groups are drastically different. Whereas 
libertarians advocate for unencumbered liberty (which they argue requires minimal 
government and the belief that most motivations and methods of redistributing resources 
are tantamount to theft65), egalitarians are concerned with what a fair distribution of 
resources and goods should entail. Egalitarians might argue that libertarians spend so 
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much time worrying about property rights that they neglect numerous other human 
rights66 that should be afforded consideration.  
 But how might we go about determining what a fair distribution of goods and 
resources might be? Twentieth century philosopher John Rawls developed a now famous 
thought experiment in his book A Theory of Justice (1971).  In this book he points out 
that attempting to come up with a fair distribution of goods is not possible if people come 
to the table with different advantages and bargaining positions.67 Therefore, he theorizes 
that in order to come up with a truly fair and unbiased system, the principles that would 
govern such a society would have to be “chosen behind a veil of ignorance” in which “no 
one knows his place in society.”68 Rawls refers to this as the “original position of 
equality.”69 The idea is that if a group of people determined the principles of their society 
not knowing if they would be high-ranking officials or garbage collectors in that society, 
they would arrive at principles that would be advantageous to themselves regardless of 
their actual position in that society. Rawls states, “Since all are similarly situated and no 
one is able to design principles to favor his particular condition, the principles of justice 
are the result of a fair agreement or bargain.”70  
Sandel points out that in such an experiment it is clear that rational, self-interested 
persons would not choose utilitarianism. For behind the veil of ignorance, they would not 
know if they would end up being a part of the happy majority or an oppressed minority.71 
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Furthermore, they would not choose laissez-faire libertarian principles either, for they 
might end up being wealthy with many entitlements, but they might end up being 
homeless and destitute with no hope for relief.72 Instead, Rawls identifies two principles 
he believes individuals in the original position would choose:  
[T]he first requires equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties, while the 
second holds that social and economic inequalities, for example inequalities of 
wealth and authority, are just only if they result in compensating benefits for 
everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members of society.73 
 
The first principle provides equal basic liberties for all citizens.74 This is 
somewhat equivalent to the idea of equality under God, or the equality of dignity and 
value that Kant believes all rational persons should be afforded. The second principle 
deals with social and economic equality.75 But this principle does not advocate for 
equality of outcome. Rawls’s conception of equality is undoubtedly one of equality of 
opportunity. He believes that privileged positions and offices should be available to all. 
In support of this idea he states, “While the distribution of wealth and income need not be 
equal, it must be to everyone’s advantage, and at the same time, positions of authority 
and offices of command must be accessible to all.”76  
Of course, it is a reality that people experience different levels of privilege and 
want, of talents and abilities.77 If one person is born into a wealthy family and given the 
best possible education, while another person is born into poverty and struggles to read, it 
is very unlikely that they will have equal opportunity to apply for the same jobs or run for 
the same privileged offices. Therefore, if individuals are to be afforded true equality of 
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opportunity, inequalities must be compensated for.78 Now it may be the case that one 
person’s natural advantages can be put to good use for the betterment of the least 
advantage in the society. When this is the case, those inequalities are deemed 
acceptable.79 But it may also be the case that sometimes, in order to preserve true equality 
of opportunity, “society must give more attention to those with fewer native assets and to 
those born into the less favorable social positions.”80 To help walk the tension between 
these two possibilities (i.e. the privileged maintaining their advantages in order to benefit 
the least well-off, versus the underprivileged receiving a greater share of assets in order 
to offset their disadvantages), Rawls develops a principle he calls “the difference 
principle.”81 This principle encourages the gifted and talented “to develop and exercise 
their talents, but with the understanding that the rewards these talents reap in the market 
belong to the community as a whole.”82 Of course, this is an argument for the necessity of 
redistribution in some instances.      
 If it is the case that the advantaged in a society should use what they have to 
benefit those who have little, then perhaps a fairly radical redistribution of goods and 
services is what distributive justice requires. In recent years, numerous modern ethicists 
have advocated for just such a radical redistribution of wealth in order to combat abject 
poverty. But many of these philosophers and ethicists, while they do care about rights and 
liberty and fairness, also care about something else – needs.    
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D. Appeals to Need 
Philosopher Sarah Clark (S.C.) Miller points out, “In the contemporary theoretical 
terrain, preferences, interests, desires, and especially rights have preempted needs.”83 In 
2008 the World Bank set the international poverty line at $1.25 per day. In 2009 at least 
1.4 billion people lived in extreme poverty, below this meager line. In the poorest 
countries, one in five children dies before the age of five (contrasted with fewer than one 
in a hundred deaths in rich countries).84 These are just two examples meant to illustrate 
the vast needs caused by global poverty. If need is truly a primary criterion for 
distributive justice, it seems as if there are plenty of people who warrant our attention and 
consideration. 
Before proceeding further, it will be beneficial to establish what we mean when 
we refer to needs. S.C. Miller explains that not all needs have moral significance. For 
instance, a proper cake needs sugar. But this need for sugar is not morally significant or 
normative. And no one is obligated to provide sugar for the cake. (It will just be a lousy 
cake sans sugar, which in the scheme of things is no big deal). But not all needs are like 
this. Some needs are vitally important, and if they are not met, serious harm will befall 
those who experience this failure.  S.C. Miller calls these morally significant needs 
fundamental needs.85 
…it is both important and necessary for fundamental needs to be met, because if 
they are not met, agency is compromised and serious harm ensues. Fundamental 
needs carry with them a feeling of urgency, which contributes to the sense that 
they must be met…  
At the core of compromised agency is, of course, the notion of agency 
itself. I understand agency as the ability to achieve some manner of results in the 
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world, to affect change in accordance with one’s volition, and to maintain the 
ability to carry out projects (often self-determined) in a surrounding 
environment.86 
 
Failure to meet fundamental needs compromises rational autonomy, and it also 
results in emotional and relational impediments. Agents have emotions, and consequently 
agency also involves a caring component. Furthermore, human agents are finite. The 
existence of fundamental needs highlights two consequences of our finitude: vulnerability 
and dependency.87 As agents who are fragile and subject to physical, emotional, and 
psychological harms, we cannot deny the fact that “others must [sometimes] meet our 
fundamental needs and aid us in evading harm. In this sense, our fundamental needs leave 
us profoundly dependent on other people…sometimes they must support us by 
developing, maintaining, or restoring our agency.”88 
Before proceeding, I should at least mention S.C. Miller’s list of fundamental 
needs. She includes eleven fundamental needs in two loose categories: (a) needs relating 
to physical necessity, and (b) needs of psychological and/or social necessity. These are 
universal needs, meaning that all humans experience them throughout their lives,89 and 
these needs must be met in order to “cultivate, maintain, or restore agency.”90 The eleven 
fundamental needs include (1) nutrition and water, (2) rest, (3) shelter (including 
clothing), (4) healthy environment (hygienic, non-toxic, etc.), (5) bodily integrity 
(freedom from physical and sexual abuse, freedom to control matters affecting their 
bodies, etc.), (6) healing (access to some medical attention), (7) education,  
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(8) attachments (positive emotional attachments), (9) social inclusion, participation, and 
recognition, (10) play (pleasurable recreational experiences which foster humor and 
creativity), and (11) security (freedom from coercive, threatening environments).91   
  But if it is the case that certain needs – fundamental needs – require a moral 
response, why is this the case? We undoubtedly do have some intuitions that “others’ 
needs affect what we ought, morally, to do.”92 More specifically, S.C. Miller asserts: 
“Some needs have undeniable normative force. The hunger of the starving stranger, the 
homelessness of the refugee, and the loneliness of the widower call for a response from 
those who encounter them.”93 But it isn’t enough to merely assert that such needs have 
normative force – we need to give a reason why we are morally obligated to act in order 
to help meet the fundamental needs of others.94 Furthermore, if a genuine obligation to 
help the needy exists, how many people must I care for? How much must I give of myself 
and my resources, and for how long?95  
In order to provide a justification for the belief that fundamental needs require a 
response, S.C. Miller develops an idea she calls “the duty to care,” in which she argues 
that “certain needs require a moral response of care.”96 She further explains that if 
someone has a need, the required response is that someone else give care. This is an 
interactive process, and although it involves two people (the “caregiver” and the “care 
receiver”), the perspective of the one needing care is privileged.97 She develops the duty 
to care by meshing feminist care ethics with Kant’s idea of beneficence. S.C. Miller 
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believes that “the Kantian duty of beneficence provides the foundation for the duty to 
care, one that explains why we are obligated to respond to certain needs found in 
others.”98  
In The Doctrine of Virtue,99 Kant contrasts the duty of benevolence (which is 
simply wishing others well, and costs us nothing), with the duty of beneficence, which 
requires that those who have the means to respond to the real needs of others (such as 
S.C. Miller’s fundamental needs) are required to do so.100 But again, why is this the case? 
In short, Kant’s justification goes back to his categorical imperative in its first 
formulation: “act only according to that maxim through which you can at the same time 
will that it become a universal law.”101  
Kant points out that rational beings cannot help but to hope for their own 
continued existence and wellbeing. But rational beings also must admit their own 
finitude. Finite rational beings, then, recognize that their own existence requires the help 
of others throughout their lives. In a society of finite people who are interdependent upon 
one another, it is necessary then for a principle of beneficence to become a universal 
maxim, obligating me to help others who are in need, and obligating others to help me 
when I am in need. My continued agency requires that my fundamental needs are met, 
and this requires that if I find myself in need the possibility that others will respond to my 
need beneficently must remain open.102 S.C. Miller explains why this is the case:  
It is in light of this finitude and interdependence, and because rational beings, as 
rational, will their own continued existence, that finite rational beings must help 
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one another in cases of need as they practice the duty to care…[A] principle of 
non-beneficence or mutual indifference – that one never helps another in need and 
therefore never receives the help of others when in need – could, without 
inconsistency, serve as a universal law…Finite rational beings, however, cannot 
will that this be so, as doing so would destroy the conditions of willing their own 
continued existence. As finite, they will necessarily experience needs that they 
cannot themselves meet and will then require the help of others. Under a universal 
principle of non-beneficence, such help would not be available to them…In 
willing that this maxim become a universal law of nature, the will of such a man 
would contradict itself because situations will inevitably arise in which the man of 
mutual indifference must call for others’ help to meet his own needs. He is 
inevitably dependent on others…It is not enough that individuals not interfere in 
one another’s lives. Well-being for finite rational beings can only come about in a 
world involving beneficence.103           
 
Lest some criticize Kant here for turning the duty to care into a selfish agreement 
to help others only for the benefit you will yourself eventually reap, Kant does not 
believe that beneficence is the result of such a cool calculation. He merely points out that 
“the possibilities of requiring aid and of experiencing need are inescapable for finite 
rational beings.”104 Furthermore, his position is one of humility in admitting the 
interconnectedness and dependence of finite rational agents. The duty to care naturally 
arises out of this state of weak, dependent commonality, and anyone who believes he or 
she is above this reality is simply arrogant.105 In Miller’s words, “Obligations arise in the 
face of human imperfection…One feature of the human condition that Kant cannot ignore 
is dependency, represented most clearly by the persistent and vast nature of human need, 
and the resultant requirement of care.”106  
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This interdependence of finite rational agents “reveals the relational normativity 
that connects finite human beings in a common moral community.”107  Here we can refer 
back to MacIntyre’s belief that the narrative quests of a community full of people interact 
with one another. I must be concerned not only with my own story, but with the part I 
play in the stories of many others. Many of our narratives are “embedded in [the 
narratives of] others” and “each drama constrains the others.”108 I believe MacIntrye 
would agree with S.C. Miller and Kant. Because people are dependent upon one another, 
living in humble community requires caring for the needs of those whose narrative quests 
intersect with our own, and accepting care when we find ourselves in need of help.  
If we do have a genuine duty of care, what should this practically entail? A more 
detailed discussion on this matter will be included in Chapter Six, but I will mention a 
few words here. For her part, S.C. Miller advocates that the duty to care is a “wide duty,” 
allowing for variety in the caring responses of moral agents who assume the caregiver 
role. The general duty of care involves responding to the fundamental needs of others, 
but it does not prescribe specific ways in which agents are to respond in order to fulfill 
their obligations.109 The one criterion of acceptable response that S.C. Miller imposes 
requires that caregivers meet the fundamental needs of others in ways that preserve the 
dignity and agency of those in need.110  Aside from that, there is much freedom in how 
caregivers administer care to those who are in need.  
While S.C. Miller does not give a definitive response to the questions regarding 
how much care an agent should be obligated to provide and for how long, others have 
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made more rigorous attempts to do so. One such moral philosopher, Peter Singer, argues 
for an extremely comprehensive and demanding response to the vast needs in the world.  
In his seminal 1971 paper Famine, Affluence, and Morality,111 Singer uses the 
East Bengali crisis (in which East Bengali people were dying from a lack of food, water, 
and medical care while much of the developed world gave little or no aid) as the 
backdrop for his argument that something has gone horribly wrong in the way affluent 
global citizens go about their lives with little or no thought of or action toward alleviating 
gross socioeconomic injustices around the globe. Singer argues that the way in which 
people in relatively affluent countries act (or rather fail to act) is inexcusable. 
Consequently, he claims that our “moral conceptual scheme” needs to be altered, along 
with “the way of life that has come to be taken for granted in our society.”112 
In order to accomplish this shift in the moral conceptual scheme of his readers, 
Singer states that he will lay out several assumptions that he believes will be easily (and 
virtually universally) accepted. He will then argue that if his assumptions are accepted 
(which he believes they will be), then his conclusion must be accepted as well. His first 
assumption is that “the suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care 
are bad.”113 He claims that this assumption is by-and-large universally unquestioned.  
Singer’s second assumption is that “if it is in our power to prevent something bad 
from happening without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, 
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we ought, morally, to do it.”114 Singer argues that this is also relatively uncontroversial, 
and does not ask much of people. It carries a negative requirement to prevent what is bad, 
but no positive requirement to do what is good; also the negative requirement only stands 
when it can be accomplished without the sacrifice of something else that is equally 
morally important. Singer offers his classic example of a child drowning in a shallow 
pond. If I can save the child and the only cost to me is that my clothes will get muddy, 
this is not a morally significant consequence, and thus I am obligated to save the child.115 
This sets up a very weak version of Singer’s argument, because what is required 
does not involve any great amount of sacrifice. Elsewhere, however, Singer argues more 
strongly that because we know that many people will not contribute their fair share 
toward meeting the basic needs of others, those of us who can do more should do 
more.116 Not only should we give to others in need when it will not require us sacrificing 
anything morally significant, but we should give to others in need “as much as possible, 
that is, at least up to the point at which by giving more one would begin to cause serious 
suffering for oneself and one’s dependents…”117  
Because our traditional moral categories are now upset, we must reevaluate the 
traditional distinction between duty and charity.118 When giving to alleviate the suffering 
of others is viewed as charity, there is no condemnation for those who do not give, and 
often times praise is offered for those who do give. But when giving to alleviate suffering 
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is considered to be a duty, there is condemnation for those who do not give, and giving is 
no longer praiseworthy but rather is expected. Giving is no longer supererogatory.119  
So what should we give then? How much aid are we required to give to those who 
experience real, fundamental needs? Elsewhere Singer argues that everything we make 
above and beyond what we need for our own bare necessities should be given away. In a 
1999 New York Times article, Singer argues that an American household should give 
away all of their income over $30,000.120 Of course we can adjust this number for 
inflation, but this still leaves us with a massive amount of money that needs 
redistribution. As Singer states:  
I can see no escape from the conclusion that each one of us with wealth surplus to 
his or her essential needs should be giving most of it to help people suffering from 
poverty so dire as to be life-threatening. That’s right: I’m saying that you 
shouldn’t buy that new car, take that cruise, redecorate the house or get that pricey 
new suit…the formula is simple: whatever money you’re spending on luxuries not 
necessities, should be given away.121 
 
When some have the ability to provide care for the fundamental needs of others who 
desperately need care, those with this ability are obligated to give (according to Singer) 
until they have given all of the surplus that is not necessary to their our own fundamental 
needs. We can clearly see on such a view how need is the primary criterion given 
consideration when questions of distributive justice arise. All other considerations are 
deemed trivial in the face of unmet fundamental needs, and those with the ability to 
alleviate such needs are required to do so, often at considerable cost to themselves. 
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 While I tend to agree more with S.C. Miller in that the duty to care and to meet 
the fundamental needs of others is wide, leaving multiple actions and responses open for 
potential caregivers, I do believe that Singer’s view is at least beneficial in that it 
encourages us to really examine our own lives and the luxuries many of us enjoy. While I 
do not believe we can so easily place a dollar amount on how much some should be 
required to give to others, the posture of giving to meet fundamental needs that Singer 
encourages is, I believe, a beneficial one to consider. Perhaps it should become more 
natural for us to question our so-called entitlements and to consider the needs of others 
more than we currently do, even if our responses to these needs are varied and diverse. 
And again, we will cover some potential practical responses in Chapter Six. 
E. Appeals to Virtue 
 Thus far I have discussed several views of distributive justice: appeals to welfare 
(i.e. utility), appeals to rights (i.e. freedom, liberty, and fairness), and appeals to needs. A 
fourth option proposes that distributive justice primarily involves “cultivating virtue and 
reasoning about the common good.”122 Historically, this idea comes from Aristotle, who 
believed that the telos (the purpose, end, or essential value) of a practice was essential in 
determining its justice. Furthermore, Aristotle believed that debates about justice were 
much more than debates about right and wrong – they were debates about “honor, virtue, 
and the nature of the good life.” 123  
To determine how a good should be distributed, we must first determine the 
purpose of that good. A person who will use a good most excellently for its intended 
purpose should be allotted that good. This points to the main criterion of just distribution 
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being that of desert or merit.124 But on Aristotle’s conception desert or merit is based on 
excellence of character, not on wealth or birth or numerous other factors.125 Those who 
are deserving of honors and rewards are those who have worked toward promoting a 
good quality of life for those in their community. Aristotle states:  
True justice means that those who have contributed to the end of the city should 
have privileges in proportion to their contribution to that end. The end of the city 
is not mere life, nor an alliance for mutual defense; it is the common promotion of 
a good quality of life…the operative aim is always the promotion of a good 
quality of life. Those who contribute most to the realization of that aim should in 
justice have the largest share of office and honour.126      
 
Aristotle goes on to argue that the end (telos) of the city (or for our purposes we 
could talk about the end of the communities for which we are a part) is not only to 
provide an alliance for defense or a means for commercial exchange. Rather, the end of 
the city should concern itself with ensuring a good quality of character among the 
members of that society. It should not be enough for the city to ensure mere life, but 
rather its aim should be a good quality of life for all of its inhabitants.127 Aristotle’s view 
proposes shortcomings in the other views presented in this chapter, for as Sandel 
summarizes Aristote:    
…political community isn’t only about protecting property or promoting 
economic prosperity…political community isn’t only about giving the majority its 
way…the highest end of political association…for Aristotle is to cultivate the 
virtue of citizens…It’s about learning how to live a good life.128 
 
 This should remind us of Finnis’s view of the ‘common good’. Remember that on 
Finnis’s view the ‘common good’ still places high value on the good of individuals, but 
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also stresses the importance of individuals working together in community. Finnis’s 
concept of the ‘common good’ is built on Aristotle’s notion of the good life. But how can 
individuals achieve the good life? In Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle explains that we can 
cultivate virtue through practice.129 We deliberate with others regarding right and wrong, 
good and evil, justice and injustice, and over time we become habituated toward the right 
things.130 It does take practice to know when to do the right thing “to the right person, to 
the right extent, at the right time, with the right motive, and in the right way.”131  
 Aristotle’s appeal to virtue does not prescribe for us precisely what to do in 
certain situations. It does not tell us how to go about actually distributing resources. But it 
does assure us that when we cultivate good habits, these habits develop into good 
character. Good character results in civic virtue. Those who possess such virtue are able 
to deliberate using practical wisdom132 – a type of wisdom that enables those who possess 
it to make decisions about particular situations in a manner that benefits humanity. As we 
engage in life together we practice what it means to be citizens imbued with character, 
legislating for the good of those around us.133  
F. Toward A Theoretical Resolution  
1. John Finnis’s view of distributive justice. And this brings us ultimately back 
to John Finnis. In Section II, I laid the foundation for our discussion of distributive justice 
by explaining Finnis’s belief that practically reasonable people recognize that they are 
and should be participants in various communities, and also that justice requires such 
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people to seek after the common good of those in their communities. In Section III, I 
articulated that one of Finnis’s main concerns regarding distributive justice deals with 
how to divide up the elements of the common stock and the results of communal 
enterprises. Finnis does not at all advocate for a Marxist system in which private 
ownership is denied. Rather, he feels strongly that objects of common stock and 
communal enterprise should be allocated and distributed to individuals, because doing so 
ultimately increases the common good. He also believes that, to some extent, private 
individuals should have a great deal of freedom to use the resources they have been given 
in the ways they see fit. For instance, Finnis states the following:  
And in all those fields of activity, including economic activity, where individuals, 
or families, or other relatively small groups, can help themselves by their own 
private efforts and initiatives without thereby injuring (either by act or omission) 
the common good, they are entitled in justice to be allowed to do so, and it is 
unjust to require them to sacrifice their private initiative by demanding that they 
participate instead in a public enterprise…The good of personal autonomy in 
community…suggests that the opportunity of exercising some form of private 
ownership, including of means of production, is in most times and places a 
requirement of justice.134 
 
…individuals, singly or in combination, should have access either directly or (as, 
for example, in the case of a share-holder in a joint stock company) indirectly to 
natural resources, capital goods, and/or consumer durables, such access being 
more or less exclusive (in that he or they are entitled to exclude other individuals 
from access), more or less immune from divestment by or at the instance of other 
individuals, and more or less transmissible by him at his choice. The purpose of 
these rights of exclusion and transmission and immunity from divestment is to 
give private owners freedom to expend their own creativity, inventiveness, and 
undeflected care and attention upon the thing(s) in question, to give them security 
in enjoying the thing(s) or investing or developing them, and to afford the owners 
the opportunity of exchanging their thing(s) for some alternative item(s) of 
property seeming to them more suitable to their life-plans.135 
 
Finnis points out that such goods, in order for them to be of any benefit at all, 
must be distributed to someone. But the goal in distributing such goods to some is not so 
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that they can hoard an excess of goods for themselves (as is often allowed by 
libertarians), but so that they can use the excess of those goods to benefit the 
community.136 If private ownership is to be distributively just, owners must conform to 
certain conditions, including an understanding that private owners of natural resources or 
capital goods have duties to put those resources or goods to productive use, or to give 
those goods over to others who can put them to productive use for the good of the 
community. Thus, Finnis states, “…speculative acquisition and disposition of property, 
for the purposes of merely financial gain uncorrelated with any economically productive 
development or use, is contrary to distributive justice.”137 Acquiring and hoarding 
property for one’s own excessive gain is not acceptable, and is a violation of distributive 
justice. Finnis goes on to explain that a person’s holdings beyond what one reasonably 
needs for himself, his dependents, and co-owners are actually part of the common stock. 
He explicates the following:  
In other words, beyond a certain point, what was commonly available but was 
justly made private, for the common good, becomes again, in justice, part of the 
common stock; although appropriated to management and control by an owner or 
owners, items of private property (‘things’) are now not for the owners’ private 
benefit but are held by them immediately for common benefit…From this point, 
owners have, in justice, duties not altogether unlike those of a trustee in English 
law.138 
 
When it comes to distributive justice, Finnis does not advocate for a distribution 
(or redistribution) of goods that is numerically equal. All members of a community 
should be equally considered in matters of distribution, but this should not mean that 
everyone is given the exact same things.  In Finnis’s words, “The objective of justice is 
not equality but the common good, the flourishing of all members of the community, and 
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there is no reason to suppose that this flourishing of all is enhanced by treating everyone 
identically when distributing roles, opportunities, and resources.”139 Finnis points out that 
if the goal of redistribution is to take away fine wine from a few to distribute cheap beer 
to the masses, this is hardly an example of the demands of distributive justice. But if 
taking fine wine away from a few can help to provide health, autonomy and self-
direction, defense against injustice, and other basic human rights to others, then such a 
redistribution is exactly what justice requires.140  
If our goal is to promote the good and flourishing of our communities, then it is 
important to discuss how we should go about resolving the question of distribution. 
Finnis lays out five criteria for a just distribution of goods. His first (and primary) 
criterion is need. Setting aside situations in which people may be in need because of their 
own poor choices and decisions, there remain numerous situations of emergency, when 
people find themselves in grave need due to no fault of their own. Finnis believes that 
when such emergencies arise,  “…a few or even many may rightly be deprived of much 
in order that those who can defend the whole community against its dangers may be 
enabled and encouraged to do so.”141 If I myself am a victim of such an emergency, I can 
only hope that my community will rally around me and pick me up in my distress. A 
society where this is a common occurrence benefits everyone, because members of such a 
community can have confidence that their tribe will catch them when calamity strikes. 
Finnis focuses specifically on needs that arise due to emergencies, but I believe we can 
extend this to include the needs of those who are in a state of chronic/consistent need due 
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to systemic and structural factors. These types of situations are more in line with how 
S.C. Miller construes needs and the duty to care for others’ needs.  
Finnis’s second criterion of distributive justice is function. As he understands 
things, function describes a need that is relative to roles and responsibilities in the 
community.142 If someone functions as a doctor within her community, she should be 
allocated the tools and provided with the support needed to fulfill her role. Equipping 
doctors appropriately provides an obvious benefit to the communities in which they live 
and work.  
Finnis’s third criterion of distributive justice is capacity. This deals not only with 
the roles individuals play in communal enterprises, but also to individuals’ opportunities 
for advancement.143 It is not unjust to admit that some people will themselves benefit 
from higher education (and then could subsequently benefit their communities), while 
other people would not benefit greatly from higher education, but would benefit from 
apprenticing as carpenters or agricultural workers. People are built and wired differently, 
with different gifts and talents and skills. Thus, goods should be distributed accordingly. 
Hammers are useless in the hands of academics, and flutes are useless when given to 
(non-musical) politicians.   
Finnis’s fourth criterion of distributive justice deals with desert and contributions. 
Some people engage in actions that deserve recognition. Sometimes people engage in 
acts of self-sacrifice, and other times they meritoriously use their efforts and abilities for 
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the good of others.144 In such instances, it may be appropriate to recognize their 
contributions to society through distribution of goods.  
Finnis’s fifth criterion of distributive justice involves foresight and forethought 
regarding risks. He points out that sometimes individuals create certain risks, or they 
have foresight regarding potential risks and yet proceed anyway.145 In such cases, if a 
person has taken unwarranted liberty in risking common stock assets, what he or she is 
due in regards to distribution may be impacted. In other words, the community as a whole 
should not be expected to pay for those who unwisely risk common stock assets and lose. 
In considering distributive justice, and in trying to assess when and how to 
distribute common stock goods and the incidents of communal enterprise so that the good 
of the community is realized, we must consider what “practical reasonableness requires 
of particular people (in their dealings with other people).”146 And this ultimately depends 
on what responsibilities different people have, what commitments they have made (and 
roles they have assumed) within their societies, what past and present benefits they have 
received, who is dependent upon them, and what kinds of relationships people have with 
one another. To some extent, this involves taking into account the interrelationships and 
interdependencies between the communities “that together make up the whole 
community of mankind.”147 We cannot fail to consider how our narrative stories intersect 
and intertwine.   
2. Combining needs and virtues. Perhaps it was made clear in the preceding 
discussion, but for the sake of clarity, I reject the utilitarian view of distributive justice. 
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Individual people are far too valuable to be reduced to mere means for the end of 
collective happiness or pleasure. I also reject the libertarian notion of liberty. As was 
argued in the discussion of communities, common good, and narrative quests people are 
not islands of entitlements with no responsibilities to one another other than preserving 
property. And while the egalitarians move in the right direction in trying to establish the 
concept of rights, and in trying to determine what distributions are most fair, I believe 
that sometimes the monumental fundamental needs of others may supersede even 
rights.148 Furthermore, it is often the case that rights and needs converge. Comparing the 
United Nations Declaration of Human Rights with something like S.C. Miller’s list of 
fundamental needs will show numerous such instances of overlap. And in all of this, 
encouraging the development of virtuous citizens who will shoulder the shared 
responsibility of pursuing the common good can not be underestimated.  
Under Finnis’s framework of distributive justice – of discussing how certain 
resources should be allocated and distributed amongst people – we can appeal to the idea 
of positive duties, which are duties to provide aid to those who are in need. Positive 
duties “require that we render assistance to those in distress.”149 If Finnis is right, and 
those who have been given a greater allocation of the common stock have been given 
those resources in order to work toward the common good and to benefit more than just 
themselves, then we can rightly question a world in which some live in opulence while 
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many live in abject poverty, while nevertheless the resources exist to adequately feed and 
clothe and heal and free those who have been deprived of such provisions.  
Distributive justice demands that we fulfill our positive duties to aid the 
disadvantaged through pursuit of the common good. Fair distribution of common stock 
products and incidents of communal enterprise include the allocation of adequate goods 
and services for those who are in need, and we have positive duties to provide for such 
people out of the common stock and the fruits of our communal enterprises. 
Furthermore, working toward this type of just distribution inevitably requires a 
kind of integrity or virtue. In his support of the Aristotelian stance of the importance of 
virtues in deliberations of justice, Sandel admits that it is exactly the concept of the good 
– of placing value judgments on certain actions – that philosophers such as Kant and 
Rawls hope to avoid. For them, “the right is prior to the good,”150 and before we engage 
in moral deliberation we should extract ourselves from any prior attachments, 
commitments, beliefs, or values. But Sandel believes that this is often not possible, and 
even if it is possible it is perhaps not desirable.151 He points out that many of the moral 
debates we care about the most are, at the heart, debates over values and our conceptions 
of the good life. At the heart of the abortion debate stands the moral and religious 
controversy concerning when personhood begins. This is a debate over values. At the 
heart of the debate over same-sex marriage lies the question of the telos, or purpose of 
marriage. This is not fundamentally a debate about rights, but rather a debate about 
honors, rewards, and recognition.152  
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 It seems counterintuitive to consider what justice should look like when it comes 
to distribution, and to be barred from considering that perhaps the distribution that is 
right is just so because it is a distribution that is good. After all, most people can agree 
that forcing adolescents into sexual servitude is objectively bad, and providing meals for 
starving children is objectively good. We don’t seem to have a problem making value 
judgments such as these. Furthermore, these value judgments likely help to inform our 
opinions regarding what acceptable responses might be when we encounter such 
situations. Should we really be forced to check our values at the door before we begin 
moral deliberations?  
 What we value can have a major impact on how we view the distribution of 
common stock goods and enterprises. If we value the happiness of the majority, we will 
distribute accordingly. If we value individual rights above all else, we will distribute in a 
way that protects such rights. If we value fairness and equality, we will devise policies 
that champion these values and perhaps overlook others. If we value the fulfillment of 
fundamental needs, we will distribute resources with the goal of satisfying such needs for 
all. And if we value character, we will work toward structures that reward character 
development heavily.  
Nevertheless, values are not such that we can only hold one value at a time. In 
reality, we value multiple things at one time, and our values can also change over time. 
However, of all the views we have discussed thus far, two views (and their accompanying 
values) seem to me to stand out: appeals to need and appeals to virtue. If we truly wish to 
deliberate regarding the good life, I do not see how we can overlook the fundamental 
needs of other people. It seems clear that we are, in fact, members of communities in 
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which we live, work, play, suffer, rejoice, learn, and need together. Our narrative quests 
are hopelessly intertwined. Even if we do not agree with something like Singer’s strong 
view of our obligation toward those in need, it seems unreasonable to ignore the reality of 
unmet fundamental needs all around us, and to hold tight to a belief that we are ‘entitled’ 
to our surpluses and relative opulence. And even if we wish to cling to some form of duty 
(such as a duty to provide for the needs of others based on our own finitude and 
vulnerability), we can place high value on the cultivation and habituation of virtuous 
people who will shoulder the heavy civic duty of fighting for the good life for all people 
– a good life that includes food and shelter and safety and satisfaction of the numerous 
other fundamental needs required to preserve human agency. Distributive justice hinges 
on our values. As Sandel states, “Justice is not only about the right way to distribute 
things. It is also about the right way to value things.”153 
For these reasons, I believe that we can adopt Finnis’s view of distributive justice, 
while supporting it with views such as Immanuel Kant’s ascription of dignity to 
humanity, the egalitarian notions of fairness and human rights, S.C. Miller’s duty to care 
for the fundamental needs of others, Aristotle’s insistence on the importance of 
cultivating virtue in individuals, and MacIntyre’s binding thread of our intersecting 
narrative quests. Thus, we are finally left with a satisfying picture of what justice 
abstractly requires of us in our dealings with other people.   
V. What Boundaries Matter?  
A. Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism 
I have spent much time in this chapter arguing that all human beings are members 
of multiple communities, and that justice requires such beings to seek after the common 
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good of other individuals in those communities. But this brings up several other related 
questions: “What are the relevant boundaries of our communities?” “To what extent does 
the practically reasonable person orient herself to the boundaries of mankind, as opposed 
to more narrow boundaries?” “Does our duty to distribute or redistribute resources, or to 
aid those who have needs, have geographic or proximity-based limits?” “Are there some 
circumstances in which national borders (or some other similar boundaries) might place 
legitimate constraints on our obligations?” These are questions posed by the 
contemporary debate between patriotism and cosmopolitanism, and they cannot be 
ignored if we wish to determine the scope of our duty to favor and foster the common 
good of our communities.   
Those who argue on the side of patriotism (sometimes also referred to as 
nationalism) place high value on the general idea that special obligations exist among 
compatriots (i.e. fellow community members).154 Samuel Scheffler explains that this 
view exhibits a “common-sense doctrine…that one has distinctive responsibilities (or 
‘special obligations’) toward members of ones’ own family and others whom one stands 
in certain significant sorts of relationships.”155  
For purposes of our discussion, I do not wish to get bogged down with the terms 
‘patriotism’ and ‘nationalism’. In general, I especially hesitate to use the term 
‘nationalism’ because of its relation to the political notion of a nation-state.156 
Consequently I will stick with using the term ‘patriotism’, and when I use it I intend to 
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mean something more broad, something that could pertain to nation-states, but could also 
pertain to other special relationships between groups of people such as families, 
community groups, religious groups, educational or employment institutions, and various 
other groupings of people that may or may not have anything to do with nationality or 
with political sovereignty. 
Cosmopolitanism is the view that it is our obligation to ensure that all persons 
share in equality in light of our common humanity.157 Our primary allegiance should be 
toward human beings qua human being. Diogenes the Cynic expressed this sentiment 
when he stated, “I am a citizen of the world.”158 What Justice requires is universal and 
applies to all people equally, not in virtue of their nationality (or other specific 
affiliations), but in virtue of their humanity.159 Peter Singer and Peter Unger both argue 
along these lines and claim that proximity should have no bearing on ethical decisions, 
especially when people are needlessly dying.160 
What is of central importance to our discussion hinges on a specific type of 
patriotism and cosmopolitanism. Sarah Clark Miller points out that there are several 
different varieties of cosmopolitanism (and we can extend these to patriotism) including 
political, economic, cultural, and moral conceptions. Political conceptions focus on “the 
nature of international political organization.” Economic conceptions focus on “the 
development and proper regulation of global economic systems and features.” Cultural 
conceptions focus on the prevalence of cultural change and the proper role of cultural 
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diversity. But Miller believes these are not the central concerns of the debate. She argues 
that what we are really concerned about when we question the nature and scope of our 
obligations toward other human beings involves our moral commitments.161  
B. Ethical Universalism and Ethical Particularism 
In his book On Nationality, David Miller explains that the main difference 
between cosmopolitans and patriots can be understood by distinguishing between two 
competing ideals: ethical universalism and ethical particularism.162 Ethical universalism 
uses universal, unbiased principles to determine what we are obligated to do for others 
(and what others should do for us). Only general facts about others are morally relevant. 
As D. Miller points out, a universalist principle might be “relieve the needy,” and 
therefore if another individual is in need and I have resources that could provide relief, I 
am obligated to do so. If I happen to have a special relationship with another individual 
(i.e. as mother or sister or neighbor, etcetera), these “relational facts” cannot enter into 
the picture when determining duties or obligations toward others.163 
Ethical particularism asserts the opposite view. It advocates that our moral 
deliberations must take into account our pre-existing ties and commitments to other 
particular agents and groups. Human relationships are “part of the basic subject-matter of 
ethics.” As such people are encumbered, connected, and morally committed to different 
individuals in different ways. Appealing to these special relationships and the demands 
they entail may give us morally satisfactory justification for attending first to the needs of 
our “compatriots” (or more broadly those with which we have particular relationships).164  
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Perhaps what is most intriguing about David Miller’s conception, however, is that 
he believes the division between moral universalism and moral particularism is not rigid. 
He states, “[I]t is possible to start from a universalist position and then move some 
considerable distance to accommodate particularist concerns, and vice versa.”165 This is, I 
believe, especially encouraging, because as Miller also points out both of these views 
possess strong supportive arguments. It is not difficult for us to intuitively value human 
beings qua human being. And it is also natural for us to feel strong allegiances toward 
those with which we stand in various relations, and to take seriously the demands that 
those relationships and memberships seemingly impose.166  
So how might one go about converging these two views, or moving from one 
toward another on a continuum? First let us consider beginning with universalist 
convictions. How might we incorporate particularist concerns? One way is for us to 
affirm that our ultimate allegiance is toward the whole of humanity, but the best way to 
practically pursue this value is to start with those closest to us and work our way outward. 
This helps us to better coordinate our efforts to meet the needs of others because we can 
more easily see and understand how to meet the needs of those nearer to us, and it is 
simply more feasible for us to transfer resources into our own families and 
communities.167 For example, Miller explains,  
I am likely to know in detail what members of my family need, and I can get 
resources to them easily. So, we require conventions to decide who is to discharge 
duties such as this in particular cases, and it is easy to see that the most effective 
conventions will be ones that take account of relationships like those we find in 
families. Let us call this the ‘useful convention’ method of getting from universal 
duties to particular ones.168 
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Another way of moving from universalist toward particularist commitments is to 
recognize that human agents are capable of entering into contracts or making promises 
with one another, and when we do so we take on special duties toward those others. All 
of our relationships flow from voluntary associations – even our familial relationships. In 
D. Miller’s words, “I am entitled freely to enter such associations, and once I have 
become a member I am subject to the rules and obligations of membership.”169 D. Miller 
calls this the ‘voluntary creation’ of particular duties ultimately rooted in universal 
duties. People have the “moral power to bind themselves into special relationships with 
ethical content.”170 One obvious weakness of this view is that it cannot account for 
relationships that seem to have no voluntary content. Often times people do not choose 
their governments. And while an argument could be made that by living in a certain 
society you are implicitly agreeing (through social contract, perhaps) to the 
responsibilities and privileges of that society, nevertheless children do not choose their 
parents, so on this view how can one ground one of the most fundamentally recognized 
special relationships – that of child to parent(s)?  
Of course one answer to such criticism is to adopt the alternative view – that of 
the particularist – and then to move toward explaining how a particularist might 
accommodate universalist convictions. David Miller explains the particularist conception 
in the following way:  
The picture of ethical life favored by particularists tends to be pluralistic. This is, 
we are tied in to many different relationships – families, work groups, voluntary 
associations, religious and other such communities, nations – each of which 
makes demands on us, and there is no single overarching perspective from which 
we can order or rank these demands. In case of conflict – say, where I have to 
decide whether to use my resources to help my brother or my colleague at work – 
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I simply have to weigh their respective claims, reflecting both on the nature of my 
relationship to the two individuals and on the benefits that each would get from 
the help I can give. Given a picture of this kind, it is relatively straightforward to 
include the claim that I owe something to my fellow human beings considered 
merely as such. The relationships in which I stand vary considerably in their 
complexity and closeness. There is nothing in particularism which prevents me 
from recognizing that I stand in some relationship to all other human beings by 
virtue of our common humanity and our sharing of a single world. The problem is 
rather to decide on what ethical demands stem from this relationship, and to 
weigh it against other more specific loyalties.171 
 
In D. Miller’s opinion, the ethical universalist’s position is untenable because it 
“draws a sharp line between moral agency and personal identity on the one hand, and 
between moral agency and personal motivation on the other.”172  As we have already 
explored earlier in our discussion of MacIntyre, he asserts that “I inherit from the past of 
my family, my city, my tribe, my nation, a variety of debts, inheritances, rightful 
expectations and obligations. These constitute the given of my life, my moral starting 
point.”173 This “moral starting point” is an inherited one – it is not one we specifically 
choose. If we are forced to discount elements of our personal identity – who we are and 
where we come from – we are forced to make ethical decisions in a contrived atmosphere 
and we are expected to discredit what should be real, valid ethical considerations. 
Gertrude Himmelfarb argues along these lines when she states:  
Above all, what cosmopolitanism obscures, even denies, are the givens of life: 
parents, ancestors, family, race, religion, heritage, history, culture, tradition, 
community – and nationality. These are not “accidental” attributes of the 
individual. They are essential attributes. We do not come into the world as free-
floating, autonomous individuals. We come into it complete with all the 
particular, defining characteristics that go into a fully formed human being, a 
being with an identity. Identity is neither an accident nor a matter of choice. It is 
given, not willed…To pledge one’s “fundamental allegiance” to cosmopolitanism 
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is to try to transcend…all the actualities, particularities, and realities of life that 
constitute one’s natural identity.174 
 
On the particularist view, special relationships are not morally arbitrary or irrelevant. 
Rather, they are our ethical starting point. And even when we do not choose these special 
relationships, they can make claims on us. Along these lines, Sandel argues that 
“obligations of solidarity or membership may claim us for reasons unrelated to a choice – 
reasons bound up with the narratives by which we interpret our lives and the communities 
we inhabit.”175  
C. “Moderate Patriotism” and “Conditional Cosmopolitanism”  
In an essay titled “In Defense of ‘Moderate Patriotism’,” Stephen Nathanson 
argues that admitting to a universal morality does not necessitate disregarding special ties 
to particular individuals. He asserts, “Commonsense morality certainly permits and 
encourages local loyalties and even frowns on extreme detachment or total 
impartiality.”176 He does not believe that universal morality is inconsistent with allowing 
for special obligations and other particularist commitments.177 His view, which he calls 
“moderate patriotism,” advocates that particularist commitments are “perfectly 
permissible” and exhibit “important virtues” in people, so long as these are not exclusive 
commitments, and so long as they do not violate the rights of members outside these 
particular relationships.178 We should be committed to universal moral principles – 
principles that protect the basic rights of all human beings – and these principles may 
sanction our special obligations and may place constraints on the actions that are 
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permissible for us to take on behalf of our particularist connections.179 When certain 
actions are objectively morally wrong, we are not permitted to engage in them, even if 
doing so would prove to benefit those with whom we have special relationships.180 
Simply stated, “Moderate patriots distinguish between patriotism and morality and seek 
to subject patriotism to moral constraints.”181  
 I personally find Nathanson’s stance to be attractive. It renders “the demands of 
national loyalty” (and I would broaden this to include particularist special relationships of 
all sorts) compatible with “the requirements of universal morality.” It is good for people 
to be ‘patriotic’, but this is conditional depending on whether this patriotism conflicts 
with the demands of universal morality.182  
I would like, however, to propose a slight shift in focus from privileging 
patriotism to a focus on privileging cosmopolitanism under certain circumstances. Let me 
explain. By naming his view ‘moderate patriotism’, Nathanson places the focus on 
patriotism as long as certain conditions are met. I think however, in some extreme 
situations, we should become what I like to refer to as ‘conditional cosmopolitans’ first 
and foremost. In instances where the demands of universal morality are gravely violated, 
we should become ‘conditional cosmopolitans’, acting and reacting from a position of 
privileging and valuing the fundamental rights and needs of global citizens above 
particularist relationships. This may seem to be just a difference of semantics, but 
sometimes the words we choose to privilege matter. And while being a citizen of the 
world does not nullify my other citizenships, in some extreme situations my global 
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citizenship should stand as my primary commitment. So perhaps what I’m advocating is 
that in many situations (on a more regular basis) we can rightfully ascribe to ‘moderate 
patriotism’. But in certain other extreme circumstances, we should become ‘conditional 
cosmopolitans’, working tirelessly to see the demands of global justice recognized for all 
people, while placing our particularist commitments on the back burner. But what types 
of situations would warrant this shift? I have in mind the most egregious human rights 
violations, such as those committed against the extremely poor in denying them food and 
shelter and employment opportunities, or the withholding of autonomy and bodily 
integrity from those who are physically enslaved.183 When it comes to addressing these 
types of injustices and deprivations, perhaps the best view to take is one of ‘conditional 
cosmopolitanism’ – i.e. when these conditions apply our allegiance is to humanity above 
all. 184 
VI. Conclusion 
  In this chapter I have advocated that practically reasonable people recognize that 
they are members of communities, and that they should care about justice within their 
communities. Furthermore, such people recognize that the narrative quests of their lives 
intersect with the narrative quests of many others. Because life for human beings is life in 
communities, it is fitting for us to concern ourselves with pursing justice for all those in 
our shared communities and shared world.  
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Of specific concern in this chapter regards what pursing distributive justice should 
entail – when it comes to distributing common stock resources and the incidents of 
communal enterprises, on what criteria should such distributions be made? We have 
explored distributions according to welfare (utilitarianism), distributions according to 
freedom and rights (Kant, libertarianism, and egalitarianism), distributions according to 
needs, and distributions according to virtues and values. I have advocated that the most 
compelling criteria for distribution includes considering together both the fundamental 
needs of others and the development of good character in one another. If we consider 
distributive justice with these ideals in mind, we can humbly admit that we are all weak, 
vulnerable, finite, and needy, and we can work toward developing moral character in one 
another that will place the meeting of our fundamental needs as the highest of priorities.  
Furthermore, in this chapter I have admitted and recognized that we stand in 
special relationships with some individuals and groups that we do not experience with all 
people globally. I have admitted that I do believe that these special relationships can and 
do hold moral value. But I have also advocated that under certain extreme circumstances, 
when the needs of others are gravely endangered, or when their fundamental rights are 
horribly denied, we should adopt a stance of ‘conditional cosmopolitanism’ in which we 
privilege our allegiance to humanity above all, even if this means sacrificing some of our 
more specific special relationships and obligations.    
Ultimately, I have not yet made a case for any specific distributions of specific 
resources. I will do this (in a roundabout way) in Chapter Six, although only specifically 
as relates to modern slavery. But I do hope that this chapter has served to provide a 
compelling argument that the lives of individual people, the meeting of their fundamental 
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needs, and the development of virtue within a community is of chief concern when we 
deliberate regarding distributive justice. When I ask myself, “To whom do I owe what 
when it comes to distributive justice?” I believe my answer should be, “I owe quite a bit 
to those in need if their fundamental needs are unmet and mine are met in abundance.” 
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CHAPTER 4
 
COMMUTATIVE JUSTICE 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 I began the previous chapter by arguing alongside Finnis that practically 
reasonable people accept certain responsibilities and commitments to favor and foster the 
common good of all people within a shared community. I then fleshed out this idea of 
living in shared communities by appealing to MacIntyre’s concept of the narrative quest. 
This concept paints a vivid picture of a world in which we all live out narrative stories, 
and our stories touch and are touched by the stories of others. How I live my life has 
implications for others, because I am a part of their stories, and they are a part of mine. 
This interconnectedness of lives lived in communities is crucial to our understanding of 
what justice should look like for human beings within those communities.  
 The topic of the previous chapter dealt with Finnis’s first broad class of problems 
related to justice – distributive justice – which is concerned with determining how 
‘common stock’ resources and incidents of communal enterprise should be allocated and 
distributed throughout communities of people. This present chapter deals with the second 
class of problems, which Finnis describes as problems of commutative justice. He 
describes commutative justice as follows:  
There is a vast range of relationships and dealings between persons (including 
dealings between officials and individuals) in which neither the requirements or 
incidents of communal enterprise nor the distribution (whether by public or 
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private owners) of a common stock are directly at stake, but in which there can be 
question of what is fitting, fair, or just as between the parties to the relationship.1 
 
Commutative justice, then, deals not with distributing common resources and privileges 
among individuals in communities, but rather with assuring that people treat those with 
whom they have relationships in ways that are fitting and fair. This still hinges on our 
foundation of favoring and fostering the common good of community members, and 
recognizing that our narrative quests are intricately intertwined with one another. But as 
we will soon see these ideals take on additional significance when applied to our more 
specific human interactions and connections as opposed to our shared resources. 
II. Commutative Justice Explained 
A. ‘Corrective’ or ‘Commutative’?  
In much of the literature dealing with justice, the counterpart to distributive 
justice is identified as corrective justice2 (not commutative justice). Finnis explains that 
this categorization can be traced back to Aristotle, who wished to divide the field of 
problems related to justice into two broad classes. He categorized the first class, 
distributive justice, in much the same way as has already been characterized in the 
previous chapter. His second class, which he named corrective justice, deals with “justice 
that rectifies or remedies inequalities which arise in dealings…between individuals.”3 
Under this type of view, distributive justice can be seen as a type of ideal theory in which 
fair shares and fair allocations of resources is the goal, and when a community falls short 
of that goal then the need for compensation for injuries and remedies for damages arises. 
																																								 																				
1 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 178. 
2 Christopher Arnold, “Corrective Justice,” Ethics 90, no. 2 (January 1980): 181-182; W.D. Lamont, 
“Justice: Distributive and Corrective,” Philosophy 16, no.61 (January 1941): 3; Ernest J. Weinrib, 
Corrective Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012): 6.  
3 Finnis, 178.  
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The gap between what should be the case in distributive justice and what actually is the 
case in a given society sets up the need for corrective justice.4 Or as W.D. Lamont states, 
“Corrective Justice comes into operation when the scheme created by distributive justice 
has been infringed; and it may take the form either of Reparation or of Punishment.”5 
In his book titled Corrective Justice, law professor Ernest J. Weinrib sets out to 
discuss the relationships that people share with one another, and more specifically the 
ways in which one person may be found to be liable to another.6 Weinrib appeals to 
Aristotle to explain his thought of liability further. The idea is that in relationships, the 
opposing parties can have active and passive roles in relation to the same injustice – one 
is the doer of injustice, and the other is the sufferer of that same injustice. The question, 
then, is what should be done in such situations to remedy or make restitution to those 
who have suffered such injustices?7 What should the party liable for an injustice do to 
remedy the situation for the sufferer of injustice?  
But Finnis is not satisfied with granting that corrective justice is the sole 
counterpart to distributive justice. While corrective justice rightly emphasizes correction 
and restitution and remedy in situations when one person injures another, or when one 
person fails to follow through with an agreement or contract, this still “leaves untouched 
a wide range of problems.”8 Thomas Aquinas recognized this, and consequently took 
Aristotle’s view of corrective justice and broadened it, inventing a new term: 
commutative justice.9 In Aquinas’s usage, this new term “is limited neither to correction 
																																								 																				
4 Arnold, 181-182. 
5 Lamont, 3.  
6 Weinrib, 1.  
7 Ibid., 2. (Later in this chapter we will discuss the notion of liability in more detail, especially as it relates 
to notions of guilt and responsibility).   
8 Finnis, 178.  
9 Ibid., 179.  
		 96 
nor to voluntary or business transactions,” but rather it also incorporates the whole field 
of human interactions, with the goal of determining “what dealings are proper between 
persons (including groups).”10 So whereas corrective justice covers how to make things 
right in retrospect (i.e. how to remedy or restore following an injustice), commutative 
justice considers the whole of human interactions to determine what justice requires of us 
as we live intersecting lives in a shared world. This does undoubtedly involve remedy 
and restoration and restitution. But it also involves so much more, including determining 
proper interactions between people in prospect (i.e. with the goal toward preventing 
future injustices). Stated another way, commutative justice asks all of the following 
questions: “What are the standards of conduct which individuals must live up to in 
relation to their ‘neighbors’?” “What should be the extent of liability of one who fails to 
live up to those standards of conduct?” and “How should those injured by the wrongs of 
others be restored to their former condition?”11 These questions consider how we should 
treat each other all the time, whether or not we have already acted unjustly toward others.  
In my realm of the world, used car salesmen get a really bad rap. They are 
generally assumed to be dishonest hustlers who will tell you anything to get you to buy 
their cars. Maybe this it true, or perhaps it is an unfair overgeneralization. Regardless, 
appealing to commutative justice can help us to understand a wide gamut of potential 
interactions between the salesmen and their customers. Commutative justice governs 
proper standards of conduct in sales interactions, for instance what kinds of things are 
permissible to say, and what is impermissible to say in order to sell a car. What level of 
transparency is required regarding the past history of a used car, and what monetary value 
																																								 																				
10 Finnis, 179. 
11 Ibid., 180.  
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constitutes a fair asking price? These questions are not concerned with remedying an 
injustice already committed, but rather they are helpful questions to govern the buying 
and selling of used cars at the outset. Of course, these transactions are not always 
seamless. Sometimes a salesman crosses certain lines and gives false information about a 
used car such that a buyer overpays, or ends up with a lemon when he was promised 
reliable transportation, or when the terms of the financing contract are misconstrued, or 
when a whole host of other conditions are not as they were promised to be. In such 
situations commutative justice may require that remedy or restitution or restoration is 
necessary. But as this example hopefully shows, commutative justice covers both the 
setting up of just standards of conduct, and the providing for restitution or restoration 
when those standards of conduct are broken.  
B. Aspects of Commutative Justice 
 On Finnis’s view, there are at least five aspects of commutative justice. First, 
commutative justice may concern relations between ascertained individuals. If one person 
A makes a contract with another person B, then A is required in commutative justice to 
uphold the contract with B, or to pay damages to B in the event that she fails to uphold 
the contract. As Finnis states, “…adherence to these duties of commutative justice 
between one individual and another is an integral and indispensable aspect of respect and 
favour for the common good. How can a society be said to be well-off in which 
individuals do not respect each other’s rights?”12 Of central importance to this first of 
Finnis’s five aspects of commutative justice is the focus on the relationship between two 
specific individuals.  
																																								 																				
12 Finnis, 184.  
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 Second, “…an individual may have a duty in commutative justice to many more 
or less ascertained individuals.”13 In such instances a subject A finds herself in some sort 
of relevant relationship with multiple other subjects B, C, D…etcetera. These relevant 
others are known to the subject – they are not some nebulous ‘other’.    
 Third, “…an individual may have duties in commutative justice to many more or 
less unascertained individuals.”14 In other words, it is possible that person A has duties to 
persons B, C, D…etcetera, but these other persons are not specifically known to A. Finnis 
envisions here that an individual A might exploit or free-ride on some system in a way 
that is advantageous to himself, all the while knowing that supporting such a system is 
harmful to some (or perhaps even many) others who are not specifically known to A. It 
may be the case that abandoning such a scheme and instead following another scheme, or 
even returning to another previous scheme, might be better to many other unascertained 
individuals. If A ignores this reality and continues to exploit such a system to his own 
advantage and to the detriment of numerous unidentified others, this is seen as 
commutatively unjust.15 
Finnis’s fourth and fifth aspects are closely related, and deal with relations to 
government. The fourth aspect of commutative justice establishes that “…one (any 
individual) has duties in commutative justice to the governing authorities of one’s 
community.”16  This includes the duty to conform to just (and sometimes unjust) laws.  
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14 Ibid. (italics mine).  
15 Ibid.  
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		 99 
The fifth aspect of commutative justice establishes that “…persons holding public 
authority…owe duties of commutative justice to those subject to their authority.”17 So 
both of these aspects of commutative justice deal with the reciprocal nature of 
membership in communities – community members are expected to uphold the rules and 
laws of their communities, and public officials in such communities are accountable to 
their subjects and are expected to work toward preserving justice for community 
members. Finnis points out, for example, that a judge’s duty to faithfully apply the law is 
what is required of her in her official dealings with others under her jurisdiction.18 
C. Commutative Justice and Negative Duties 
In the previous chapter I mentioned that distributive justice can be linked to 
positive duties, which are duties to provide aid to those who are in need, and “require that 
we render assistance to those in distress.”19 Similarly, commutative justice can be loosely 
linked to another type of duties – negative duties – which “require that we refrain from 
harming and injuring others.”20 One extremely simple explanation of these two types of 
duties states, “A negative duty is a duty not to do something, a duty of omission. A 
positive duty is a duty to do something, and cannot be fulfilled by inaction.”21  
When I claim that commutative justice and negative duties are loosely related, this 
is because it is not the case that commutative justice and negative duties provide a 1:1 
mapping onto one another. For instance, while the demands of commutative justice 
definitely include refraining from harming others, they also involve restoration when we 
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18 Ibid., 179-180.  
19 Raymond A. Belliotti, “Negative and Positive Duties,” Theoria 47, no.2 (August 1981), 82.  
20 Ibid. 
21 Marcus G. Singer, “Negative and Positive Duties,” The Philosophical Quarterly 15, no. 59 
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have harmed others. Commutative justice involves more than mere duties of omission. It 
also involves duties of active retribution, restitution, reparation, and restoration. The need 
to make restitution after a failure of a negative duty serves as the grounds for a positive 
obligation, and these are both components of the requirements of commutative justice. 
However, pointing out the correlation between commutative justice and negative 
duties is important, I believe, because we can draw from some of the literature dealing 
with negative duties as we further explore questions surrounding commutative justice. 
For instance, who are our ‘neighbors’, and are we responsible in commutative justice 
toward other individuals only, or perhaps also to groups? Must we know the ‘others’ with 
whom we share relevant relationships? And is it possible to be responsible for things that 
happen to others without being guilty/culpable for wrongs committed against them? 
Some theories of negative duties deal with these questions, and can be helpful as we also 
deal with these questions in the sections that follow. 
III. Comparing Responsibility, Fault/Blame, and Guilt/Culpability 
A. Introductory Remarks 
 Philosopher Herbert Morris points out that a person may be held responsible for 
contributing to an injustice, but still be absolved from guilt. Thus, contributing to 
injustice does not necessarily result in guilt on the part of the actor. However, when a 
person commits a wrongdoing and is at fault for such a wrongdoing, then that person is 
also guilty.22  
Finnis seems to agree with drawing distinctions between some of these concepts. 
He points out that in some instances a person may fail to follow through on a contract, 
																																								 																				
22 Herbert Morris, On Guilt and Innocence: Essays in Legal Philosophy and Moral Psychology (Berkeley: 
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and should be required to pay damages (i.e. held responsible in some capacity), even 
though her failure may not have been culpable (i.e. blameworthy).23 This is perhaps an 
example of injustice without fault, which results in responsibility without 
culpability/guilt.     
 Therefore, for us to fruitfully consider the nature and requirements of 
commutative justice, we must determine when we may be guilty/culpable of certain 
injustices, and when we may be responsible (but not guilty) for certain injustices or 
responsible for certain responses (or lack of response). Furthermore, we must consider 
if/when when are expected to make restitution or reparation or restoration due to our 
actions or failures. Does such a requirement present only when we are guilty of injustice, 
or do we also have restorative obligations when we are responsible in some capacity, but 
fall short of being guilty of injustice?   
B. Guilt and Fault  
One common motivation for wanting to assign moral responsibility (as well as 
criminal and civil responsibility) to an agent for an injustice is because we have a strong 
desire to establish “who dunnit”.24 We want to know who caused a given harm, and 
therefore who is to blame for that harm. Iris Marion Young explains that under standard 
frameworks of moral and legal responsibility, “it is necessary to connect a person’s deed 
linearly to the harm for which we seek to assign responsibility.”25 Under this standard 
framework, which she names the liability model of responsibility, she points out that 
ascribing guilt or blame necessitates that “there should be clear rules of evidence, not 
only for demonstrating the causal connection between this agent and a harm, but also for 
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24 Iris Marion Young, Responsibility for Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 95.  
25 Ibid., 96.  
		 102 
evaluating the intentions, motives, and consequences of actions.”26 Whereas Morris 
asserts that wrongdoing and fault are necessary to determine guilt, Young seems to 
equate fault with blame. So the question remains, when is it appropriate to ascribe blame 
or fault to someone for an unjust action? If we can rightly determine blame or fault, we 
can ascribe guilt or culpability.  
Political and legal philosopher Joel Feinberg points out that when considering the 
legal test of wrongdoing, intention is vitally important.27 Whether or not an agent is 
morally blameworthy may also depend upon the intentions, motives, and consequences of 
his actions.28 According to Feinberg, someone may commit intentional wrongdoing if he 
(a) “acts with a wrongful conscious objective” or (b) “knowingly produces a forbidden 
result even incidentally as a kind of side-effect of his effort to achieve his objective.”29 In 
the first instance, the wrongdoing is the intentional conscious objective of the actor in 
question. In the second instance, the wrongdoing is not the intentional objective, but 
rather a known, forbidden side effect. The actor knows that quite likely if she completes 
the action, a forbidden side effect will occur. Feinberg labels this recklessness, and states 
that recklessness is characterized by the existence of risk, and is present when the actor is 
willing to unreasonably gamble her own interests or the interests of others.30  In the first 
instance (a) it seems right to assign moral blame to an actor who consciously, 
intentionally commits wrongdoing. Many would also assign moral blame in the second 
instance (b) because in such instances, actors are fully aware that their actions will (or 
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will very likely) bring about forbidden (blameworthy) consequences. In such instances, 
the ascription of blame, or fault, results in guilt on behalf of the actor/agent. 
C. Responsibility without Guilt 
Sometimes we may act within our rights, or we may follow through with actions 
which may not in themselves be wrong, but nevertheless cause some harm to befall 
others. In such instances it may be said that we have participated in injustice, or that we 
carry some level of responsibility for injustice, but fall short of being (morally) 
blameworthy or guilty.31 As Herbert Morris explains,   
…a person might admit that he was responsible for some harmful occurrence and 
reject the appropriateness of his being blamed or held responsible, for he may 
argue that he was without fault. That is, he may argue that his conduct met 
standards for proper conduct in the circumstances.32  
 
Suppose a baseball pitcher aspires to perfect his curve ball. He knows that he has a 
tendency to throw just a hair too close to batters (occasionally hitting them), but he has 
been practicing all season to master a curve ball that is close enough to batters to make it 
difficult for them to hit, but far enough away to reduce the risk of hitting them. Suppose 
the pitcher throws a curve ball that accidentally hits a batter and incapacitates him for the 
remainder of the game. The pitcher has acted within his rights and the rules of the game 
to throw a curve ball. It’s just a fact of baseball that sometimes batters get hit. 
Nevertheless, responsibility for the batter’s injury lies with the pitcher, although we 
would not likely go so far as to ascribe moral blame or culpability toward the pitcher. He 
did not intend to hit the batter. He had been practicing relentlessly so that he would not 
hit batters with his curve ball, and his curve ball had improved. He just wasn’t quite there 
																																								 																				
31 I might still be held legally responsible, especially if someone needs to pay for some sort of damage, but 
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yet. Some might object that we do not hold the batter responsible at all. However, even 
though he lacks culpability, we might still expect him to apologize to the batter, or send a 
heartfelt card as the batter recovers from his injury, or provide assistance to the batter’s 
family if he is more seriously incapacitated. Lack of moral blameworthiness does not 
necessarily negate other forms of responsibility, nor does it rule out the need perform 
certain responsive actions when one is responsible for a harm.  
This illustrates that sometimes people can be held responsible for actions they 
commit, but assigning responsibility for such actions does not necessitate a judgment of 
moral blameworthiness. People can be responsible for injustice without being guilty of 
doing something wrong.  
What would make someone responsible for injustice but not morally blameworthy 
or guilty? Iris Marion Young puts forth a possible answer that hinges on the collective 
actions of multiple people combining together to produce injustices for multiple other 
people and groups. In her book Responsibility for Justice, Young is especially concerned 
with structural injustice, which she claims is the result of social processes that 
disadvantage some while simultaneously advantaging others. She states,  
Structural injustice, then, exists when social processes put large groups of persons 
under systematic threat of domination or deprivation of the means to develop and 
exercise their capacities, at the same time that these processes enable others to 
dominate or to have a wide range of opportunities for developing and exercising 
capacities available to them. Structural injustice is a kind of moral wrong distinct 
from the wrongful action of an individual agent or the repressive policies of a 
state. Structural injustice occurs as a consequence of many individuals and 
institutions acting to pursue their particular goals and interests, for the most part 
within the limits of accepted rules and norms.33 
 
Young appeals to political philosopher Hannah Arendt, who believes that guilt 
and blame cannot be applied to entire groups or collectives, but rather only specific deeds 
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can be assessed as guilt inducing.34 Arendt states, “Where all are guilty, nobody is. Guilt, 
unlike responsibility, always singles out; it is strictly personal. It refers to an act, not to 
intentions and potentialities.”35 Arendt uses the paradigm example of Nazi Germany to 
argue her point, stating that it is inappropriate to label the whole German people as guilty 
for Nazi crimes just because they lived in that society, passively allowing its crimes and 
wrongs. But although a collective and its members cannot be guilty of wrongdoing, 
Arendt does not deny that a collective and its members may be responsible in a different 
sense.36 Those who supported the Nazi regime may not have been guilty of killing Jews, 
but they still bear some responsibility for what happened in their country under their 
noses, and often times with their tacit permission.37 Such people did things (or failed to 
do things) that indirectly contributed to the enactment of crimes or wrongs, and thus bear 
some responsibility for the consequences of those wrongs. On Arendt’s view, only a 
relatively small number of people under the Nazi regime were both responsible and 
guilty. But many people share responsibility without guilt.38   
 My ultimate goal here, which I believe Arendt helps us to see, is to show that the 
concept of responsibility without fault or guilt is both coherent/viable and needed/helpful. 
Arendt uses the historical example of Nazi Germany to argue that many people bore some 
responsibility for the extermination of Jews even though they were not guilty of killing 
Jews. A similar story could be told of many Americans during several centuries of 
slavery and racial inequality. Many Northern Americans were not slaveholders, nor were 
																																								 																				
34 Young, 76.  
35 Hannah Arendt, “Collective Responsibility,” in Responsibility and Judgment, ed. Jerome Kohn (New 
York: Schocken Books, 2003), 147. 
36 Young, 77.  
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they involved themselves in the slave trade. More surprisingly, a majority of Southerners 
were also not slaveholders.39 Only a small percentage of Southerners – the most wealthy 
– owned slaves. Arendt would likely ascribe guilt and blame for slavery to those who 
devised and maintained the system, and who physically held slaves. But although that 
only included a relatively small number of people, she would also ascribe responsibility 
to many others. Many Northerners could arguably have done more to fight against 
slavery. For instance, how many of them became a part of the Underground Railroad? 
How many of them became active participants in the abolitionist movement? Many 
Southerners could have done more as well. How many of them rallied against pro-slavery 
legislation? How many of them left their ground-floor church pews to venture into the 
‘colored’ balconies to converse and build friendships with their dark-skinned neighbors? 
How many of them stepped in to prevent blatant physical abuse of slaves in public 
places? During the Jim Crow era, how many whites drank from ‘colored’ fountains as 
evidence that they were not dirty or diseased?  
Just like many twentieth century Germans did nothing to oppose the Third Reich 
and protect their Jewish neighbors, many eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth century 
Americans did little to oppose the wrongs committed against their black brothers and 
sisters. And while we may be leery to label them as guilty for not risking their own lives 
and families to harbor runaway slaves, we feel right in ascribing some level of 
responsibility toward them for injustices that were allowed to continue for generations. 
After all, if more individuals had acted with greater courage, or if a great majority of both 
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Northerners and Southerners had risen up against the institution of slavery, perhaps 
history would tell a different story than it now does.          
 I will offer one more example, this time a modern hypothetical, to further 
illustrate both the viability and the necessity of ascribing responsibility without guilt.40 
Consider an instance of school bullying, which unfortunately is an all-too-common 
occurrence today amongst adolescents and teens. Suppose a ninth grade boy is being 
teased and bullied relentlessly by two of the most popular football players. This abuse 
happens in public, and numerous bystanders are aware of the bullying. We can easily 
ascribe guilt and fault to the two bullying football players. Furthermore, it does not seem 
right to ascribe guilt toward the bystanders (presuming they are actually just bystanders, 
and not instigators or supporters of the bullying). But to the extent that each of the 
bystanders could do certain things to help protect the bullied boy, they are responsible 
when they fail to do these things. One student might be a teammate of the bullying jocks 
and could step between the bullies and the victim. Another student might feel 
comfortable informing a guidance counselor or an administrator. Still another student 
could befriend the victim to provide emotional support. Another student could advocate 
for awareness programs and tougher consequences for school bullies. To the extent that 
these other students stand silently by and allow bullying to continue, they share in 
responsibility for this injustice.     
 The above example also illustrates one other important component of 
responsibility for injustice. Different people may bear different responsibilities, and may 
consequently be obligated to act in multiple different ways as they respond to injustices 
around them. For instance, a respected teammate of the bullies may be obligated to speak 
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up and call them out. A friend of the victim who is seen as a social outcast may need to 
inform a counselor or administrator rather than challenge the bullies. A student 
government member may be best situated to bring up systemic inefficiencies and 
inadequate bullying policies. How multiple students discharge (or execute) their 
responsibilities may vary given their different abilities, opportunities, positions of 
influence, side effects of interventions, and numerous other factors. Furthermore, certain 
groups of students (say the entire student government association working together) may 
also bear a collective responsibility to work towards changing the culture of bullying in 
their school. As Winston Churchill once stated: “Where there is great power there is great 
responsibility, where there is less power there is less responsibility, and where there is no 
power there can, I think, be no responsibility.”41 A person’s position and power affects 
the nature and scope of his or her responsibility. And similarly, the position and power of 
certain groups of people may come to bear on the responsibilities of these collectives and 
their members. (We will specifically discuss the responsibilities of collectives and their 
members in greater detail shortly).  
D. When to Make Reparations (The Proper Place of Corrective Justice) 
While commutative justice does not deal solely with retribution, restitution, and 
restoration, commutative justice includes these aspects of corrective justice. In light of 
our discussion of guilt, blame, fault, and responsibility, it is extremely relevant and 
important to consider when we may be obligated to take restorative steps when we have 
participated in injustice. Are we only obligated to take restorative steps when we are 
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guilty/culpable of wrongdoing? Or are we sometimes obligated to take restorative steps 
even when we bear some responsibility for injustice but are not morally blameworthy?  
Finnis believes that culpability is not necessary in order for restitution or 
restoration to be required.  He gives the example of a failure to perform on a contract. In 
some instances, an individual A may fail to perform on a contract. Finnis claims that in 
such situations, A is required in commutative justice to pay damages to B, even when the 
failure is not culpable.42  Even when the reason for the breach of contract renders A 
morally blameless, he may still be required to compensate B for her loss. Consider a 
situation in which A wishes to sell his car. B expresses interest in the car. A and B agree 
that once payment is received, then A will deliver the car to B. B pays A for the car. As A 
is driving the car to deliver it to B, he is involved in an accident which, although not his 
fault, totals the car. A can no longer fulfill his end of the contract by presenting the car to 
B, but this is not his fault, and he cannot be blamed for the accident. Still, A is responsible 
to compensate B for her loss, which should minimally include returning the money she 
has already paid for the car.  
Young brings in the concept of liability, which she understands to include 
assigning responsibility under the law and in moral judgment in order to “identify liable 
parties for the purposes of sanctioning, punishing, or exacting compensation or 
redress.”43 On this understanding, the purpose of determining liability is to determine 
what one party may owe to another, or what potential consequences may be required 
because of one party’s actions. Young’s understanding is that when someone is liable, 
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this means precisely that he or she is responsible in a way that demands a response. Often 
times this includes a legal response, but this is not always necessary.44 
The important point to make with liability is that actors/agents/parties may be 
held liable for injustice or injury or harm, and subsequently expected to make some sort 
of restitution or restoration or compensation, even if they did not intentionally act 
wrongly and are not morally blameworthy. On the contrary, sometimes you can take 
every foreseeable precaution and still be responsible for harm that befalls others. 
Depending on the circumstances, this may then require a restorative response. Feinberg 
gives the following example:    
…even if a construction company, for example, takes every reasonable precaution 
before dynamiting, it nevertheless can be found liable, if through some freakish 
chance a person at a great distance is injured by a flying rock set in motion by the 
blast, and can be forced to compensate the injured party for his losses. That the 
company was faultlessly careful in its operations is no defense.45  
 
On the other hand, it is not always the case that responsibility for harm carries 
with it liability that necessitates a restorative response. Consider the example above of the 
baseball pitcher with the rogue curve ball.  In this instance, although the offending pitcher 
is responsible for the harm that befalls the injured batter, the pitcher is not expected to 
make any sort of compensation to the batter. The rules of the game of baseball allow the 
batter a free pass to first base, but the inaccurate pitcher need not make any further steps 
of reparation or restitution.  
However, if I am driving a car and lose control after hitting an oddly placed 
construction cone, my lack of moral blameworthiness does not negate my responsibility 
to pay for the damages that I cause as I overcorrect and sideswipe another car. I am liable 
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for the results of the incident, and I am responsible for providing compensation, 
restoration, etcetera for the victim(s) of the accident. Despite the odd circumstances that 
may present in cases such as the baseball case above, for the most part many instances of 
responsibility, even when devoid of moral guilt or blame, carry with them some amount 
of liability for those circumstances. Consequently they also carry some level of obligation 
to make compensating efforts toward restitution, restoration, or retribution. But how far 
do these obligations carry? How far do the arms of commutative justice reach, and with 
whom do we stand in these sorts of obligating relationships?  
IV. With Whom Do We Have Relationships in Commutative Justice?  
A. Back to Narrative Quests 
At the heart of commutative justice lies the reality of our membership in 
communities. Commutative justice is about treating those with whom we have 
relationships justly. And of course our multiple communities are comprised of numerous 
people with whom we possess varying degrees of interconnections and relationships. As 
we already discussed in Chapter Three, Alasdair MacIntyre argues that our membership 
in communities means that our own individual narrative stories intersect with the stories 
of countless others. As such others play a part in my story, and I play a part in theirs.  
But MacIntyre goes further than merely noticing that we play parts in one 
another’s stories. He also asserts that we are accountable for the ways we impact one 
another, and that our actions should be intelligible to other human beings. He states that 
we should “understand an action as something for which someone is accountable, about 
which it is always appropriate to ask the agent for an intelligible account.”46 When we act 
in certain ways (especially in ways that impact those around us), others have the right to 
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question our actions, to ask us why we say or do certain things, and to hold us 
accountable in instances where our actions are unintelligible. Our actions must stand up 
to scrutiny. And the main way that we are able to make our actions and others’ actions 
intelligible is by placing them in the context of narrative histories, “histories both of the 
individuals concerned and of the settings in which they act and suffer.47   
MacIntyre also points out that our stories (both our personal stories and the stories 
we intersect and impact) possess somewhat pre-determined structures. We don’t enter 
onto a blank set that is just waiting for us to build our own narratives from scratch. 
Rather, our stories are constrained by the decisions and actions of others as well as the 
structures that govern our shared lives. As MacIntyre explains,      
I spoke earlier of the agent as not only an actor, but an author. Now I must 
emphasize that what the agent is able to do and say intelligibly as an actor is 
deeply affected by the fact that we are never more (and sometimes less) than the 
co-authors of our own narratives. Only in fantasy do we live what story we please. 
In life…we are always under constraints. We enter upon a stage which we did not 
design and we find ourselves part of an action that was not of our making. Each of 
us being a main character in his own drama plays subordinate parts in the dramas 
of others, and each drama constrains the others…48 
…Of course just as they do not begin where they please, they cannot go on 
exactly as they please either; each character is constrained by the actions of others 
and by the social settings presupposed in his and their actions…49 
…But it is not just that different individuals live in different social 
circumstances; it is also that we all approach our own circumstances as bearers of 
a particular social identity….Hence what is good for me has to be the good for 
one who inhabits these roles. As such, I inherit from the past of my family, my 
city, my tribe, my nation, a variety of debts, inheritances, rightful expectations 
and obligations. These constitute the given of my life, my moral starting point.50 
 
We ALL enter the world in specific places, at specific times, into certain families, 
inhabiting certain regions and countries, inheriting existing social practices, and subject 
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to established political structures. These are our communities, and they are most 
definitely not blank slates or empty manuscripts. They come with histories and structures 
and baggage and expectations and obligations that their members must navigate and 
shoulder.51  
B. Who Are My ‘Neighbors’?  
1. General remarks.  We have established that we are members of communities 
with pre-existing structures and histories. Within these communities, we are constrained 
by the narrative stories of others, and they are constrained by our stories as well. But 
before we can move further we need to ask who exactly are the members in our 
communities with whom we are so intertwined? If we are going to consider what 
standards of conduct commutative justice requires of us in relation to our ‘neighbors’, we 
need to know who our ‘neighbors’ are. Who should we consider to be our fellow 
community members? How narrow or wide should we construe these communities?     
Perhaps we can appeal back to our discussion of patriotism and cosmopolitanism 
from Chapter Three. This discussion, because it was couched in a conversation regarding 
distributive justice, was especially focused on who has certain resources, and whose 
needs should take precedence when one is determining when/where/how to use available 
resources to meet certain fundamental needs. My conclusion was that, especially in 
extreme cases involving grave violations of fundamental human rights, we should ascribe 
to ‘conditional cosmopolitanism’, privileging the needs of human beings qua human 
being over and above closer special relationships.  
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But considering patriotism and cosmopolitanism in relation to commutative 
justice changes the discussion a bit, because now we are only considering duties and 
obligations we have toward people with whom we possess relationships. These could be 
close, tight relationships like those of nuclear family members. Or they could be distant, 
loose ties between consumers and assembly line workers. Nevertheless, duties of 
commutative justice always hinge on relationships we have with fellow community 
members – regardless of whether these represent tight bonds or loose connections, the 
point is that they represent real, existing relationships. 
2. Individuals or groups? Persons known or unknown? Minimally, we can 
draw from the negative duty to refrain from harming others. And we can appeal to the 
focus of corrective justice, which requires restoration when we have come to harm 
others. But as I pointed out earlier, Finnis’s concept of commutative justice involves 
much more than correction, restitution, and restoration. It incorporates the whole field of 
human interactions, with the goal of determining “what dealings are proper between 
persons…”52 Commutative justice considers how we should treat each other all the time. 
But does this apply only to people we know? And does it govern only how we treat other 
individuals, or does it also apply to how we treat groups or aggregates of people? And 
does it matter if I am acting alone, or in concert with other individuals or groups? 
Let us now further consider Finnis’s first three (of five) aspects of commutative 
justice. These were briefly mentioned in Section II above. The first aspect concerns 
relationships between ascertained individuals.53 This is the most straightforward aspect 
of commutative justice, as it deals with relationships between two specific individuals 
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who know each other. It is not controversial to assert that if I am interacting directly with 
another individual, we share some type of relationship. A person with whom I am 
actively communicating is clearly my ‘neighbor’, a person who possesses certain rights,54 
and a person with whom I possess corresponding duties of commutative justice.  
Finnis’s second aspect of commutative justice concerns relationships between 
multiple (or many) ascertained individuals.55 As a teacher I have duties toward many 
different students, each of whom is (more or less) known to me. Again, this seems pretty 
straightforward and uncontroversial. It is not difficult for me to identify these students as 
my ‘neighbors’, even if I don’t know each individual especially well. We share a fairly 
close bond as teacher and students, and it seems obvious that we possess duties and 
responsibilities toward one another in commutative justice. I possess certain duties 
because I have agreed to teach them, and they possess certain duties because they have 
signed up for my course. Furthermore, we all possess duties to respect and treat one 
another in ways befitting of our dignity as human beings. 
Finnis’s third aspect of commutative justice asserts, “…an individual may have 
duties in commutative justice to many more or less unascertained individuals.”56 As I 
explained in Section II above, this means that a person may have duties to multiple others 
who are not known to her.  Finnis believes this especially applies to situations in which 
an individual A might exploit a system that advantages herself, all-the-while knowing that 
such a system simultaneously disadvantages or harms others. It is irrelevant that such an 
individual does not personally know those who are disadvantaged or harmed by such a 
system. It is also irrelevant that such an individual may not control the exploitative 
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system, or intend to disadvantage or harm these others. If A ignores this reality and 
continues to exploit such a system to her own advantage and to the detriment of 
numerous unidentified others, this is seen as commutatively unjust.57  
Young agrees with this assessment of our duties and responsibilities to others who 
are unknown to us, but who are systematically disadvantaged by structures that 
simultaneously work toward our advantage. I already introduced Young’s concept of 
structural injustice above, but it is beneficial now to revisit her view. By way of reminder, 
I will again quote her explanation of structural injustice:   
Structural injustice, then, exists when social processes put large groups of persons 
under systematic threat of domination or deprivation of the means to develop and 
exercise their capacities, at the same time that these processes enable others to 
dominate or to have a wide range of opportunities for developing and exercising 
capacities available to them. Structural injustice is a kind of moral wrong distinct 
from the wrongful action of an individual agent or the repressive policies of a 
state. Structural injustice occurs as a consequence of many individuals and 
institutions acting to pursue their particular goals and interests, for the most part 
within the limits of accepted rules and norms.58 
 
Young clearly believes that in many instances of structural injustice, the 
individuals and institutions who sustain these structures are themselves generally acting 
“within the limits of accepted rules and norms.” Nevertheless, they are still involved in 
supporting and upholding a kind of injustice distinct from direct, wrongful action. 
Furthermore, it is often impossible to develop a causal connection between a particular 
agent and direct harms to other individuals. Young articulates the problem, and her 
proposed solution, as follows:  
The problem with structural injustice is that we cannot trace this kind of [causal] 
connection. It is not difficult to identify persons who contribute to structural 
processes. On the whole, however, it is not possible to identify how the actions of 
one particular individual, or even one particular collective agent, such as a firm, 
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has directly produced harm to other specific individuals…If we want to say that 
some people nevertheless bear responsibility for structural injustice, then we need 
a conception of responsibility different from the standard conception, which 
focuses on individual action and its unique relations to a harm. I propose such an 
alternative conception…which I call a social connection model of responsibility. 
The social connection model finds that all those who contribute by their actions to 
structural processes with some unjust outcomes share responsibility for the 
injustice. This responsibility is not primarily backward-looking, as the attribution 
of guilt or fault is, but rather primarily forward-looking. Being responsible in 
relation to structural injustice means that one has an obligation to join with others 
who share that responsibility in order to transform the structural processes to 
make their outcomes less unjust.59  
 
Young’s social connection model of responsibility understands that we commonly 
use the term ‘responsible’ in different ways. On one understanding, being responsible is 
understood as being guilty or at fault. But the sense of ‘responsible’ that Young is most 
concerned with is summed up with the understanding that “people have certain 
responsibilities by virtue of their social roles and positions, as when we say that a teacher 
has specific responsibilities, or we appeal to our responsibilities as citizens.”60 Therefore, 
determining responsibility in this sense does not involve finding fault or liability for a 
past wrong, but rather “it refers to agents’ carrying out activities in a morally appropriate 
way and seeing to it that certain outcomes obtain.”61  
This reminds me of MacIntyre’s belief in the interconnectedness of our narrative 
stories - that we are accountable for the ways we impact one another, and that our actions 
should be intelligible to other human beings.62 The distinction between these views is that 
MacIntyre focuses primarily on the responsibility of individuals to act in certain ways. 
Young focuses specifically on shared responsibility, which on her social connection 
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model can only be discharged through collective action.63 Still, though, Young’s focus on 
responsibility deriving from “belonging together with others in a system of 
interdependent processes of cooperation and competition through which we seek benefits 
and aim to realize projects”64 seems extremely MacIntyrean. 
  Moral philosopher Elizabeth Ashford also agrees with Young’s assessment that 
being ‘responsible’ concerns fulfilling social roles and positions. Ashford points out that 
the traditional conception of duties and responsibilities specifically related to human 
rights65 is inadequate in our current era.  On this traditional conception, responsibility for 
a human rights violation is assigned by identifying the perpetrator(s) of the violation, and 
attaching blame “for a specific harm suffered by a particular victim” to that agent or 
agents.66 But Ashford further claims that the current climate renders this traditional 
conception lacking, because the harms inflicted on many global people “increasingly 
result from extremely complex causal chains involving the behaviour of a huge number 
of agents, few or none of whom can be singled out as responsible for a serious harm to 
any specific victim.”67 
Samuel Scheffler points out that we naturally give primacy to individual effects 
over group effects, and that “when an outcome is the joint result of the actions of a 
number of people, including ourselves, we tend to see our own agency as implicated to a 
much lesser extent than we do when we take an effect to have resulted solely from our 
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own actions.”68 This is an empirical observation, explaining how we psychologically 
attempt to lessen our own feelings of responsibility when others act alongside us. But as 
Scheffler further explains, a variety of developments in the modern world (e.g. advances 
in science, technology, travel, communications, information processing, economic and 
political interdependence, and population growth) have “made it more difficult than ever 
to sustain the conception of human social relations as consisting primarily in small-scale 
interactions among single individuals.”69  
Additionally, Ashford addresses the concept of indirect responsibility for human 
rights violations. She points out that sometimes individuals contribute non-voluntarily to 
complex causal chains that lead to harms, and their contributions are neither foreseeable 
nor avoidable.70 Generally, in such cases the offending agents find that their greatest 
causal impact is “via their participation in social institutions.”71 Ashford admits that it 
may be difficult or impossible for agents to predict just how their individual actions will 
affect others. Furthermore, Ashford recognizes that it is not feasible for most agents to 
withdraw from the social institutions in which they participate, and it is “not plausible to 
hold agents directly morally responsible for their individual causal contribution to the 
harms resulting form the operation of social institutions.”72 However, Ashford does 
believe it is appropriate to attribute to such individuals a shared responsibility for the 
shaping of the social institutions in which they participate.73  
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It is possible that we participate in institutions that contribute to human rights 
violations (e.g. political structures that allow torture), and it is possible that we participate 
in social institutions that themselves constitute human rights violations (e.g. legal 
structures that allow slavery).74 Ashford believes that responsibility for laws such as 
those that condoned and sustained antebellum slavery “lay with the citizens who 
sustained them.”75 
This leaves the question, then, regarding how much responsibility individuals 
actually carry for wrongs produced in concert with numerous others. Young points out, 
though, that her social connection model does not assign liability to some in ways that 
absolve others. Shared responsibility for actions that contribute to structural processes 
producing structural injustices “is a responsibility I personally bear, but I do not bear it 
alone.”76 It is not possible in such circumstances to mathematically divide out which 
person is responsible for which bits of harm inflicted on others, and so while 
responsibility is shared, it is not divided and distributed. Young explains:  
In thinking about shared responsibility, I am indebted to Larry May’s theory. 
According to May, the concept of shared responsibility is distinct from the 
concept of collective responsibility in that the former is a distributed 
responsibility, whereas the latter is not. A collective of persons, such as a 
corporation, might be said to be responsible for a state of affairs without any of its 
constituent individuals being determinately responsible for it. Shared 
responsibility, on the other hand, is a personal responsibility for outcomes or the 
risks of harmful outcomes, produced by a group of persons. Each is personally 
responsible for the outcome in a partial way, since he or she alone does not 
produce the outcomes; the specific part that each plays in producing the outcome 
cannot be isolated and identified, however, and thus the responsibility is 
essentially shared.77 
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The takeaway here is that when a group of people is responsible for together inflicting 
harm on another person or group of people, even when those harms are unintentional or 
merely the result of participation in structural injustice, the individuals involved bear 
responsibility as individuals.  
I have now argued that individuals have duties/responsibilities in commutative 
justice both to other individuals and groups, and both to ascertained and unascertained 
peoples. As such, our ‘neighbors’ are not only those people whom we find proximally 
close to us, and with whom we share close relational ties, but also many others with 
whom we share social structures and global ties. When we participate in actions or 
structures that produce injustices for our ‘neighbors’, whether near or far, known or 
unknown to us, we share responsibility for these injustices.  We may not be guilty or 
morally blameworthy, but we are still responsible by virtue of our social roles and 
relationships, and the interconnectedness of our narrative quests. So then, when we find 
ourselves responsible for injustices near and far, what does commutative justice demand 
we do in response? To this question we now turn. 
V. What Does Commutative Justice Demand of Us?  
A. Taking Responsibility, Regardless of Guilt 
In the initial description of commutative justice in Section II above, I pointed to 
the following three questions from Finnis: (1) “What are the standards of conduct which 
individuals must live up to in relation to their ‘neighbors’?” (2) “What should be the 
extent of liability of one who fails to live up to those standards or conduct?” and (3) 
“How should those injured by the wrongs of others be restored to their former 
		 122 
condition?”78 We have addressed and discussed the first two questions. In relation to 
question (1), we must minimally refrain from harming our ‘neighbors’, and we should 
consider how all of our relational interactions affect the narrative stories of those around 
us, both near and far. In relation to question (2), we are responsible for numerous 
instances of harm in relation to numerous individuals and groups of people, even though 
in many of these instances we may not be morally blameworthy or guilty or culpable for 
these injustices. However, even when we are not guilty of wrongdoing, we often times 
may be liable for taking restorative steps on behalf of those who have been affected or 
harmed by our participation in injustices against them.  
So now we need to attend to question (3), “How should those injured by the 
wrongs of others be restored to their former condition?”79 Or we may want to rephrase 
this question to read something like, “When we are responsible for injustice, what should 
we do in order to restore or compensate or rehabilitate or pay restitution to those who 
have been victimized or harmed by our individual actions or our actions in concert with 
other individuals, groups, structures, and institutions?”  
  When we can connect an agent’s “intentions, motives, and consequences of 
actions”80 to a specific harm, and when we can “connect a person’s deed linearly to the 
harm for which we seek to assign responsibility,”81 then there is clearer picture of both a 
violation of negative duties and of the requirements of commutative justice. Furthermore, 
in such instances the responsible offending party is likely obligated to make specific 
restorative steps toward the victim(s). For instance, if an agent C knowingly and willfully 
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parks on his neighbor D’s yard leaving muddy tire tracks and ruining D’s newly laid sod, 
then C should minimally expend whatever funds are necessary to restore D’s yard to its 
former state.    
But when we cannot draw such easy, linear connections between responsible (or 
even guilty) agents and the victim(s) of their actions, where does this leave us? What 
should we do when we share responsibility with others for structural injustice(s)? What 
should we do when we bear some responsibility for injustices done to people we may not 
even know, in places far from where we live?   
As Hannah Arendt states, we can still be responsible and liable for things we have 
not specifically done, even though we cannot be considered guilty for things in which we 
have not actively participated.82 We have already established that our lack of guilt does 
not necessarily result in a lack of responsibility. But what is the nature of the 
responsibility we have toward people we have not individually or intentionally harmed? 
When the responsibility we have toward others is a collective responsibility – meaning a 
responsibility due to membership in a group with which we cannot voluntarily dissolve83 
- the relevant question involves whether a person’s conduct is good for the world and 
those in it (rather than good for ourselves).84 This type of responsibility – the primary 
consideration of what is good for “the world” - Arendt labels “political responsibility.”85 
Young further explains Arendt’s conception of political responsibility as follows:  
Political responsibility…concerns how things stand in the world. Whatever the 
cause of sufferings, they are our responsibility to notice and address. Or, the sins 
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of our fathers have continuing effect, and inasmuch as we belong to a political 
community continuous with theirs, we have responsibility for them.86 
 
Arendt also points out that the only way to escape this political and collective 
responsibility is to remove ourselves from our communities. However, we cannot live 
without belonging to some community, so all we can hope to do is “exchange one 
community for another and hence one kind of responsibility for another.”87 Young goes 
further to also remind us that as we participate in communities, we likely benefit from the 
operation of institutions within those communities. She states,  
This [political] responsibility falls on members of a society by virtue of the fact 
that they are aware moral agents who ought not to be indifferent to the fate of 
others and the danger that states and other organized institutions often pose to 
some people. This responsibility is largely unavoidable in the modern world, 
because we participate in and usually benefit from the operation of these 
institutions…88  
 
Where these institutions exhibit structural injustices, we are obligated to work toward 
transforming them. Those who are harmed by these systems are our neighbors. They are 
people with whom our narrative quests intersect. They are others with whom we are 
“joined together.”89  
B. The Broad, Indeterminate Obligations of Commutative Justice  
 If we are hoping for specific, concrete actions we are obligated to take to fulfill 
our duties in commutative justice, we are likely to be disappointed. As Judith Lichtenberg 
points out, believing our duties “can be parsed into simple and determinate duties is 
highly misleading at best.” She goes on to say that no plausible moral theory has ever 
shown a credible way of determining precisely what people should and should not be 
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obligated to do or refrain from doing.90 Ashford agrees, and in writing specifically 
regarding compensating for violations of negative duties, she does not find it problematic 
that we do not know exactly what we must do to discharge such duties. She thus states: 
Fulfillment of the negative duty not to collaborate in unjust institutions requires us 
to take actions to support reform of these institutions or so as to minimize the 
extent of our collaboration in them, or to provide recompense for the harms they 
cause. The nature of this action is no more specified than is the action we should 
take to carry out a positive duty of aid. The way in which we support institutional 
reform is open, and it is also open which particular harms we should seek to 
oppose or compensate for…The duty of individual members is therefore not a 
perfect duty with a specific content that can be fully discharged…it is largely 
indeterminate how to prevent the right not to be deprived of access to basic 
necessities from being violated. The onus is on individual agents to decide how to 
implement their share of the corresponding negative duty.91  
 
If anything, then, this indeterminacy of our responsibilities in commutative justice leaves 
room for us to choose not if, but how we will go about discharging our obligations. And 
while not laying out a specific required path, at least one general demand that victims 
have toward agents who harm them through participation in unjust institutions is that 
those agents seek to reform such institutions.92 
 Young agrees with this general call to work toward transforming the processes 
that currently produce unjust outcomes for our neighbors. She points out that her social 
connection model is “forward-looking” and “seeks to assign responsibility for structural 
injustice that has existed recently, is ongoing, and is likely to persist unless social 
processes change.”93 Furthermore, her social connection model is not interested in 
determining causal relationships between actors and victims in order to attribute blame 
and seek redress. She states, “The injustices produced through structures have not 
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reached a terminus, but rather are ongoing. The point is not to compensate for the past, 
but for all who contribute to processes producing unjust outcomes to work to transform 
those processes.”94 Young’s goal is not to determine blame, but rather to motivate 
change.  
Young’s appeal to political responsibility also provides us with some guidelines 
regarding how we should act in response to structural injustice. Political responsibly is 
not a responsibility to do certain things on our own, in isolation from others. Young 
argues, “Political responsibility is not about doing something by myself, however, but 
about exhorting others to join me in collective action.”95 Such collective action should 
include “…watching these institutions, monitoring their effects to make sure that they are 
not grossly harmful, and maintaining organized public spaces where such watching and 
monitoring can occur and citizens can speak publicly and support one another in their 
efforts to prevent suffering.”96  
When faced with the question of what we are obligated to do to combat 
commutative injustice, it is again helpful to appeal to MacIntyre’s conception of the 
narrative quests of many people intersecting with and informing one another’s pursuits. 
As MacIntyre asserts,  “I can only answer the question ‘What am I to do?’ if I can answer 
the prior question ‘Of what story or stories do I find myself a part?’”97 Again, the broad, 
indeterminate nature of our obligations and responsibilities in commutative justice make 
it difficult to know precisely what we should do – both as individuals and members of 
communities – when we are faced with relational injustices of many varieties. But what 
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we can know for sure is that because we live in relational communities, we are 
responsible for favoring and fostering the common good of our neighbors in those 
communities.98 Perhaps a good place to start is with opening our eyes and ears and 
making a real effort to see, hear, and understand the lives of these ‘others’ with whom our 
lives intersect in numerous and various ways. When these ‘others’ become known to us, 
the ways we should care about their lives as well as our own will likely become much 
more obvious.  
VI. Conclusion 
 
In his book on corrective justice, Ernest Weinrib asserts that corrective justice is 
about remedying the past, not about looking toward the future and making things better. 
It’s about undoing the past, not improving the future.99 Perhaps this is precisely what 
corrective justice is meant to pursue. But we are concerned with something much more 
comprehensive than this. Commutative justice involves both looking to the past to seek 
restitution for victims of numerous injustices, and looking forward to the future in order 
to address systems and institutions and even ideologies that continue to oppress and 
disadvantage and harm our ‘neighbors’. Commutative justice involves all the multiple 
ways that we live relationally in our shared world, and governs all of our actions and 
interactions with those around us.  
 There are numerous ways that we may be involved, both directly and indirectly, 
in failing to execute our duties and responsibilities in commutative justice toward our 
fellow human beings. But perhaps the words of Herbert Morris can provide some 
encouragement of where we can go from here. According to Morris, injustice cannot 
																																								 																				
98 Finnis, 165.  
99 Weinrib, 36. 
		 128 
exist unless we also have a conception of joining together and righting those injustices. 
He explains the following:      
Wrongdoing is failing to reach a level of attainment that individuals generally are 
seen as able to satisfy. When we possess the concept of wrongdoing, I want to 
suggest that it is connected for us with the concept of “being joined together” with 
another or others, the idea of union, the idea, too, that in this union one is 
complete, one is whole, in a way that one would not be without it…Next, 
wrongdoing arises in a world in which there is a conception of righting the wrong. 
It arises in a world in which persons possess a conception not just of separation 
from others but of coming together again with them, a conception of mending 
what has been torn, repairing what has been damaged – restoration.”100  
 
And I would add that in this sense, ‘restoration’ can include both backward-looking 
restitution and forward-looking change. We can assess historical injustices and determine 
when we may be obligated to take actions to repay or restore what was once taken. And 
we can come together to fight for long-term structural changes that will ensure that these 
types of damages and harms vanish from our shared world. Oh that we would always 
look to treat each other with the dignity and respect due one another as fellow travelers 
on the road to pursing our narrative quests with one another. And oh that our interactions 
with one another along these quests would always serve to encourage and never serve to 
degrade or disadvantage them.  
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CHAPTER 5
 
CONNECTING VIOLATIONS OF JUSTICE TO  
MODERN SLAVERY 
 
I. Introduction: Bringing Things Together 
I began this project by laying out the current status of slavery in our contemporary 
world. I defined slavery in our modern context, and I explained ways in which today’s 
slavery is similar to and also different from historical forms of slavery. I then spent two 
chapters discussing the general demands of justice. I appealed to John Finnis’s two major 
categories of justice - distributive justice and commutative justice. Distributive justice 
deals with the proper ways of distributing and allocating common stock resources and the 
incidents of communal enterprise amongst people. Commutative justice deals with proper 
interactions between people, including but not limited to the responsibility to restore or 
pay restitution to a victim when he or she has been unjustly harmed.  
You may be wondering how these discussions fit together. You are in luck! The 
purpose of the present chapter is to explain how the existence of modern slavery violates 
the requirements of both distributive and commutative justice. It answers the question 
“How is modern slavery our problem?” Once this case is made, it will propel us toward 
our concluding chapter, in which I will make suggestions regarding what we can and 
should do to fight for justice on behalf of today’s slaves, ultimately answering the 
question, “What are we obligated to do to help modern slaves?” 
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II. Slavery and Distributive Justice 
A. The Relationship Between Poverty and Slavery 
 In order to understand one of the primary ways that injustice in distribution leads 
to slavery, we must first explore the reality of world poverty and its effects on global 
citizens who are impoverished. According to Kevin Bales, those who are working around 
the world to free slaves have learned that poverty and vulnerability play a major role in 
driving people to slavery, and that slavery “always reflects differences in economic and 
social power.”1 He also asserts that those who become enslaved “lack both the personal 
and financial resources and the social and governmental protections to prevent their 
enslavement.”2 David Batstone states, “…denying the central role of poverty in modern-
day slavery is like denying the central role of gravity in rainfall.”3 
So what exactly is the current status of world poverty? According to a 2014 report 
from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),  
Globally, 1.2 billion people (22 percent) live on less that $1.25 a day. Increasing 
the income poverty line to $2.50 a day raises the global income poverty rate to 
about 50 percent, or 2.7 billion people. Moving the poverty line in this way draws 
in a large number of people who are potentially vulnerable to poverty and reduced 
circumstances. In South Asia 44.4 percent of the population, around 730 million 
people, live on $1.25-$2.50 a day. Many who recently joined the middle class 
could easily fall back into poverty with a sudden change in circumstances… 
Sizeable portions of the population are close to the poverty threshold (the “near 
poor”), and such a clustering implies that idiosyncratic or generalized shocks 
could easily push a large number of people back into poverty.4  
 
																																								 																				
1 Kevin Bales, Understanding Global Slavery: A Reader (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 
10. 
2 Ibid. 
3 David Batstone, Not for Sale: The Return of the Global Slave Trade – And How We Can Fight It (New 
York: HarperCollins, 2010), 290. 
4 "Sustaining Human Progress: Reducing Vulnerabilities and Building Resilience," Human Development 
Report 2014, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), page 19, accessed March 22, 2018, 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr14-report-en-1.pdf. 
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Also in 2014, 805 million global citizens (1 in 9) suffered from hunger.5 Children are 
disproportionately impacted by poverty.  UNICEF reports that in 2013, nearly “385 
million children were living in extremely poor households…with 19.5 percent of children 
in developing countries estimated to live on less than $1.90 a day, compared to 9.2 per 
cent of adults.”6  
 The UNDP also goes beyond merely assessing the reality of economic poverty, 
but also points out other factors that may make certain people or groups of people 
generally more vulnerable than others. Such factors may include a history of unequal 
treatment within some societies especially in regards to gender, ethnicity, geographic 
location, and other similar qualities.7 Furthermore, “Many of the most vulnerable people 
and groups face numerous and overlapping constraints on their ability to cope with 
setbacks. For example, those who are poor and also from a minority group, or are female 
and have disabilities, face multiple barriers which can negatively reinforce each other.”8  
Given these staggering numbers regarding global poverty, along with factors that 
increase the vulnerability of underprivileged individuals and groups, we now can 
consider the ways in which many global people are especially vulnerable to exploitation 
(including slavery) due to these factors. In order to do this, we should first understand 
implications of the immense population explosion following World War II.9 In 
approximately a fifty-year period the world population expanded astronomically, from 
																																								 																				
5 “World hunger falls, but 805 million still chronically undernourished,” Food and Agricultural 
Organization of the United Nations, September 16, 2014, accessed March 22, 2018, 
http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/243839/icode/. 
6 “Ending Extreme Poverty: A Focus on Children,” Briefing Note, UNICEF and World Band Group, page 
3, October 2016, accessed March 22, 2018, https://data.unicef.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/Ending_Extreme_Poverty_A_Focus_on_Children_Oct_2016.pdf. 
7 “Sustaining Human Progress,” iv.  
8 Ibid.  
9 Kevin Bales, Zoe Trodd, and Alex Kent Williamson, Modern Slavery: A Beginner’s Guide (Oxford: 
Oneworld, 2011), 53. 
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two billion to over six billion people. Several factors led to this boom, including better 
control of infectious diseases, better healthcare for children, and an overall increase in 
prosperity. However, most of this population boom occurred in the developing world, and 
the overall increase in global prosperity has not transferred to the poorest of the poor. 
While simply having lots of people does not guarantee that they are susceptible to 
slavery, when the regions most impacted by this massive population boom have 
insufficient resources and structures to sustain these numbers, the resulting 
impoverishment does breed a large population of people whose most basic needs are 
unmet and who are thus more susceptible to slavery out of desperation.10  
This explosion of impoverished people has resulted in another modern 
phenomenon regarding slavery – the sharp decrease in the monetary value of slaves. For 
4,000 years in the historical past, prior to the recent population explosion, the price of a 
slave fluctuated between $10,000-$40,000 in today’s currency. Since about 1950, the 
average price for a slave has dropped to less than $100,11 and in some places slaves can 
be bought (for life) for as little as $10.12 As Bales, Trodd, and Williamson explain, “The 
supply of possible slaves is especially plentiful among the 1 billion people who live on 
about a dollar a day, a population concentrated in the developing world.”13 So the current 
situation is this – there exists today a massive population of people who are impoverished 
and desperate to have their most basic needs met. They are willing to take risks in hopes 
of a better life for themselves and their children. There are individuals and networks of 
																																								 																				
10 Bales, Trodd, and Williamson, Modern Slavery: Beginner’s Guide, 53. 
11 Ibid., 51. 
12 Ibid., 29. 
13 Ibid., 51.  
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people poised to take advantage of this fact,14 and consequently some of these desperate 
people end up enslaved. The sharp increase in world population since World War II, 
especially in the developing world, has made it such that buying slaves is extremely 
cheap. And because slaves are so cheap and plentiful, they are seen as disposable and 
easily replaceable.15 
 Consider the reasons why someone might voluntarily enter into an agreement 
with a recruiter who promises good wages or educational opportunities, or why a parent 
might agree to sell their children to strangers who promise them a better life. The most 
obvious reason is that these people are impoverished and desperate, seeing few other 
options for a better life for themselves or their children, and are therefore willing to take 
risks in hopes that the promises being made are actually legitimate. Remember back to 
our discussions of debt bondage and contract slavery from Chapter Two, and the stories 
of Ajay and Vi. These are two examples of impoverished individuals who became 
enslaved because they saw no other viable options for survival. Bales, Trodd, and 
Williamson state that “[s]ome parents sell their children, or agree to take an ‘advance’ on 
the wages they will supposedly earn, not just for the money, but also in hope that their 
children will escape a situation of poverty.”16 And as modern abolitionist David Batstone 
explains,  
Widespread poverty and social inequality ensure a pool of recruits as deep as the 
ocean. Parents in desperate straits may sell their children or at least be susceptible 
to scams that will allow the slave trader to take control of the lives of their sons 
and daughters. Young women in vulnerable communities are more likely to take a 
risk on a job offer in a faraway location. The poor are apt to accept a loan that the 
slave trader can later manipulate to steal their freedom. All of these paths carry 
																																								 																				
14 Bales, Trodd, and Williamson, Modern Slavery: Beginner’s Guide, 51-54; Bales, Understanding Global 
Slavery, 25, 88.  
15 Bales, Trodd, and Williamson, Modern Slavery: Beginner’s Guide, 28-29. 
16 Ibid., 43. 
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unsuspecting recruits into the supply chains of slavery. “The supply side of the 
equation is particularly bleak,” says Senator Sam Brownback of Kansas. “Fifty 
million refugees and displaced persons exist worldwide today. This ready 
reservoir of the stateless presents an opportunity rife for exploitation by human 
traffickers.”17 
 
If you are still left with doubts, I encourage you to check out the photo project 
“Dollar Street,”18 in which Anna Rosling Rönnlund uses photography to compare the 
living conditions of people at different income levels around the world. This project 
showcases 30,000 pictures of 264 families from 50 different countries, and compares 
their homes, toilets, cooking facilities, children’s toys, and numerous other categories. 
When you see visual images of the living conditions of the poorest of these families, one 
does not have to marvel at why these families may be utterly desperate, and why some 
are willing to take risks in the hopes that their quality of life and their children’s futures 
might be made better. I personally cannot look at these photographs without tears in my 
eyes. When a family’s most prized possession in the world is their children’s birth 
documents, this is the reality of poverty.19  
B. Poverty (and slavery) as an Indication of Distributive Injustice 
The startling reality is that it is not a general lack of money that keeps people 
impoverished. According to a July 2017 Oxfam International report, “Eight men own the 
																																								 																				
17 Batstone, 11. Batstone quotes Sam Brownback, press conference (U.S. Capitol, Washington, D.C., 
September 23, 2003). 
18 Anna Rosling Rönnlund, “Dollar Street,” gapminder.org, accessed March 22, 2018, 
https://www.gapminder.org/dollar-street/family. 
19 Rönnlund, “Dollar Street.” (See photos of “Home of Jacques family,” Haiti). The even deeper reality is 
that many of the world’s poor do not even have legal documentation such as birth certificates, making them 
practically invisible and extremely vulnerable. When there is no record of your existence, it is very easy for 
you to disappear. See Sarah Morrison, “220 million children who don’t exist: A birth certificate is a 
passport to a better life – so why can’t we all have one?” Independent, July 27, 2013, accessed March 26, 
2018, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/220-million-children-who-dont-exist-a-birth-
certificate-is-a-passport-to-a-better-life-so-why-cant-8735046.html; also see “Children Out of Sight, Out of 
Mind, Out of Reach,” UNICEF, December 14, 2005, accessed April 12, 2018, https://www.unicef.org/ 
sowc06/press/release.php. 
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same wealth as the 3.6 billion people who make up the poorest half of humanity.”20 The 
report claims that inequalities between the rich and the poor continue to grow, and that 
70% of the world’s citizens live in countries where inequality has increased over the past 
30 years. According to the report,  
Oxfam interviewed women working in a garment factory in Vietnam who work 
12 hours a day, 6 days a week and still struggle to get by on the $1 an hour they 
earn producing clothes for some of the world’s biggest fashion brands. The CEOs 
of these companies are some of the highest paid people in the world. Corporate 
tax dodging costs poor countries at least $100 billion every year. This is enough 
money to provide an education for the 124 million children who aren’t in school 
and fund healthcare interventions that could prevent the deaths of at least six 
million children every year.21 
 
In Southeast Asia, although industrialization could serve to stimulate growth in 
the overall economy, this is not the reality. Accumulated wealth is unevenly distributed. 
The concentration of land and capital is relegated to a small, elite group, while the needs 
of the poor masses are ignored.22 Furthermore, distributive inequality is not only a 
problem when it comes to monetary wealth and property ownership. As we discussed in 
Chapter Three, distributive justice also concerns the distribution of things like 
opportunities and advantages.23 So when David Batstone reports, “At least one in every 
three of Cambodia’s 15 million people live below the poverty line today. Cambodian 
women, above all, do not get the chance to study formally or learn vocational skills,”24 
this exemplifies an unjust distribution of the opportunities and advantages offered by 
receiving an education or vocational training. These realities seem to lend credence to the 
declaration of Pope Francis I, who states, “Human rights are violated not only by 
																																								 																				
20 “Just 8 men own same wealth as half the world,” Oxfam International, January 16, 2017, accessed March 
26, 2018, https://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/pressreleases/2017-01-16/just-8-men-own-same-wealth-
half-world. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Batstone, 20-21. 
23 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 166.  
24 Batstone, 21. 
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terrorism, repression or assassination, but also by unfair economic structures that create 
huge inequalities.”25  
 Still, it may be easy for many of us “average” folks to criticize the world’s 
billionaires, and yet to feel like we have not reaped any special benefits from our position 
of relative affluence in the global economy. But Peter Singer points out that while 1.4 
billion people (in 2009) live in extreme poverty, about a billion people live at a level of 
affluence never before experienced outside of kings and nobles. And in some ways, these 
1 billion people are better off than historical kings when we consider our access to things 
like air conditioning, balanced diets including fruits and vegetables, and good medical 
care.26 Singer points out that another indicator of our wealth is the small amount of time 
we work in order to provide the food we need. He states, “Today Americans spend, on 
average, only 6 percent of their income on buying food. If they work a forty-hour week, it 
takes them barely two hours to earn enough to feed themselves for the week. That leaves 
far more to spend on consumer goods, entertainment, and vacations.”27  
 Now I suppose many who read this do in fact spend more than 6 percent of their 
income on food. Still, many of us have more expendable income than we might 
recognize. Consider that we waste $100 billion of food in the United States annually.28 
Consider that in 2014, people around the world spent $10 billion on beverages at 
Starbucks! If everyone gave up drinking Starbucks for a year and diverted that money 
toward feeding the poor, 1/3 of the world’s hungry people would be fed.29  Or consider 
																																								 																				
25 “Sustaining human progress,” 14. 
26 Peter Singer, The Life You Can Save (New York: Random House, 2009), 9.  
27 Ibid.  
28 Ibid., 11.  
29 Saleem S. Khatri, “Crazy stats on how much Starbucks we drink each year,” Business Insider, July 29, 
2015, accessed March 27, 2018, http://www.businessinsider.com/here-are-some-crazy-stats-about-how-
much-starbucks-we-drink-each-year-2015-7.  
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that a 2004 press release from the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) divulged the following 
information regarding luxury consumption: “Americans spend an estimated $20 billion 
on ice cream, while Europeans spend $11 billion. The global population spends: $18 
billion worldwide on facial cosmetics, $15 billion on perfumes and $14 billion on ocean 
cruises.”30 These are products that many if not most people in the developed world enjoy, 
even among those of lower socioeconomic standing. And while we spend billions upon 
billions of dollars on wasted food, coffee, ice cream, cosmetics, perfumes, cruises, and 
numerous other consumer products, the world’s poorest citizens are short food for all or 
part of each year, cannot afford to keep their children in school, live in unstable housing, 
and have no clean source of drinking water.31  
 My intention here is not to embark on a detailed analysis of global economics, 
partly because I am definitely no economist, and partly because that would distract us 
from the more general argument that seems pertinent here. My concern is not with the 
specifics of how global economic structures bring about such stark inequalities. Rather, 
my intention is make an empirical observation – half of the people in the world live off of 
$2.50 a day or less, while others of us spend so much money on coffee and ice cream that 
we could put a massive dent in poverty, if not completely eradiate it. Regardless of how 
this inequality exists, the fact is that it does exist.  
And just as it is not a lack of money that keeps people impoverished, money is 
even less of an issue when it comes to freeing the enslaved. Freeing slaves in the 
developing world often does not cost much money. Bales mentions an organization in 
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northern India called the Sankalp organization which can help an entire family move 
from slavery into freedom for around $35 USD.32 In Bales’ words, “Freedom may be 
precious, but it doesn’t have to be expensive.”33 Bales goes on to imagine how financially 
possible it might actually be to free the world’s slaves. Conjecturing that the figure of $35 
for freedom and a new life applies to all slaves, and supposing there are 27 million slaves, 
it would cost $945 million to end slavery on our planet.34 And even if we double or triple 
or quadruple this amount to account for more slaves or higher amounts of money to 
achieve their freedom, we could end slavery altogether in exchange for our global 
Starbucks habit.  
What does this tell us about the distribution of the world’s wealth if one portion 
spends $31 billion on ice cream and $10 billion on coffee, while a massive portion (50 
percent) lives on less than $2.50 a day and struggles to feed, clothe, shelter, and educate 
their families? This level of distributive injustice leaves millions of men, women, and 
children vulnerable to slavery. Perhaps becoming a ‘conditional cosmopolitan’ means 
that instead of taking my daughter to get ice cream as a reward for good grades, I should 
divert that money toward alleviating hunger for other children. Or better yet, I could take 
my daughter with me and we could together engage in some activity to alleviate the 
suffering of some of the world’s most vulnerable people. 
 
  
																																								 																				
32 Bales, Understanding Global Slavery, 16-17. This number is calculated by adding the annual wages of 
outreach workers, transportation costs to rural villages, costs of organizing and guaranteeing seed money 
and maintaining microcredit unions, Sankal office expenses, etc., and then dividing by the number of 
families helped in a year.  
33 Ibid., 17.  
34 Bales, Understanding Global Slavery, 17. (Bales recognizes that some slaves may cost more to liberate. 
We must also consider that Bales’s 2005 estimate of 27 million slaves is likely extremely low today. In 
Chapter 2, I pointed out that one anti-slavery organization suggests that there are 45 million slaves today).  
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C. The Demands of Distributive Justice on Behalf of Slaves 
You may ask, “So what if I have an expensive coffee habit? I am entitled to spend 
my hard-earned money however I see fit.” But this may not actually be the case. In 
Chapter Three we compared the libertarian “entitlement theory” championed by Robert 
Nozick with John Finnis’s view of distributive justice. By way of reminder, Nozick 
believes that redistribution according to certain patterned principles (such as merit, effort, 
or need) is unjust. Taking from some people things for which they hold justly either 
through acquisition or transfer, and redistributing them to others, is tantamount to 
stealing.35 However, we also explored the sticky territory of justice in holdings. Nozick 
himself admits that some holdings are acquired through theft, fraud, or enslavement, and 
that justice in holdings depends on what has actually happened historically.36 Consider 
the land that my husband and I own. How can we even know that the original acquisition 
of the land was just, or that every transfer of the land from one owner to the next was 
just?  
Furthermore, even presuming that a plot of land (or numerous other similar 
resources) was justly acquired and has been justly transferred throughout history, this 
does not entitle the owner to do whatever she wants with the land if this includes 
privileging her own desires to the extent that she neglects the fundamental needs of 
others. This is precisely Finnis’s point when he argues that common stock resources and 
incidents of communal enterprise, although rightly allocated to certain individuals 
because otherwise they are not useful, are ultimately meant to benefit the common good 
of the community.  
																																								 																				
35 Robert Nozick, “Anarchy, State, and Utopia,” in Justice: A Reader, ed. Michael J. Sandel (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), 65.  
36 Ibid., 61.  
		 140 
As was explained in Chapter Three, acquisitions are made, and private holdings 
are encouraged, not for the purpose of hoarding for oneself, but for the purpose of 
increasing value and productivity for the benefit of the common good of the members of 
one’s communities.37 If one person or group is hoarding resources that should be put to 
use benefiting the greater community, then those resources should be reallocated to 
someone who can and will use them for greater benefit. Finnis explains this the following 
way:  
Those arguments [for the permissibility of private ownership] in no way suggest 
that private ownership, thus understood, is unconditionally just. On the contrary, 
by starting from the general notion of the common good, and by emphasizing that 
natural resources are essentially common stock (though apt for distribution, 
including distribution as private property), the arguments themselves suggest the 
conditions which private owners must conform to if their ownership is to be 
distributively just. As private owner of a natural resource or capital good, one has 
a duty in justice to put it to productive use or, if one lacks the further resources 
required to do so, to dispose of it to someone willing and able to do 
so…speculative acquisition and disposition of property, for the purposes of 
merely financial gain uncorrelated with any economically productive 
development or use, is contrary to distributive justice.38 
 
We should also appeal back Sarah Clark Miller’s discussion of our “duty to care” 
for the fundamental needs of others, and her observation that we all find ourselves 
weakly vulnerable and dependent on one another at various points. If we assume that 
others have a duty to care for us in our times of need, we must also recognize that we 
have a duty to care for them in the midst of their needs.39 Additionally, when we consider 
Miller’s list of fundamental needs, it is clear that the practice of slavery violates all 
eleven of these needs in some way. For easy reference, her fundamental needs include: 
(1) nutrition and water, (2) rest, (3) shelter (including clothing), (4) healthy environment 
																																								 																				
37 Finnis, 170.  
38 Finnis, 172. 
39 Sarah Clark Miller, The Ethics of Need: Agency, Dignity, and Obligation (New York: Routledge, 2012), 
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(hygienic, non-toxic, etc.), (5) bodily integrity (freedom from physical and sexual abuse, 
freedom to control matters affecting their bodies, etc.), (6) healing (access to some 
medical attention), (7) education, (8) attachments (positive emotional attachments), (9) 
social inclusion, participation, and recognition, (10) play (pleasurable recreational 
experiences which foster humor and creativity), and (11) security (freedom from 
coercive, threatening environments).40  
I argue in Chapter Three that distributive justice hinges, at least in part, on 
meeting the fundamental needs of those who are in dire situations. I also argue that we 
should be concerned with developing the type of character in ourselves and our fellow 
community members that results in a desire to cultivate virtuous citizens who recognize 
that they are part of a larger story,41 and who fight for a good quality of life for their 
fellow community members.42  
Seeing as how modern slaves are subject to horrific deprivations and experience 
profuse needs, virtuous global citizens should recognize that the plight of slaves is a 
paradigm case of a reality that demands we become ‘conditional cosmopolitans’. Because 
the abuses perpetuated against slaves include the worst crimes against humanity 
imaginable, we should respond by privileging and valuing the fundamental rights and 
needs of slaves above other particular relationships, and we should work tirelessly to see 
the demands of global justice recognized for all people. 
IF world resources are distributed such that some have way more than we need 
for basic subsistence while millions of others have had everything taken from them, 
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42 Aristotle, “The Politics,” trans. Ernest Barker, in Sandel, Justice: A Reader, 288.  (Taken from Book III: 
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including their freedom, we cannot deny that we have benefited from more than our fair 
share of the available common stock resources and incidents of communal enterprise. If 
slave children in India are forced to weave the rug I buy for my den,43 they have mixed 
their labor into something for which they have failed to reap any benefit, and I have 
reaped a major benefit in a low-cost rug, although I have done nothing specifically to 
deserve this benefit. I was born in the right place at the right time to be the beneficiary of 
a system that provides me low-cost goods at the expense of enslaved others. This is an 
unjust distribution on many levels – physical goods, money, physical freedom, autonomy, 
educational opportunities, safety, and the list goes on. If Finnis is right, and those who 
have been given a greater allocation of the common stock have been given those 
resources in order to work toward the common good and to benefit more than just 
themselves, then we can rightly question a world in which some live in opulence while 
many live in abject poverty and slavery, while nevertheless the resources exist to 
adequately feed and clothe and heal and free those who have been deprived of such 
provisions. 
III. Slavery and Commutative Justice 
A. The Relationship Between Consumerism and Slavery44 
 I have made a case above as to how the existence of slavery in our modern world 
violates the demands of distributive justice. It is now time we consider how slavery is 
																																								 																				
43 Kevin Bales and Zoe Trodd, To Plead Our Own Cause (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 
2008), 69-81. 
44 Some portions of this section are borrowed from my forthcoming article: Tiffany Beaver, “Negative 
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also a violation of commutative justice. Let us first remember how Finnis explains 
commutative justice by appealing to the following:   
There is a vast range of relationships and dealings between persons…in which 
neither the requirements or incidents of communal enterprise nor the distribution 
(whether by public or private owners) of a common stock are directly at stake, 
but in which there can be question of what is fitting, fair, or just as between 
the parties to the relationship.45 
 
So whereas distributive justice deals with distributing common resources and privileges 
among individuals in communities, commutative justice is concerned with assuring that 
people treat those with whom they have relationships in ways that are fitting and fair. 
This still hinges on our foundation of favoring and fostering the common good of 
community members, and recognizing that our narrative quests are intricately intertwined 
with one another.  
 Our chief concern in considering the demands of commutative justice is to 
ascertain the nature of our relationships with numerous others, and to determine if these 
relationships serve to treat these others justly, or if these relationships exhibit a failure to 
pursue the good of our neighbors. Furthermore, commutative justice may require that if 
and when we fail our neighbors, we are obligated to take steps toward restoration or 
correction. We must consider, then, how the existence of modern slavery might implicate 
us as failing to uphold the demands of commutative justice in our relationships, both 
local and global. A first step in this process is to examine the links between consumerism 
and slavery. 
For those of us living in the developed West, most of us go about our daily lives 
giving little or no thought to how our lifestyles – specifically our consumer habits – 
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might be linked to the slavery of others. But the reality is becoming increasingly clear 
that those of us who consume are linked in multiple ways to those who produce, and 
often times a portion of those producers are slaves. Numerous organizations are now 
dedicated to making consumers aware of how their consumer practices contribute to 
slavery worldwide. One such agency explains,  
Slavery flows into our homes, offices, and schools through many of the products 
we buy. Slaves harvest cocoa in West Africa, and it ends up in our chocolate. 
Slaves make charcoal in Brazil, which is used to run smelters that make steel for 
our cars. Many food products and raw materials are tainted by slavery—such as 
tomatoes, tuna, shrimp, cotton, diamonds, iron, sugar, and gold.”46  
 
That same agency also claims, “Many everyday products are made by slaves, or with 
slavery-tainted parts or raw materials -- such as cars, computers, chocolate, cell phones 
and clothing.”47  
In Chapter Two we discussed different types of modern slavery, including bonded 
labor. Siddharth Kara points out that many of the products we use or consume regularly 
are made by bonded laborers (i.e. slaves) in South Asia. He explains, 
…the products of present-day bonded labor touch almost every aspect of the 
global economy, including frozen shrimp and fish, tea, coffee, rice, wheat, 
diamonds, gems, cubic zirconia, glassware, brassware, carpets, limestone, marble, 
slate, salt, matches, cigarettes, bidis (Indian cigarettes), apparel, fireworks, knives, 
sporting goods, and many other products. Virtually everyone’s life, everywhere in 
the world, is touched by bonded labor in South Asia.48 
 
Another organization has developed an online test that consumers can take to 
determine approximately how many slaves it takes to sustain each consumer’s own 
lifestyle. This test determines an individual’s “Slavery footprint.”  
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Your TOTAL SLAVERY FOOTPRINT represents the number of forced laborers 
that were likely to be involved in creating and manufacturing the products you 
buy. This is determined based on information regarding the processes used to 
create these products as well as investigations of the countries in which these 
stages of production take place for known slave labor (within these specific 
processes.) This number is compiled from multiple individual product scores…In 
order to create individual scores, we first chose to investigate slave labor usage in 
the supply chains of more than 400 of the most popular consumer products.49 
  
When I took this test initially, I was informed that my lifestyle supports forty-seven 
slaves. I took the test again after having a child, and my score jumped up to seventy-four 
slaves. This is an appalling number, especially since I like to think that I am a fairly 
informed and responsible consumer. However, by virtue of simply being a consumer in 
an affluent Western society, my contribution to slavery is seemingly undeniable. 
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The U.S. Department of Labor’s “List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or 
Forced Labor” identifies 134 goods produced by 74 countries that have strong evidences 
of child labor, forced labor, or both.50 Among these goods are bricks, flowers, various 
fruits and vegetables, accessories, textiles, garments, coffee, sugar, cotton, footwear, fish, 
shrimp, salt, various minerals (such as zinc), various metals (such as gold and silver), 
various gemstones (such as diamonds, emeralds, jade, rubies, etc.), rice, rubber, coal, 
electronics, nails…and the list goes on and on.51 Kevin Bales reiterates and adds to this 
list when he points out the following:  
One of the most shocking facts about slavery for people in the United States and 
Europe is that we are using slave-made products every day. Cotton, chocolate, 
sugar, steel, even some of the metal in cell phones, may be tainted by slavery. The 
total volume of these slave-made ingredients is actually very small. A tiny 
fraction of the world’s cotton or cocoa or steel has slave input. The problem is 
that it is almost impossible to know which shirt or candy bar or chair carries 
slavery into your home. The criminals using slaves sell their produce into the 
market like everybody else, and it flows into the global commodities market and 
mixes with goods from free workers.52 
 
Thus it is often difficult or nearly impossible for consumers to know if and when they 
consume products such as these that are actually sourced by slave labor somewhere in 
their supply chains. The blood, sweat, and tears of slaves is mixed into the global 
economy and we are the unwitting purchasers. But what we can know with confidence is 
that we are undeniably linked to those who make the products we consume, and at least 
some portion of those products is made for us by slaves.  
 You may wonder how this is even possible. How can we unknowingly purchase 
products made by slaves? Bales, Trodd, and Williamson explain that the globalization of 
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the world economy is the primary culprit. For most of history, individual countries 
controlled the flow of money across their own borders. However, in the mid-1980’s most 
of these border restrictions ended and money began flying freely around the globe. 
Businesses could move at will when they could make things more cheaply elsewhere, and 
as money and businesses moved freely, governments lost control over their operations.53 
The most unfortunate side effect of globalization is the resulting ease with which slavery 
thrives and its profits proliferate. “With the financial systems of globalization, without 
labor market regulation, slave profits flow smoothly across national borders and 
governments find it very difficult, if not impossible, to stop the flow of this money.”54 
This tangled web of modern slavery across borders is illustrated in the following passage: 
Slavery’s flows are merging and crossing. In Brazil, slaves are “recruited” in 
densely populated, economically depressed regions and then shipped over 1000 
miles to the forests where they make charcoal. The charcoal, in turn, is shipped 
another 1000 miles for use in steel mills. The resulting steel is sold to Canada and 
the US. The European Union imports nearly a million tonnes of Brazilian steel 
each year to produce everything from cars to buildings to toys. Women are 
trafficked from Burma or Laos for use in brothels in Thailand, Japan, or Europe. 
Capital from Hong Kong funds the brothels of Thailand and investment from 
Europe supports the charcoal operations of Brazil…The phenomenon of 
globalization means that the goods we buy are increasingly assembled in different 
parts of the world, using components from all over the world. There are numerous 
steps and parts that go into making a product and slavery can creep into any one 
of them.55 
 
Close scrutiny of the entire supply chain of a product, from the growth and harvesting of 
raw materials, through multiple steps of production and manufacture and shipping, until it 
reaches a consumer hundreds or thousands of miles away, is imperative in order to be 
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assured that consumer products are not tainted by slavery.56 Unfortunately, this level of 
transparency is often not available, and even if it is we often do not take the time and 
effort to research such processes. As policy professor and transnational crime expert 
Louise Shelley explains,  
Many of the world’s citizens would never buy illegal drugs or smuggled weapons, 
but consumers will use the products produced by trafficking victims without 
thinking about why they are available at such an affordable price. Instead, they 
are satisfied to have found a well-priced good in a global competitive economy. 
They will unknowingly buy clothes produced by the sweatshops where trafficked 
workers are employed, any buy the fruits and vegetables harvested by trafficked 
agricultural workers. Increasingly accustomed to the benefits of a consumer 
society, they will eat in restaurants where trafficked laborers are employed.57 
 
B. Sex Consumerism and Slavery 
 
1. The demand for sex. Thus far, my focus has been on the links between the 
demand for cheap consumer goods and slavery, especially focusing on the convoluted 
steps of supply chains and the likelihood that slave labor is mixed into many products we 
routinely buy and use. But physical goods are not the only things routinely consumed at 
the expense of slaves. Throughout the globe, the consumption of sex and sexual services 
plays a major role in the enslavement of millions.58 
Forcing women and children (and sometimes men) into slavery for the purpose of 
sexual exploitation only happens because there is a demand for such services, the 
fulfillment of which proves to be very lucrative for those willing to engage in such 
exploitation.59  While it is true that trafficking (the movement of people) only accounts 
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for a relatively small percentage of people who are enslaved, a majority of the people 
who are trafficked are done so for use in the sex industry.60 The trafficking of people, and 
their subsequent enslavement, “…is an economic activity in which organizations try to 
make profits...Traffickers will only sell persons for sexual exploitation when market 
conditions make it profitable.”61 This highlights the point that sexual slavery would not 
exist were there not a demand for such services, and were their fulfillment not profitable. 
Shelley points out that traffickers choose to trade in human beings “because there are low 
start-up costs, minimal risks, high profits, and large demand.”62  
 We have already discussed why the supply of potential slaves is so great by 
pointing out the links between population, poverty, vulnerability, and slavery. We have 
also discussed the reasons that many women and children especially are either coerced or 
sent into slavery, and why they remain trapped there. Phony contracts, fraudulent and 
fabricated debts, broken promises of jobs or educational opportunities, withheld 
documents, and physical and mental violence are just some of the factors contributing to 
the sexual enslavement of these vulnerable individuals.63 But again, having a large pool 
of potential victims does not ensure enslavement if there is no demand for their services. 
We must examine why there is such a demand for available sex slaves. 
 First, the availability of so many slaves is an obvious advantage for brothel-
businesses. When the owners of brothels are able to pay their “workers” relatively 
nothing, this drastically increases their own profit potentials. As Kara states, “…it did not 
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take long for those in the sex industry to deduce that they could vastly increase profits by 
capitalizing on the desperation and vulnerability of dislocated women and children.”64 
Second, the general drop in the price of slaves does not only apply to those used 
for labor. Because slaves are cheap and plentiful, the price for a paid sexual experience 
has also dropped in the past decades, resulting in an increased demand for such services. 
Brothel owners learned that they could “expand the potential market for their product – 
sex with a human female or child – by lowering the retail price of that product.”65 The 
result is that as the price of sex drops, more men can afford to buy it, or to buy it more 
often.66 As Kara further states,  
In most red-light districts I visited, I procured tangible evidence that the average 
price of a sex act was decreasing over time as a direct result of the increased use 
of slaves. These decreasing prices opened the market to low-wage consumers, 
such as day laborers and tuk-tuk (rickshaw) drivers. Such men could not 
previously afford sex with a prostitute, but as prices in some parts of Asia and 
Europe dropped by half, new consumers entered the market, and traditional 
consumers returned more often.67 
 
Kara also points out that there has always been a demand from a small percentage 
of the male population for paid sex services which in turn supports a commercial sex 
industry. The current reality, though, is that the commercial sex industry today is 
increasingly comprised of slaves, and consequently is also available for exploitation by a 
larger portion of the population.68 Shelley sums up Kara’s sentiments in the following 
way: 
Men who purchase sexual services rarely think about the prostitutes with whom 
they have sexual relations. Instead, they happily hire the services of a younger 
woman who is compliant and affordable without thinking of why these services 
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are so accessible. Sex slavery today, according to one financial analyst, has made 
sex services more available than a decade ago and thereby has increased the 
demand.69 
 
2. Sex tourism. One indication of the insatiable demand for commercial sex is the 
existence of an entire industry centered around sex tourism. According to one article, 
tourism (in general) is the world’s largest industry. Furthermore, in some places such as 
Thailand, the main purpose that many people have for traveling there is to patronize the 
commercial sex industry. In fact, 70 percent of the tourists to Thailand are men traveling 
alone, and this figure rises as high as 90 percent in areas specifically known for their sex 
tourism opportunities.70 Most of these travelers are from developed regions such as North 
America, Western Europe, Australia, Japan, and wealthy Arab countries, and they have 
enough vacation time and disposable income to fund such trips and to pay for the 
fulfillment of their wildest sexual fantasies, including those involving children.71  
One can easily find a plethora of information about how to partake of such 
activities from the ever-so-generous patrons who have traveled to partake and returned to 
recount their adventures. Numerous internet sex diaries and websites targeted at 
dispensing advice to fellow sex tourists are just one Google search away.72  Bishop and 
Robinson record the recommendations of one patron as written in a 1994 entry in the 
Internet’s World Sex Guide:  
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If you want the best blow job in the world, say so . . . [The manager]’ll tell you 
which girls specialize in the field. If you want anal, say so. If you want to watch 
two or three girls making love to each other and then join in, say so. Be specific 
and graphic: they've heard it all before, and will direct you toward the right girl(s) 
. . . [In the room, after the bath and body massage,] you'll dry off, move to the 
bed, and do whatever it was you paid to do. It's all very leisurely; you've got two 
hours to play. On occasion . . . a girl might possess some extremely powerful Thai 
stick, and will ask you to join her in a smoke. It's up to you, but if you don’t you 
can be sure she'll have had a better time than you (and have blotted you 
completely out in the process). Whatever, almost without exception in my 
experience, these girls are very, very good at what they do. That said, it would be 
well to remember that what these girls "do " . . . is not what they "are." Often, 
they are quite funny and bright. Even if not, if you never cease to remember that 
they are, before anything else, human beings with human feelings, chances are 
good you'll truly enjoy yourself, and you will have made her life, for a moment, at 
least, not as completely horrible as it might have been.73 
 
While the focus of all sex tourism is not the sexual exploitation of children, one 
cannot deny that for some such consumers the prospect of sex with children is an 
especially enticing lure. The United States Department of Justice refers to this as the 
“extraterritorial sexual exploitation of children,”74 and defines it the following way:  
The extraterritorial sexual exploitation of children is the act of traveling to a 
foreign country and engaging in sexual activity with a child in that country.  
Federal law prohibits an American citizen or resident to travel to a foreign 
country with intent to engage in any form of sexual conduct with a minor (defined 
as persons under 18 years of age).  It is also illegal to help organize or assist 
another person to travel for these purposes.  This crime is a form of human 
trafficking, also referred to as child sex tourism. Convicted offenders face fines 
and up to 30 years of imprisonment.75 
 
Despite such risks that may be associated with engaging in sex tourism, specifically with 
children, some men still choose to engage in these activities. One reason is because they 
enjoy the anonymity they experience in a foreign land.76 They feel safe and uninhibited, 
and unless they get caught, they can operate under the mantra, “What happens in 
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Thailand (or the Philippines, or Eastern Europe, or India, etcetera) stays there.” This draw 
of sex tourism, of course, is not to the exclusion of the demand for sex with children 
among the locals as well.77 As Batstone points out, “…the sex trade has raised the 
demand for slave children, and the impoverished masses generate the supply.”78 
2. Considering prostitution – is it free or coerced? One proposed solution to the 
problem of forced sexual exploitation, including human trafficking for the purpose of 
sexual exploitation, is the move by some to decriminalize (i.e. legalize) prostitution.79 In 
fact, there are essentially three options when it comes to the legal status of prostitution. 
Option one includes the complete and total criminalization of prostitution. On this model, 
both the buying and selling of sex is illegal. This is the current model adopted by the 
United States of America under the belief that an especially effective way to fight sex 
trafficking and forced sexual exploitation is to make prostitution illegal.80 
Option two includes the criminalization of buying sex, and the decriminalization 
of selling sex. This means that it is illegal to buy sex, but not to sell it; the buyers can be 
prosecuted, but the sellers cannot. This is the current model in Sweden and Norway.81 
The idea is that this shifts the balance of power away from the buyers (who act illegally 
when buying sex) and toward the sex workers (who act legally in selling sex, and can 
therefore speak out if they are mistreated or hurt).82 It attempts to protect the victims of 
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the commercial sex industry instead of criminalizing them, while working to sway the 
balance of power in their direction.   
Option three includes the total decriminalization of prostitution, making it 
completely legal to both buy and sell sex. Neither party is breaking the law by engaging 
in sex-for-pay. This is the current Dutch and German model, as well as the model used in 
New Zealand and parts of Australia, among other countries.83 For instance, prostitution in 
Amsterdam (Netherlands) is legal, and those who work as prostitutes are viewed as 
“independent entrepreneurs.” Legal prostitution is regulated and taxed in an attempt to 
combat forced prostitution and human trafficking for sexual exploitation.84 The general 
argument for fully legalizing prostitution is summed up in a 2004 article from The 
Economist, which claims, “Criminalisation forces prostitution into the underworld. 
Legalisation would bring it into the open, where abuses such as trafficking and under-age 
prostitution can be more easily tackled. Brothels would develop reputations worth 
protecting.”85 
The question looming large is whether or not decriminalizing prostitution actually 
does have this ameliorating effect on human trafficking for sexual exploitation. Is it really 
the case that human trafficking and forced sexual exploitation diminish when prostitution 
is legalized? Cho, Dreher, and Neumayer assert the existence of two competing effects 
that must be examined in order to answer this question - the substitution effect and the 
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scale effect - and they analyze which effect dominates the other.86 The substitution effect 
exists when legal sex workers are favored over illegal workers, empowering local women 
(and men) who wish to engage in legal sex work, but who are not interested in 
participating in an illegal industry. This should supposedly lead to a decrease in 
illegal/trafficked/forced sex workers, and is what we hope will happen if we legalize 
prostitution. The second effect, the scale effect, explains that when prostitution is 
legalized, the market for commercial sex services expands, requiring a greater number of 
sex workers to meet the demand.87 The question, then, is which effect is greater? Are 
there enough workers supplied by the substitution effect to meet the demands of the scale 
effect?  
What Cho, Dreher, and Neumayer conclude is that the expansion of the market  
(i.e. the increased demand for commercial sex in places where it is legalized) makes it 
such that so many sex workers are needed that there is, in fact, no decrease in illegal sex 
workers. To the contrary, often times there is an increase in both legal (free) sex workers 
and illegal (slave) sex workers, and the illegal sex workers (i.e. trafficked people) are 
necessary to keep up with the demands of the market. The ugly truth is that the scale 
effect dominates the substitution effect, and that “countries with legalized prostitution 
have a statistically significantly larger reported incidence of human trafficking 
inflows.”88 
One study concludes: “…we find that the trafficking of women for commercial 
sexual exploitation is least prevalent in countries where prostitution is illegal, most 
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prevalent in countries where prostitution is legalized, and in between in those countries 
where prostitution is legal but procuring illegal.”89 Another study commissioned by the 
European Parliament investigated 11 significant member states of the European Union, 
including the Netherlands, in an attempt to identify links between the level of legality of 
prostitution in those states and the prevalence of human trafficking for sexual 
exploitation. While this is a complicated and multi-faceted study that does not claim 
concrete results, the study does note increases in human trafficking statistics following 
the Dutch legalization of prostitution in 2000, and also notes that an extremely high 
percentage of Dutch prostitutes are not Dutch at all, but rather come (against their will) 
from numerous other countries, most notably Eastern European and African countries.90 
In further support of this conclusion, Farley states the following:  
Evidence supports the theory that legal prostitution is associated with increased 
trafficking. Traffickers and pimps can easily operate with impunity when 
prostitution is legal…Wherever prostitution is legalized, trafficking to sex 
industry marketplaces in that region increases…After prostitution was legalized in 
Germany and the Netherlands, the numbers of trafficked women increased 
dramatically. Today, 80% of all women in German and Dutch prostitution are 
trafficked.91  
 
Prostitution was legalized in New Zealand in 2003.92 In 2008, Debbie Baker, who 
runs an organization which provides support services for people in prostitution who wish 
to leave, noted the negative effects of New Zealand's decriminalization of prostitution.  
We have also seen a marked increase in men cruising the streets trying to buy sex. 
Although the numbers vary from day to day, it appears to us that overall, the 
number of men buyers has doubled since decriminalization. We as a team have 
been solicited by men while working with our clients on the street. Before 
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decriminalisation this had not happened. These solicitations of the Streetreach 
staff occurred both in the street and also in massage parlours. The staff at 
Streetreach believe that the clients of prostitutes who are trying to pick up women 
have generally become more open and forthright.93 
 
It is also important to consider the impact that prostitution in general (and 
legalizing prostitution specifically) has on children. Sex with children is always coerced 
and illegal. Yet, the scale effect dominating the decriminalization of the commercial sex 
industry extends to the demand for and sexual exploitation of children. Only three years 
after prostitution was legalized in New Zealand, Aukland lawyer David Garrett “declared 
decriminalization a ‘disaster’ that had resulted in an ‘explosion’ of children trafficked for 
prostitution in Auckland and Christchurch,” and he reported that the overall trafficking of 
children in New Zealand increased following decriminalization, “especially the 
trafficking of ethnic minority Maori children.”94  
Former child victim Rachel Lloyd, who “worked” while underage in Germany’s 
legal sex industry, reports that most of the girls who worked with her were underage 
immigrants with histories of trauma and abuse prior to their exploitation in the 
commercial sex industry.95 She affirms that legalizing prostitution has adverse effects on 
marginalized populations, including children. She states,  
The presence of an adult sex industry increases both the rates of child sexual 
exploitation and trafficking. It may be true that some women in commercial sex 
exercised some level of informed choice, had other options to entering and have 
no histories of familial trauma, neglect or sexual abuse. But, these women are the 
minority and don’t represent the overwhelming majority of women, girls, boys 
and transgender youth, for whom the sex industry isn’t about choice but lack of 
choice. The argument that legalizing prostitution makes it safer for women just 
hasn’t been borne out in countries implementing full legalization. In fact, 
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legalization has spurred traffickers to recruit children and marginalized women to 
meet demand. Amsterdam, long touted as the model, recently started recognizing 
rates of trafficking into the country have increased and is beginning to address the 
enormous hub of trafficking and exploitation that it's created.96 
 
Some estimates claim that there are nearly two million children exploited in the 
global commercial sex trade,97 while others fear that the actual situation is much worse.98 
Additionally, there are specific and extremely lucrative markets selling the services of 
virgins and young girls.99 The following story from Shahnara exhibits many of the 
characteristics mentioned thus far (poverty and vulnerability), as well as several of the 
modern components of slavery (coercion, fraud, human trafficking, and sex tourism, 
maintained through debt bondage), leading to the sexual enslavement of children.  
I was twelve when my mother died. My father and my uncle had been using drugs 
for many years. Soon my father was imprisoned; I do not know for what offense. 
My uncle sold everything in our house to buy drugs. When I was thirteen he 
forced me out on the street. I was living in the streets, sleeping under benches in 
the park. He told me to sell myself if I was not able to find money any other way. 
I went to the police and they sent me to Vartashen orphanage. Once my classmate 
told me that there was a woman in her neighborhood helping pretty young girls to 
go to Germany to work for a fashion magazine. I could not believe it. I was so 
happy. Later the woman told me that after she had arranged documents for me 
and the other persons we would travel together to Germany…There were fourteen 
of us, girls of different ages between thirteen and twenty-three. We went by taxi 
to Tbilisi. From there we traveled to Moscow and from Moscow to Dubai, as we 
found out later. The woman who had recruited me had twenty-seven children 
employed, mostly from orphanages or from the streets. She deals in this business 
for twelve years already. The hell I lived through at home continued in Dubai. 
They placed us in a hotel. They had special interest in young virgins. They were 
selling them at enormous prices to rich Arab sheikhs for one night, after which 
they were working with clients like other ordinary girls…My friend who was 
thirteen was taken to a wealthy man…Two days later they took us to a night club 
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and explained the nature of our work and the amount that we should pay them 
every day. They explained that they had paid a lot of money for our passports and 
travel, in total $6,000 for permission to fly and tickets. They were also paying for 
our room and food. Almost all the children were crying. They could not 
understand what was expected from them and how they were going to do it. The 
Arab partner of our pimp was getting angry when he was not getting the amount 
of money they were expecting us to provide. He was beating children with a belt 
and was very violent. I was also crying at the very beginning, but what could I 
do? Sometimes there were rich businessmen who hired us every time they came 
to Dubai…After nights of work we were getting so tired that we could not do 
anything else but sleep…When our visas expired we traveled with our pimp to 
Iran to extend visas. We stayed there for no more than two hours. Our passports 
were usually given to us at the airport and taken away after passport control. We 
could not run away or complain to the police since they assured us that they were 
bribed…100 
 
The general point here is that the mere existence of prostitution promotes 
commercial sexual exploitation, and the outright acceptance of prostitution increases 
even more the demand for sex services and the presence of a commercial sex industry, 
which in turn increases the numbers of slaves (both adults and children) who are 
exploited in that industry.  The reality is that the existence of legalized prostitution 
actually increases the overall demand and the need for trafficked victims. In the 
commercial sex industry, some workers are free, many more are coerced or forced, and it 
is often difficult or impossible for the consumer to tell the difference. 
  3. The problem of pornography. One obvious means of consuming sex, which 
implicates a much larger portion of the general population than does buying sex in a 
brothel or engaging in sex tourism, includes the consumption of pornography. The 
American Psychological Association puts porn consumption rates at 50 percent to 99 
percent among [U.S.] men, and 30 percent to 86 percent among [U.S.] women.101 
																																								 																				
100 Bales and Trodd, Plead Our Own Cause, 127-128. 
101 Kristen Weir, “Is Pornography Addictive?” Monitor on Psychology 45, no. 4 (2014), accessed April 5, 
2018, http://www.apa.org/monitor/2014/04/pornography.aspx.  
		 160 
Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest direct links between pornography and sex 
slavery. One author suggests: 
In some parts of the world, centers of trafficking are also centers for the 
production of pornography. An example is St. Petersburg, where representatives 
from NGOs report that they have heard of many cases of women being forced to 
make pornography. Many of the women in prostitution in St. Petersburg have also 
been used to make pornography. They say the police will take complaints about 
the production of pornography only if children are used. Budapest, Hungary is a 
destination and transit city for women trafficked from central and eastern Europe. 
Budapest has also become the pornography production capital of Europe. 
American and European pornography producers moved to Budapest because of 
the cheap, available victims.102 
 
And even if the pornography consumed by some individuals does not directly support 
slavery (for instance, the actors are not themselves slaves), the pornography industry 
itself may directly and indirectly encourage practices that have been known to lead to sex 
trafficking and sex slavery.    
 One organization that seeks to help people break addictions to pornography points 
out that society at large sees sex trafficking as a problem that we should fight, while 
simultaneously overlooking pornography “as simply another genre of entertainment. This 
dichotomy between sex trafficking and the realities of pornography is a serious 
misconception that needs to be addressed.”103 Such a claim leads us to ask an obvious 
question – What are some potential ways that commercial sexual exploitation (including 
human trafficking) and pornography are linked?  
One potential link between pornography and sex slavery is that pornography 
drives up the demand for bought sex, and is the “primary gateway to the purchase of 
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humans for commercial sex.”104 Pornography and sex slavery are both part of the 
commercial sex industry. As such, they easily become intertwined. Harvard Law 
professor Catharine MacKinnon argues that “[c]onsuming pornography is an experience 
of bought sex,”105 and claims “that the sexually used are transported on paper or celluloid 
or digitally may make the transaction seem more distanced, but it is no less real a 
commercial act of sex for any of the people involved.”106  Pornography stimulates the 
demand for purchasing future sex acts.107 Furthermore, viewing pornography “creates a 
drug-like addiction which distorts the individual’s view on sexuality,” which sometimes 
results in seeking more explicit and violent content.108 As MacKinnon reports, 
“Pornography is documented to create demand for specific acts, including dangerous and 
demeaning ones inflicted on prostituted people, as well as for bought sex in general…the 
more men use pornography, the more they use prostitutes.”109 And I would add here, as 
we have previously established, that many prostitutes in the commercial sex industry are 
slaves. So pornography fuels the demand for sex consumption, which fuels the demand 
for sex slaves. 
A second potential link between pornography and sex slavery, which is mentioned 
above in the quote from Donna M. Hughes, is that many of the people exploited in the 
actual production of pornography are trafficked victims, or slaves.110 This, of course, 
includes children as well as adults.  
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Child pornography is, by most accounts, a multi-billion-dollar global enterprise. 
In Germany alone, estimated sales of child porn exceed $250 million, with the 
number of consumers ranging from 30,000 to 40,000. The biggest market for 
child pornography is in the United States, where an estimated $6 billion is 
generated annually. Eighty-five percent of the worldwide sales of child 
pornography comes from America. Each year, an estimated 30,000 children are 
sexually exploited by child pornographers in Los Angeles alone.111 
 
One brave survivor, Christine Stark, was born into sexual slavery in Minnesota (USA). 
She was born into a family of pimps, pornographers, and prostitutes. As Christine recalls, 
“The men pimped the women and girls and sometimes the boys. They made 
pornography. They sold us in whorehouses and at live sex shows. The men used me in 
pornography in basements, barns, houses, warehouses, isolated wooded areas, and public 
buildings.”112 
 The tangled truth is that pornography and prostitution (both of which rely on 
slaves to meet their demands) are inextricably woven together. Pornography is supply-
driven, meaning that “[m]en do not want it until they see it. The more they see it, the 
more they want it.” Furthermore, prostitution is demand-driven, meaning that “[w]omen 
[and children] are in prostitution because men want to use them that way…”113 And as 
we can now see, often times the pornography consumed by many is made by slaves, and 
it encourages the continued exploitation – both through consuming more pornography 
and through buying actual sex from prostituted people – of many victims who are 
exploited in the multi-billion dollar commercial sex industry. 
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C. The Demands on Commutative Justice on Behalf of Slaves 
 1. Recapping the scope of commutative justice. By way of a quick reminder, 
commutative justice concerns assuring that people treat those with whom they have 
relationships in ways that are fitting and fair, and considers the whole of human 
interactions to determine what justice requires of us as we live intersecting lives in a 
shared world.114 This includes, but is not limited to, taking corrective/restorative actions 
when we have participated in the harming of others.  
We have also already discussed that of central importance in our understanding of 
commutative justice is our understanding of whom to count when we evaluate our duties 
and obligations in justice toward our ‘neighbors’. I argued in Chapter Four that 
individuals have duties/responsibilities in commutative justice both to other individuals 
and groups, and both to ascertained and unascertained peoples. Thus, our ‘neighbors’ are 
not only those people whom we find proximally close to us, and with whom we share 
close relational ties, but also many others with whom we share social structures and 
global ties. It is not necessary for us to know each of our ‘neighbors’ specifically in order 
for us to bear certain responsibilities in commutative justice toward them. This leads us to 
the main purpose of our discussion, which includes exploring how many (if not most or 
all) of us fail in our duties of commutative justice in relation to the millions of enslaved 
people both in our own neighborhoods and around the world. 
 2. When we find guilt and fault. In Chapter Four, I drew a distinction between 
instances in which individuals are at fault or guilty for injustices, and instances in which 
they may be responsible in some sense but are not guilty of wrongdoing. It is often times 
fairly easy to point out instances in which this category of guilt and fault applies to 
																																								 																				
114 Finnis, 179.  
		 164 
modern slavery. The most clear-cut case of this would be a slave-owner/slave-
holder/human trafficker/pimp/etcetera who holds the power of ownership over another 
person or group of people. The individuals and criminal networks that sustain, perpetuate, 
and reap the benefits of the modern slave trade are most definitely in violation of the 
requirements of commutative justice, and are plainly guilty of injustice. Furthermore, 
when these people are caught, they should be obligated to take steps toward restoration, 
retribution, and reconciliation for those they have enslaved.  
In Chapter Four I also pointed out that whether or not an agent is morally 
blameworthy may depend upon the intentions, motives, and consequences of his 
actions.115 I appealed to Joel Feinberg, who asserts that someone may commit intentional 
wrongdoing if he (a) “acts with a wrongful conscious objective” or (b) “knowingly 
produces a forbidden result even incidentally as a kind of side-effect of his effort to 
achieve his objective.”116 Those who enslave or trade in human beings commit 
intentional wrongdoing. They either act in full knowledge of their conscious objectives 
(i.e. they specifically enslave others, perhaps in order to assert their power or dominance 
or to attain a position of prestige), or they knowingly and willingly engage in some 
activity or enterprise with the full understanding that it will require or produce the 
enslavement of human beings (i.e. they willingly enslave in order to accomplish their 
objectives, such as the ability to produce cheap goods in a competitive market, or the 
ability to make easy money through the forced sexual exploitation of others). In such 
instances, the ascription of blame or fault results in guilt on behalf of the actor/agent(s). 
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 Another somewhat straight-forward case of guilt and moral responsibility for 
violations of commutative justice involves the willing consumption of services offered 
through the commercial sex industry. In the previous section I explained the reality that 
the commercial sex industry, including the prostitution and pornography industries, 
drives the demand for commercial sex services, which results in a great deal of forced 
sexual exploitation (i.e. slavery) within these industries to meet this demand.  
 If Farley’s numbers are correct and 80% of German and Dutch prostitutes are 
trafficking victims, then it follows that anyone who pays for commercial sex acts from 
prostitutes in these countries is very likely paying for sex with slaves. And this truth can 
be expanded to apply to the commercial sex industry outside of Germany and the 
Netherlands as well. While the people utilizing these services may not be specifically 
aware if and when they are having sex with slaves, engaging in the services offered by 
the commercial sex industry inevitably includes accepting the risk that when you pay for 
sex, or when you view pornography, you are actively participating in the forced sexual 
slavery of innocent victims. In such instances, you are guilty of violating your duties and 
obligations in commutative justice toward these ‘neighbors’ whom you exploit for your 
own sexual gratification. And even if the bought sex consumed by some individuals does 
not directly support slavery (i.e. the prostitutes or pornography actors are not themselves 
slaves), the industry itself may directly and indirectly encourage practices that have been 
known to lead to sex trafficking and sex slavery. Thus, by extension if you support the 
commercial sex industry, you are likely both guilty and morally responsible for 
supporting modern slavery.  
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  As regards the link between consumerism and slavery that was mentioned above, 
it becomes much more difficult to ascribe guilt and fault, especially to individuals, for 
injustices that are largely the result of social and economic structures. Of course in 
instances where a consumer has very strong evidence that she is directly purchasing 
slave-made goods, it might be possible to ascribe such blame and guilt. For instance if a 
consumer were to visit a rug factory where children are forced to work the looms, and 
then purchase a rug from that factory, then we could more easily ascribe guilt for her 
action. But this is hardly ever the case when it comes to the relationships between 
consumers and the slaves who make their goods. Consumers are rarely aware of the 
histories of the products they buy, and even if they want to trace the supply chains of 
their purchases this is often difficult or impossible. However, as we discussed in Chapter 
Four, the absence of guilt and fault and moral blameworthiness does not necessarily mean 
that an individual or a group of people carries no responsibility for pursuing commutative 
justice, or no obligation to take steps toward reconciliation for the victims who suffer 
such injustices.  
3. Responsibility without guilt or fault. In Chapter Four, we discussed the 
possibility that sometimes people can be held responsible for harmful actions they 
perform, but assigning responsibility for such actions does not necessitate a judgment of 
moral blameworthiness. People can be responsible for contributing to injustice without 
being guilty of engaging in morally wrong actions. The paradigm case of this involves 
what Iris Marion Young deems “structural injustice.” I will again recount her view as 
follows:  
Structural injustice, then, exists when social processes put large groups of persons 
under systematic threat of domination or deprivation of the means to develop and 
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exercise their capacities, at the same time that these processes enable others to 
dominate or to have a wide range of opportunities for developing and exercising 
capacities available to them. Structural injustice is a kind of moral wrong distinct 
from the wrongful action of an individual agent or the repressive policies of a 
state. Structural injustice occurs as a consequence of many individuals and 
institutions acting to pursue their particular goals and interests, for the most part 
within the limits of accepted rules and norms.117 
 
Unfortunately, our modern consumer system often produces a perfect example of 
structural injustice. One group of people is grossly deprived and desperate to meet their 
own fundamental needs, while another group of people economically benefits from this 
state of affairs through the existence of accepted social, economic, and legal norms. Or to 
make things more concrete, desperate people become trapped in slavery through force, 
fraud, or coercion, and other more privileged people benefit from a world in which these 
desperate people are used as free labor to produce cheap goods for consumers like many 
of us, myself included. 
The question then remains – to what extent am I (or are many of us) implicated by 
this structural injustice? Speaking for myself, I do not own or control slaves, I do not visit 
brothels or view pornography, and I have no desire to support a system of slavery through 
my consumer habits. Nevertheless, I cannot escape the reality that when I purchase 
consumer products, some of them are inevitably made in part or whole by slaves.  
  It is perhaps helpful to remind ourselves here of Hannah Arendt’s belief that guilt 
and blame cannot be applied to entire groups or collectives, but rather only specific deeds 
can be assessed as guilt inducing.118 Consequently, she does not believe that all German 
citizens were “guilty by association” of Nazi crimes. However, she does believe that 
many average German citizens, although not guilty of killing Jews and others, 
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nevertheless bore some responsibility for the atrocities committed all around them by the 
Nazi regime.119 As I explained in Chapter Four, these people often did things (e.g. blindly 
followed orders), or failed to do things (e.g. failed to investigate suspicions activities, or 
failed to stand up to evil leaders, etcetera), that indirectly contributed to the enactment of 
crimes or wrongs, and thus these people bore some responsibility for the consequences of 
those wrongs. But according to Arendt’s view, only a relatively small number of people 
under the Nazi regime were both responsible and guilty. Nevertheless, many people 
shared responsibility without guilt.120  
This provides a helpful lens for us to look at cases of structural injustice which 
result in the slavery of some for the benefit of others (many who are unwitting or 
unwilling participants). Perhaps it is the case that many of us are like those average 
German citizens. Often times we are not fully or even partially aware of the slave-
sustaining structures operating around us. Furthermore, if we do know about these 
structures, we may feel completely powerless to do anything to change these systems. 
After all, I conjecture that only a minute portion of the population really understands the 
intricacies of global trade structures, or the inter-workings of supply chain economics, or 
the political maneuvers of corrupt governments and law enforcement agencies. Yet these 
are some of the big-picture contributors to the unjust structures that support slavery. 
Furthermore, we often have no idea how to go about opposing such systems, and we 
question whether or not we possess any power at all to be agents of change.  
But remember, even though the average German citizens during Nazi occupation 
were not actively involved in the injustices committed against millions of people, and 
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therefore under Arendt’s view they were not guilty of wrongdoing, they still bore 
responsibility in some sense for the injustices committed on their watch and in their 
name. And when it comes to the present-day global economic system, many of us are 
similarly implicated. Most of us are not guilty of committing injustice, but we bear some 
responsibility for injustice, because it is our consumer activity in conjunction with the 
consumer activities of numerous others that drives the demand for cheap, plentiful goods. 
In order to meet this demand, millions of people are enslaved. As David Batstone 
explains,  
Like any other commercial market, the slave trade is driven by the dynamics of 
supply and demand…slaveholders can compete successfully in almost any 
market. The profit margins will rise as high as the demand will bear. We may not 
even realize how each of us drives the demand during the course of a normal day. 
Kevin Bales expresses well those commercial connections: “Slaves in Pakistan 
may have made the shoes you are wearing and the carpet you stand on. Slaves in 
the Caribbean may have put sugar in your kitchen and toys in the hands of your 
children. In India they may have sewn the shirt on your back and polished the ring 
on your finger.”121 
 
 This being the case, and since the most basic aspect of commutative justice 
involves determining what is “fitting, fair, or just as between the parties”122 in numerous 
relationships, we can see how acting as a consumer in a global economic system that 
bolsters and supports slavery constitutes a failure of commutative justice. Even though 
we often do not know the people at the other end of the supply chain harvesting and 
crafting and assembling and transporting the goods we consume, we are still connected to 
these people. When our actions harm them, even when we do not intend to harm them, 
we bear responsibility for the results of our actions and our failure to fully achieve 
commutative justice on their behalf, even though we may not be guilty of wrongdoing or 
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of specifically violating the demands of commutative justice. And as MacIntyre explains, 
before we determine what we should do in certain circumstances, we must consider in 
what stories we find ourselves participants. I appealed to this in Chapter Three, but I will 
include it here again as a reminder: 
We live out our lives, both individually and in our relationships with each other, 
in the light of certain conceptions of a possible shared future…I can only answer 
the question ‘What am I to do?’ if I can answer the prior question ‘Of what story 
or stories do I find myself a part?’ We enter human society, that is, with one or 
more imputed characters – roles into which we have been drafted – and we have 
to learn what they are in order to be able to understand how others respond to us 
and how our responses to them are apt to be construed.123 
 
Whether I like it or not, I play a role in the lives of the slaves who make the 
products I consume. I did not ask for the world to be set up this way, but it is a reality I 
inherited. And unless I withdraw completely from society, I will inevitably continue to 
and participate in the structural injustice of slavery unless and until something is done to 
bring about changes. Although I may not be guilty of wrongdoing when my contribution 
to slavery is through my participation in inherited structurally unjust systems, I am still 
responsible for the role I play. When my actions, even when only in concert with others, 
contribute to the harming of my neighbors who are slaves both near and far, I act in ways 
that are not fitting, fair, or just, and I thus fail to uphold the demands of commutative 
justice.  
4. What about correction? Finally, as we discussed in Chapter Four, while 
commutative justice is not limited to ensuring that restoration or compensation or 
retribution or correction is made when failures occur, this corrective component is a 
vitally important piece of commutative justice. In circumstances where a person is at fault 
or guilty of committing an injustice, then restitution or restoration is required in most (if 
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not all) such cases. If someone buys sex from a slave, then he should take steps to restore 
that victim (to the extent that restoration of the sexually exploited is even possible). But 
in circumstances where a person is responsible in some sense for an injustice but is not 
deemed guilty, is correction required?  
In Chapter Four, I argued that in such cases, often times there is still an 
expectation or a requirement that those responsible for injustice take restorative steps. If I 
learn that my consumer habits contribute to the enslavement of others, I should do 
something other than just continue on as usual with no thought or care to my neighbors 
whose narrative quests intersect with my own, and who’s lives my life impacts. Part of 
favoring and fostering the common good includes caring for those with whom I have 
relationships. Those who produce the goods I consume are others with whom I have 
relationships. If I know that my life and decisions and habits harm them, but I make no 
attempts to mitigate that harm or to restore their lives, then I can be said to violate 
commutative justice and to be not only responsible, but guilty of injustice. Consider the 
example from Chapter Four in which I lose control of my car after hitting an oddly placed 
construction cone, subsequently side-swiping another car. While I am responsible for the 
consequences of this unfortunate event, I am not initially guilty of committing an 
injustice against the other car owner. However, I am responsible to compensate the owner 
of the car I sideswiped, and if I fail to provide this restitution then I am considered guilty 
of violating the demands of commutative justice. The initial accident was not guilt 
inducing (although it was responsibility inducing), but my failure to restore the victim is 
guilt inducing.  
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Given the importance of our actions and responses in relation to the demands of 
both distributive and commutative justice, we should rightly be concerned with the 
question, “But what must I do?” What practical steps can and should I take to work 
toward restoration for these oppressed neighbors? Practically working toward fighting the 
unjust distributions and structural injustices that lead to slavery, and providing healing 
and restoration for victims of modern slavery will be the topic of our next and final 
chapter.  
IV. Conclusion 
 The goal of this chapter has been to bring together what was explained in Chapter 
Two regarding the reality of modern slavery with the ideas of distributive justice from 
Chapter Three and commutative justice from Chapter Four. I have argued that the 
existence of modern slavery exemplifies failures of both forms of justice. Unjust 
distributions of resources and opportunities leads to poverty, which is a major contributor 
to the desperation and vulnerability that results in millions of people becoming enslaved. 
Unjust relational arrangements result in the exploitation of numerous ‘neighbors’. These 
unjust relationships can be direct, such as between a pimp and a sex slave, or they can be 
indirect, such as between consumers and the slaves producing certain goods.  
 The bottom line is that the existence of slavery represents grave failures of both 
distributive and commutative justice. Our responsibility to favor and foster the common 
good of others, and to consider those with whom our lives intersect and impact, pushes us 
forward in the hope that we can bring about positive changes and greater justice for the 
millions of enslaved people around the world. The reality of their lives is not okay. We 
should not be okay with their slavery. And we should not be okay with the ways in which 
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we contribute to their slavery. David Batstone sums these ideas up beautifully in the 
following way: “Powerful forces aim to turn human beings into commodities that can be 
bought and sold like any other piece of property. To declare ‘Not for sale’ affirms that 
every person has the inalienable right to be free, to pursue a God-given destiny.”124  
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CHAPTER 6
 
CONCLUSION: A PRACTICAL RESPONSE TO 
MODERN SLAVERY – APPLICATION AND ACTION 
 
 
I. What are We to Do? 
A. Discharging “Wide Duties” 
 I have promised at several points throughout the preceding chapters that I would 
ultimately answer the practical question, “What are we obligated to do to help modern 
slaves?” As a person who cares deeply about the plight of slaves in our world, and who 
also hopes and wishes to fulfill the demands that justice (both distributive and 
commutative) place upon my own life, I would never commit to undertake a project such 
as this one without culminating in a discussion of what justice requires we actually do on 
behalf of the world’s modern slaves. 
 The realization that there are likely 45 million (or more) slaves in the world 
today,1 coupled with an understanding that the distribution of common resources and the 
varied relationships we share with multiple ‘neighbors’ serve to unfairly advantage many 
of us while unfairly disadvantaging millions of others, should rightly cause us to question 
what changes we may be required to make in the name of justice for the benefit of slaves. 
We have continued to come back again and again to Alasdair MacIntyre’s picture of 
numerous people pursuing their own narrative quests while also intersecting and 
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impacting the quests of each other.2 We cannot deny that the decisions we make in our 
own lives impact the lives of countless others, both near and far. Justice requires 
practically reasonable people to favor and foster the common good of those in our various 
communities, and to always act with consideration of how our decisions affect those 
around us. However, while we may wish for a list of definitive “dos and don’ts” when it 
comes to satisfying the demands justice places on us in regards to our neighbors who are 
slaves, things are not usually that straightforward. 
 But this lack of prescriptive instruction does not have to be crippling and 
overwhelming. On the contrary it may actually be freeing. In Chapter Three, I mentioned 
Sarah Clark Miller’s view that the duty to provide care for those whose fundamental 
needs are unmet is a “wide duty,” allowing for variety in the caring responses of moral 
agents who assume the caregiver role. The general duty of care involves responding to 
the fundamental needs of others, but it does not prescribe specific ways in which agents 
are to respond in order to fulfill their obligations.3 Caregivers can have freedom to 
respond to needs in a plethora of ways, as long as they are careful to preserve the dignity 
and agency of those in need.4 
 John Finnis, in his discussion of the reasons it is right and good to allocate 
common stock resources to individuals, explains that the purpose of such allocations is to 
ultimately benefit the common good. However, the way that the “owner” of such 
allocated resources chooses to put those resources to work is open, and could include a 
multitude of different activities or strategies. Finnis explains this as follows:  
																																								 																				
2 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 213-216. 
3 Sarah Clark Miller, The Ethics of Need: Agency, Dignity, and Obligation (New York: Routledge, 2012), 
61.  
4 Ibid., 62.  
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But beyond a reasonable measure and degree of such use for them and their 
dependants’ or co-owners’ needs, they each hold the remainder of their property 
and its fruits as part (in justice if not in law) of the common stock. In other words, 
beyond a certain point, what was commonly available but was justly made 
private, for the common good, becomes again, in justice, part of the common 
stock; although appropriated to management and control by an owner or owners, 
items of private property (‘things’) are now not for the owners’ private benefit but 
are held by them immediately for common benefit…From this point, owners 
have, in justice, duties not altogether unlike those of a trustee in English law. 
They may fulfill them in various ways – by investing their surpluses in 
production of more goods for later distribution and consumption; by 
providing gainful employment to people looking for work; by grants or loans 
for hospitals, schools, cultural centres, orphanages, etc., or directly for the 
relief of the poor. Where owners will not perform these duties, or cannot 
effectively co-ordinate their respective efforts to perform them, then public 
authority may rightly help them to perform their duties by devising and 
implementing schemes of distribution, e.g. by ‘redistributive’ taxation for 
purposes of ‘social welfare’, or by a measure of expropriation.5 
 
In writing about negative duties (i.e. duties to refrain from harming others, which 
we linked loosely in Chapter Four with duties of commutative justice), Elizabeth Ashford 
believes that when our actions harm others, even when the harm done to them is a result 
of our collaborative or cumulative actions, or due to our participation in unjust 
institutions, we often cannot know exactly what we must do in response to our own 
actions. She thus states: 
Fulfillment of the negative duty not to collaborate in unjust institutions requires us 
to take actions to support reform of these institutions or so as to minimize the 
extent of our collaboration in them, or to provide recompense for the harms they 
cause. The nature of this action is no more specified than is the action we should 
take to carry out a positive duty of aid. The way in which we support institutional 
reform is open, and it is also open which particular harms we should seek to 
oppose or compensate for…The duty of individual members is therefore not a 
perfect duty with a specific content that can be fully discharged…it is largely 
indeterminate how to prevent the right not to be deprived of access to basic 
necessities from being violated. The onus is on individual agents to decide how 
to implement their share of the corresponding negative duty.6 
																																								 																				
5 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 173. 
(emphasis added).  
6 Elizabeth Ashford, “The Inadequacy of our Traditional Conception of the Duties Imposed by Human 
Rights,” Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 19, no.2 (July 2006), 232. (emphasis added).  
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And so, while a few extreme zealots may implore those of us with any surplus to 
give until it hurts to those with needs,7 the more prevalent (and perhaps more pragmatic) 
approach is to maintain the view just described that holds our duties in distributive justice 
and our duties in commutative justice to be wide, imperfect duties, with multiple and 
varied ways of addressing and answering their demands. However, this lack of 
prescriptive demands does not leave us without numerous suggestions of possible ways 
we can go about fighting against slavery and making strides to fulfill our duties and 
obligations in both distributive and commutative justice for those in our world who are 
slaves.   
B. Practical Suggestions – The Multiple Ways to Discharge Our Duties and Fulfill 
Our Obligations  
 
1. Collective efforts and institutional reforms. It has likely become clear that 
 the primary way in which many of us are implicated in modern slavery is through our 
participation in certain established systems, and through the combined effects of our 
actions in concert with the actions of hundreds, thousand, and perhaps millions of others. 
Many of us have not ourselves organized the world in these ways, nor do we like the fact 
that we are inevitably connected to the slavery of others. Nevertheless we have inherited 
and benefited from structures and systems that favor some privileged global citizens at 
the expense of many other marginalized global citizens. When unjust systems and 
institutions produce distributive and commutative injustices that result in the slavery of 
millions, what should we do about this? 
																																								 																				
7 Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 1, no.3 (1972), 229-43, in 
The Global Justice Reader, edited by Thom Brooks (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), 390; Peter 
Singer, “The Singer Solution to World Poverty,” The New York Times, September 5, 1999, in The Ethical 
Life: Fundamental Readings in Ethics and Moral Problems, 2nd ed., ed. Russ Shafer-Landau (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), 235; Peter Unger, Living High and Letting Die (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1996), 152-157.  
		 178 
One answer is that we can rally together with others to advocate for changes in 
the systems and institutions that support slavery. A collaborative problem can be met 
with collaborative solutions. As philosopher Lisa Tessman suggests, “It’s imperative that 
we work to eliminate the sources of moral conflicts whenever the conflicts are due to 
unjust social, political, or economic structures – that is, whenever they’re due to 
something that is within our collective control to change.”8 Thomas Pogge argues that 
many of us belong to certain subsets of people who, if we join our collective voices, 
could wield our collective power to demand changes in unjust social, political, and 
economic structures. He argues that if enough of us make demands of our elected 
government officials, for example, they will have no choice but to listen to us.9 For 
instance, if we join together to advocate for trade policies that are protective of the most 
vulnerable and not merely advantageous for the powerful, our collective voices just might 
be heard.10 As Bales and Trodd assert, “…trade policies should reflect the idea that slave-
made goods are taboo on the world market. Trade financing can be linked to 
demonstrable efforts to remove slavery from local as well as international markets. From 
																																								 																				
8 Lisa Tessman, When Doing the Right Thing is Impossible (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 
161.  
9 Thomas Pogge, “Reply to the Critics: Severe Poverty as a Violation of Negative Duties,” Ethics and 
International Affairs 19, no. 1 (2005), 80; Also see David Batstone, Not for Sale: The Return of the Global 
Slave Trade – And How We Can Fight It (New York: HarperCollins, 2010), 255-259. Professor and 
abolitionist David Batstone recounts a project he devised in the early 1980s in El Salvador, which was 
plagued by a military government that was terrorizing El Salvadorian citizens. Military death squads 
threatened and killed many El Salvadorians working for social change. After the murders of several U.S. 
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years ago all it took for a U.S. citizen to save the life of an El Salvadorian was to hold up a passport. 
Sometimes it is simply who you are, and not only what you can do, that can make a difference.” (Batstone, 
259). 
10 Instituting globalized trade polices toward transparency is an example of one potential top-down solution 
to the problem of modern slavery. See Appendix B for a more thorough explanation of top-down versus 
bottom-up solutions, as well as an example of an organization engaging in both forms of action and 
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local police to the UN, all can play a part in ending slavery.”11 Many of us have the 
ability to advocate for such trade policies.  
An example of such a policy is the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act. 
Beginning in January 2012, California law required “that certain large companies 
disclose to the public the extent of their efforts, if any, to ensure that the goods they sell 
are not produced by workers who are enslaved, coerced, or otherwise forced into service 
or who have been the victims of human trafficking.”12 This is not a regulatory act, but 
rather a law that requires that large companies “disclose their practices in five discrete 
areas so that interested consumers can make better informed purchasing decisions.”13 
This is obviously a great step toward providing citizens with tools to aid them in 
becoming more responsible and ethical consumers. However, it is not enough. The law 
only applies to companies that “do business in California, [h]ave annual worldwide gross 
receipts exceeding $100 million, and [a]re identified as manufactures or retail sellers on 
their California state tax returns.”14 By admission, this law only deals with large 
companies doing business in California, leaving unchecked numerous smaller businesses, 
as well as numerous businesses operating outside of California. Consumers, therefore, 
can advocate for laws similar to this which would apply to smaller companies and 
companies that operate in other places. Similarly, in September 2017, the European 
Parliament voted in favor of a resolution concerning “the impact of international trade 
and the EU policies on global value chains…calling for accountability, responsibility and 
																																								 																				
11 Kevin Bales and Zoe Trodd, To Plead Our Own Cause (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 
2008), 13.  
12 Kamala D. Harris, The California Transparency in Supply Chains Act: A Resource Guide, California 
Department of Justice (2015), 3, accessed May 24, 2018, 
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13 Ibid. 
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transparency in the supply chains of businesses operating in Europe and globally.”15 
These examples can pave the way for increased demand on the part of consumers for 
supply chain transparency, and we can advocate for more and better laws, resolutions, 
and policies like these. This act is an example of a top-down approach to combatting 
modern slavery.16  
Iris Marion Young points out that the members of a given society have a specific 
political responsibility to speak out against injustices and crimes present in the 
communities and institutions in which they find themselves. She explains,  
This responsibility falls on members of a society by virtue of the fact that they are 
aware moral agents who ought not to be indifferent to the fate of others and the 
danger that states and other organized institutions often pose to some people. This 
responsibility is largely unavoidable in the modern world, because we participate 
in and usually benefit from the operation of these institutions. The meaning of 
political responsibility is forward-looking. One has the responsibility always now, 
in relation to current events and in relations to their future consequences. We are 
in a condition of having such political responsibility, and the fact of having it 
implies an imperative to take political responsibility. If we see injustices or crimes 
being committed by the institutions of which we are a part, or believe that such 
crimes are being committed, then we have the responsibility to try to speak out 
against them with the intention of mobilizing others to oppose them, and to act 
together to transform the institutions to promote better ends…Political 
responsibility is not about doing something by myself, however, but about 
exhorting others to join me in collective action. When this occurs, and it occurs 
relatively infrequently, movement participants are often the most surprised at the 
transformative power they turn out to have.17  
  
 Furthermore, even when large-scale institutional reforms move at a snails pace, 
collaborating together with other groups and private organizations is often the best 
chance we have of rescuing slaves in a timely manner. Organizing rescue missions to free 
people from slavery is not an activity that most average citizens have the know-how or 
																																								 																				
15 “European Parliament should back transparency of global supply chains” Anti-Slavery International, 
September 8, 2017, accessed May 24, 2018, https://www.antislavery.org/european-parliament-vote-favour-
transparency-global-supply-chains/. 
16 See Appendix B for a more thorough explanation of top-down vs. bottom-up approaches.  
17 Iris Marion Young, 92-93. 
		 181 
even the abilities and resources to do. If I determine this coming weekend to travel to 
India and organize and execute my own rescue mission of slaves in Delhi’s red light 
district, I will likely be unsuccessful, I quite possibly might make things much worse for 
those who are enslaved, and I could end up injured or even dead. Fighting for the 
freedom of slaves is not something that can be accomplished on a whim apart from much 
time spent strategizing and planning and organizing and imagining multiple possible 
scenarios and numerous potential responses.  
 Kevin Bales points out that since World War II, movements and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) have emerged that deal with issues often neglected 
by nation-states and political parties. Universal human rights is one such issue, and of 
course slavery stands as a gross violation of established universal human rights.18 
Furthermore, the process of globalization has resulted in many NGOs surpassing the 
importance and effectiveness of governmental, political, and nation-state structures. As 
Bales explains,  
The process of globalization has created a fertile context for non-governmental 
organizations concerned with human rights. They are not restricted to nation-state 
boundaries (except by choice), and most important, their organizing intellectual 
paradigms center on moral concepts generalizable to all people. The object of 
their work is normally the alteration of a human activity that transcends cultural 
boundaries, and their potential market is the world population. Their challenge is 
to bring about a public redefinition of their issue as a moral issue, not locally but 
globally.19  
 
 These organizations are important for several reasons. First, many NGOs are 
“grassroots organizations that directly liberate and rehabilitate slaves.”20 They physically 
																																								 																				
18 Kevin Bales, Understanding Global Slavery: A Reader (Berkely: University of California Press, 2005), 
69-70.  
19 Ibid., 78.  
20 Ibid., 81. (Additionally, grassroots organizations are an example of a bottom-up approach to combatting 
modern slavery. See Appendix B for a more thorough discussion of this.)  
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free slaves, and they are much more effective than governments at “creating 
circumstances to ensure that reenslavement is less likely to occur.”21 The rehabilitation 
component of rescue is vital. We spoke at length in Chapter Five regarding the social and 
economic vulnerability that results in some people becoming enslaved. Those 
vulnerability factors do not disappear once a slave is liberated. David Batstone 
understands this importance when he points out the following: 
Rescuing slaves does not end the moment they are freed from captivity. To 
abandon the rescued and expect them to fend for themselves leaves them 
vulnerable to falling back into a forced labor relationship with a different owner. 
Abolitionists, therefore, must answer the question ‘What next?’ before they rush 
into a rescue plan…For the period immediately following a rescue, IJM 
[International Justice Mission, a leading anti-slavery NGO] collaborates with a 
network of relief partners to provide ex-slaves with shelter, food, emotional 
counseling, and protection from vindictive owners…the agency will delay 
executing a rescue plan until it has a long-term support structure in place.22  
 
This is part of the reason my rushing off to India to rescue slaves from the red-light 
district on my own is foolish. The expertise of grassroots organizations on the ground is 
much more effective than my well intentioned yet poorly contemplated zeal. As Bales 
states, “Around the world, liberation without rehabilitation has been shown to be 
ineffectual and often temporary,”23 and as Batstone points out, “Programs that encourage 
girls to escape the sex trade but leave them poor and jobless do not yield long term 
success stories.”24 
 On the other hand, rescue operations that do take into account multiple factors 
contributing to enslavement, and which plan for long-term solutions can be extremely 
effective. Lake Volta in Ghana is one of the largest lakes in the world. Due to dwindling 
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24 Batstone, 35.  
		 183 
fish stocks and related economic pressures, child slaves were used in virtually all aspects 
of the Lake Volta fishing industry. The use of children was seen as an economic necessity 
for the struggling industry. The children often suffered severe physical, mental, 
emotional, and sexual abuse, and many of them died working. Many of the children 
became enslaved when their desperate parents were tricked into sending them away with 
promises of future wages (in addition to the advances already paid to their families). 
After an NGO sent a researcher to gather data about the problem, its causes, and potential 
solutions, a number of local and international agencies became involved. One local 
organization began working with the children, and an international organization 
associated with the United Nations provided resources and expertise. These 
organizations, empowered by a large grant from the U.S. government, began freeing 
children, reuniting them with their families, and helping those families to increase their 
incomes, thus decreasing their vulnerability and desperation. The organizations also 
worked with the fisherman to help them find alternative sources of income in exchange 
for promises that they would no longer enslave children. Bales affirms that the rescue of 
these children and the transformation of the Lake Volta fishing industry shows that 
slavery can be stopped given comprehensive understanding of the problem, collaborative 
and comprehensive solutions led by organizations with appropriate skills and knowledge, 
and adequate funding. Furthermore, this shows what can happen when local, 
international, and government organizations band together. Bales states, “The rescue of 
the fishing children shows that real progress can be made when economic alternatives are 
developed for both those who would enslave and those who are vulnerable to 
enslavement.”25 
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 In addition to the importance of NGOs in the physical liberation of slaves, they 
are also often used to teach, train, research, and help implement laws and policies. While 
government officials have to be generalists, caring about multiple issues and voter bases, 
NGOs can be specialists, providing expertise on specific human rights issues that 
governments and government officials simply do not possess. Moreover, NGOs usually 
operate outside political systems, meaning that they are not disrupted by party politics, 
elections, and changes in leadership. They can remain stable in the face of political 
changes, and they can remain focused on a singular issue of importance, such as 
eradicating slavery, even when politicians are juggling a plethora of issues and constantly 
evaluating their approval ratings.26 And when it comes to the political processes in the 
developed world, Bales finds it encouraging that these are of less importance than the 
work that grassroots organizations have the ability to accomplish in these places.27  
2. Individual efforts.28 To some extent, a section regarding “individual efforts” to 
eradicate slavery is a little misleading, especially in light of our discussion above 
involving the importance of working together in concert or collaboration with other 
people, organizations, and even governments. With such a massive issue, how can 
individuals actually effect any change? But this is not a second, isolated category. Many 
of the things mentioned in the previous section involving collective efforts have 
corollaries for individuals. The purpose of discussing “individual efforts” is to point out 
specific things that individuals can do to help fight against slavery. Some of these 
activities may only be possible because certain larger structures exist (such as NGOs), but 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																				
on pages 10-12).  
26 Bales, Understanding Global Slavery, 83.  
27 Ibid., 84.  
28 ‘Individual efforts’ fall underneath the distinction of ‘bottom-up approaches’ to combatting modern 
slavery. See Appendix B for more on this.  
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the activities mentioned here are activities that one person (or two or three) can engage in 
and be assured that their actions matter. As modern abolitionist David Batstone states, “I 
believe in the power of individuals to save the world. Social movements take root and 
blossom when enough individuals take personal action. When you tell yourself that there 
is nothing you can do to arrest the global slave trade, you underestimate your own 
potential and abandon hope for those trapped in captivity.”29 So in order to fight against 
the tendency toward apathy or hopeless, instead ask yourself, “What can I do to become a 
‘conditional cosmopolitan’ in the fight against modern slavery?” 
One person can raise the alarm to let all those in her sphere of influence know that 
slavery still exists in our modern world. Bales points out that the biggest obstacle facing 
the abolitionist is that most people in the world are ignorant of the problem. He questions 
how we can hope to bring about large-scale change “when the problem is not apathy or 
indifference to the continued presence of slavery, but ignorance of it.”30 One chief goal of 
the very first NGO, which was established in the late 1700s in order to abolish the slave 
trade and bring about emancipation for slaves, was “to bring about a shift in values by 
raising public awareness.”31 
Several semesters ago I taught a class to undergraduate students on modern 
slavery. I had one wonderful student who was completely engaged in the class and who 
was determined to become a modern abolitionist. After the semester ended, he planned to 
take a world tour with several of his friends. His friends were planning to engage in sex 
tourism in Southeast Asia. After explaining to his friends that many of the “workers” in 
the commercial sex industry are slaves, and that sex tourism increases the demand for sex 
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slaves, his friends no longer wished to become sex tourists. In this instance, education 
and awareness from a peer was all it took to keep several college guys from potentially 
exploiting slaves in the commercial sex industry.  
 Perhaps we have jumped ahead though. Before we can become educators, we 
must ourselves be educated regarding the reality of modern slavery, its multiple 
manifestations, and effective tools for fighting slavery in our modern context. One 
important component of educating ourselves involves being aware of common places and 
occupations where slaves are often discovered so that we can be vigilant and look for 
signs of slavery in the world around us. David Batstone remembers discovering that his 
favorite San Francisco Bay Indian restaurant, unbeknownst to him, used slave labor. The 
operation thrived until a tragedy revealed the truth. This helped Batstone to understand 
that while slaves themselves are not invisible – meaning that we may see them all around 
us – the existence of slavery in our modern world is a largely invisible reality for many of 
us. He states,   
Just as I never suspected that my favorite restaurant had become a hub for a 
trafficking ring, slavery likely crosses our path on a regular basis without our 
awareness. We may pass a construction site and never think twice about whether 
the laborers there work of their own volition. Or we might drive along city streets 
at night, see young girls on a street corner peddling their bodies, and wonder how 
they could ever “choose” such a life…slavery is in reality not invisible…slaves 
toil in the public eye.32  
 
So if slavery is all around us, how can we train ourselves to see and know when 
slavery is likely present? Anna Rodriguez, the founder of the Florida Coalition Against 
Human Trafficking, teaches workshops to citizens wishing to become better equipped to 
recognize slavery in their own communities. In her presentations she points out that 
slaves are often found in the following industries/occupations/situations:  
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Housecleaning services, Landscape and gardening businesses, Households in 
which domestic (home) workers are present, Large-scale agricultural labor, 
Construction sites, Casinos, Garment factories, Hotels (housekeeping), Nail 
salons, Migrant or transitional communities, Zones known for prostitution, Strip 
clubs/ massage parlors, and Domestic violence cases.33   
 
Bales, Trodd, and Williamson point out some key warning signs that a person may be 
enslaved. We can all watch for these signs. A person may be enslaved if he or she:  
…is not free to change employers; has been assaulted or threatened for refusing to 
work; has been cheated and forced to pay off “debts” upon arrival in the US or the 
UK; has had his or her passport or other documents taken away; lacks proper 
identification; is unable to move freely or is being watched or followed; is under 
the control or constant supervision of another; is rarely allowed to speak freely; 
has an “interpreter” with them; lacks the means to support him/herself or control 
money, in spite of long hours at work; lacks contact with or is isolated from 
family and friends; lacks permanency in the community; has a constant 
appearance of fear, nervousness, and/or apprehension; is afraid to talk in the 
presence of others; has unexplained injuries or is malnourished.34  
 
In February of 2017, an Alaska Airlines flight attendant noticed some of these signs in a 
young disheveled girl traveling with an older well-dressed man. The flight attendant, who 
had received training regarding human trafficking, wrote a note for the girl and left it in 
the bathroom. The girl wrote back on the note that she needed help. When the plane 
landed, law enforcement was ready to assess the situation and rescued the girl.35 A person 
was rescued from slavery because of education, an astute individual, and a swift 
collaborative response. 
Bales, Trodd, and Williamson offer multiple suggestions for individuals wishing 
to take steps toward eradicating slavery. One such suggestion is to “refuse to retire on the 
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backs of slaves.”36 They further explain that retirement and pension funds may include 
investments in companies that “refuse to take responsibility for the slavery in their supply 
chains.”37 When possible, we can instruct our financial advisors to exclude such 
companies from our portfolios. This may take some research on the part of those who 
invest in such funds, and it may not always be possible to know each company’s human 
rights track record, but in at least some instances this information is not impossible to 
find.38 
 Other suggestions include writing to members of Parliament or Congress; writing 
letters in newspapers, magazines, or blogs; organizing neighborhood watch groups that 
include slavery issues as part of their agendas; and arranging for anti-slavery speakers at 
schools, colleges, and religious and community centers. More generally, individuals can 
assess their own passions, talents, abilities, and spheres of influence and get creative!39 
David Batstone advocates for “open-source activism,” which mandates “that individual 
abolitionists develop their own creative solutions wherever they live.”40 For instance, I 
am a resident of the state of South Carolina. When Donald Trump was elected president, 
he chose our (now) former governor Nikki Haley as his ambassador to the United 
Nations. Before she began this new post, I wrote a letter as a fellow South Carolinian 
imploring her to use her new position of global influence to fight for freedom for the 
world’s enslaved. I do not know if she read my letter, but I hope that she did, and I hope 
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that it caused her to pause for a moment and to consider the role she could play in the 
modern abolition movement.   
 When it comes to slavery in the supply chains of the products we use, there are 
many ways we can begin to live more responsible lives as consumers. First and foremost, 
we can make ourselves aware of how our consumer lifestyles support slavery. I 
mentioned in Chapter Five that consumers can complete a “Slavery Footprint” survey, 
which calculates an estimation of how many slaves are required to sustain each 
individual’s lifestyle.41 Completing this survey is an invaluable first step on the journey 
to making more informed anti-slavery consumer choices. Once we are more aware of 
how our slavery footprints are impacted by our consumer habits, we can begin to make 
better informed purchasing decisions. One possibility is to buy Fair Trade products 
whenever they are available. “Once farms have been certified as having no slavery and 
child labor…farmers can sell their crops to Fair Trade buyers,” who then distribute the 
products to wholesalers and retailers who make the products available to consumer in 
more than forty countries.42 These products can be easily identified because they are 
stamped with one of several “Fair Trade Certified” (or equivalent) logos. The more 
consumers support and demand Fair Trade products, the more the supply and availability 
of such products will increase.43  
One industry that is especially implicated for its use of slave labor, and often child 
slave labor, is the carpet and rug-making industry. Hundreds of thousands of children are 
trapped in this industry in India and Pakistan alone. In India, most carpets are woven in 
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the state of Uttar Pradesh, “where the majority of workers are low-caste Hindu 
boys…The boys are forced to work for no pay, for ten to eighteen hours a day, seven 
days a week. They are beaten, tortured, branded, kept half-fed and half-clad, and are 
usually made to sleep in the loom shed.”44 For this reason, when I see advertisements for 
“hand-made” or “hand-woven” rugs, I cannot help but wonder who wove them, under 
what conditions, and how young the weavers might have been. Bales and Trodd have 
compiled numerous stories from slave-children who were forced to work in looms 
weaving carpets and rugs. In one such story from a twelve-year-old boy named Ravi, he 
recalls that when he was hurt he was still made to weave. “Very often, because the wound 
was in raw condition, the blood would start oozing out of my finger. But then we could 
not stop. With the blood running down my finger I was made to weave.”45 When Ravi’s 
father attempted to rescue him, the loom owner stated that Ravi could not leave because 
he was the only one who knew the pattern of the rug he was weaving.46  
If the thought of purchasing a rug woven by the bloody fingers of children 
horrifies you, then you are in luck! A process now exists in which rugs (and some other 
woven products) can receive a “GoodWeave label,” certifying that “no child, forced or 
bonded labor was used in the making of a certified product, and that your purchase 
supports programs that educate children and ensure decent work for adults.”47 You can 
search the GoodWeave website to discover certain companies and brands that carry 
GoodWeave certified rugs, or you can look on the backs of rugs for the GoodWeave 
																																								 																				
44 Bales and Trodd, Plead Our Own Cause, 69. 
45 Ibid., 75-76. 
46 Ibid., 76. (See pages 69-81 for several first-person accounts from children enslaved in the rug and carpet 
industry, including the entirety of Ravi’s story.) 
47 “The GoodWeave Label,” GoodWeave International, accessed May 10, 2018, 
https://goodweave.org/about/goodweave-label/.  
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label. “Each GoodWeave label has a unique code that can be traced back to the licensed 
producer.”48 One mainstream retailer that has made major strides to incorporate 
GoodWeave certified rugs into its brand is the Target Corporation.49 For many consumers 
this means that buying a GoodWeave certified rug is not only easy, it is also relatively 
inexpensive. Several years ago after learning of Target’s involvement with the 
GoodWeave label, I went to my local retailer. The first rug I turned over had a 
GoodWeave certification label on the back. A surge of adrenaline rushed through my 
veins at the sight of competitively priced, good quality, slavery-free rugs being sold five 
minutes from my house. For me, this made purchasing a slave-free rug a real, viable 
option rather than a distant, romanticized dream. 
Closely related to purchasing Fair Trade products, we can “use our consumer 
power to ask companies to examine their supply chains.”50 The goal with such endeavors 
is to “take the slavery out of the products without hurting the free farmers and workers at 
the same time.”51 For this reason, boycotts are strongly discouraged, because a majority 
of the farmers who supply materials used in production do not use slaves. When we 
boycott industries, we may cripple some of the criminals who use slaves, but we also risk 
hurting numerous free workers, and we are likely to push those workers into desperate 
situations that then leave them vulnerable to enslavement. Simply stated, “The boycott 
may hurt the slaveholder, but it will hurt the free farmer much more.”52 The better option 
																																								 																				
48 “The GoodWeave Label.” 
49 “Target,” GoodWeave International, accessed May 10, 2018, https://goodweave.org/brand/target/; 
Andrea Lillo, “The Eco-Friendly Evolution: sustainable rugs become more mainstream – and price 
friendly,” HFN, December 8, 2015, accessed May 10, 2018, http://www.hfndigital.com/news/eco-friendly-
evolution/. 
50 Bales, Trodd, and Williamson, Modern Slavery: Beginner’s Guide, 156. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid., 156-157.  
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is to fight slavery at its source – the farm, the mine, and the workshop; and as Bales, 
Trodd, and Williamson explain, “To do that, everyone along the supply chain, from the 
farmer to the consumer, takes responsibility.”53     
 Virtually all of our modern technological devices, as well as numerous other 
consumer products, possess certain minerals known as “conflict minerals.” These include 
tantalum, tin, tungsten and gold, and are largely mined by slaves is the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo. This a perfect example of slavery found at the source of 
extraction of raw materials used in consumer products. In our global technology age, it is 
nearly impossible to eliminate these products from our lives. Doing so would include 
throwing out our phones, computers, tablets, and SIM cards. It would exclude car and 
train travel.54 And unfortunately, there is no stamp or label that we can look for when we 
go to purchase a laptop like we can when we wish to purchase coffee, tea, textiles, or 
rugs. But because such a label does not exist today does not mean that it could not exist 
in the future. The Intel Corporation is leading the way in the effort to exclude conflict 
minerals from its supply chain. Intel is also encouraging other technology companies to 
join this pursuit.55 Intel encourages students to join with the Enough Project’s “Conflict 
Free Campus Initiative” in an effort to make demands of electronics companies that they 
move toward using conflict-free minerals in their products.56 The vision is that in five or 
																																								 																				
53 Bales, Trodd, and Williamson, Modern Slavery: Beginner’s Guide,157. 
54 Joyce Riha Linik, “What are Conflict Minerals and Why Does Conflict-Free Matter?” iQ (Intel), 
September 12, 2014, accessed May 10, 2018, https://iq.intel.com/why-conflict-free-matters-in-your-
everyday-life/.  
55 “Intel’s Efforts to Achieve a ‘Conflict-Free’ Supply Chain,” Intel Corporation, May 2017, accessed May 
10, 2018, https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/corporate-responsibility/conflict-minerals-white-
paper.html. 
56 “In Pursuit of a Conflict Free Supply Chain,” Intel Corporation, accessed May 10, 2018, 
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/corporate-responsibility/conflict-free-minerals.html; “Conflict 
Free Campus Initiative,” Enough Project, 2017, accessed May 10, 2018, https://enoughproject.org/get-
involved/cfci. 
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ten years, when I walk into a retailer to buy a cell phone or a laptop, I can look for 
products with a “Conflict Free” label and choose to purchase these products instead of 
uncertified ones.  
 When it comes to our contributions in the commercial sex industry, the most 
comprehensive solution is simple in prescription, but perhaps extremely difficult in 
execution. The best, and often times only, way to definitively ensure that bought sex 
services are not performed by slaves is to never buy them in the first place. I recognize 
that many may laugh at this though and claim that this is an impossible hope, but in all 
seriousness, feeding your sex drive is insignificant when slaves pay the price for your 
sexual satisfaction.     
 We have now spent quite some time discussing the importance of educating 
ourselves and others, and then acting on our knowledge. But there is at least one other 
major obstacle to eradicating slavery, and this is a lack of resources.57 As Bales, Trodd, 
and Williamson point out, “Anti-slavery groups must be reliable in everything they do 
with the communities they support; they can’t run out of money in the middle of a 
liberation.”58 We already discussed in Chapter Five that if those of us with excess 
resources would make small sacrifices, such as curtailing our coffee and ice cream 
expenditures and instead funneling those funds into anti-slavery initiatives, then we could 
at least put at major dent in the existence of slavery, and at best actually achieve its 
eradication. In many instances, organizations and structures already exist with the skills 
and passion to fight modern slavery, but they cannot work to their fullest potential when 
they are underfunded. As Bales points out, most of the organizations working tirelessly to 
																																								 																				
57 Bales, Trodd, and Williamson, Modern Slavery: Beginner’s Guide, 146.  
58 Ibid., 154. 
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free slaves and to provide them with supportive services so that they do not remain 
vulnerable to reenslavement “have scant local resources and little or no support from the 
developed world.”59 It may seem like sending money is too little a thing given the 
circumstances, but often times sending money is both the most feasible and practical way 
for us to help, and is also the most needed and effective way we can join the fight against 
slavery.  
Of course, not all NGOs or other human rights organizations are maximally 
effective. In fact, some of them are rather ineffective.60 Therefore blindly supporting 
NGOs may or may not be an effective way to fight against slavery. For this reason, Leif 
Wenar believes that while supporting NGOs and other aid organizations is important, we 
should not do so blindly.61 Wenar questions the validity of the assertion: “…small 
sacrifice from the rich can bring great benefit to the poor…”62 This assertion is used 
liberally in appeals for charitable contributions. However, Wenar believes that confidence 
in this statement is “seriously misplaced,” as empirical evidence to support the truth of 
this statement is often difficult to find.63 Even in the age of globalization, it is often not as 
simple as rich people giving generously, and their contributions easily finding their way 
to their global neighbors who need assistance the most.64 We should assess how each 
dollar we give will affect the long-term well being of the slaves we hope to help.65 
																																								 																				
59 Bales, Understanding Global Slavery, 81. 
60 “The complicated story of NGOs in post-disaster Haiti,” CBS News, December 19, 2016, accessed May 
8, 2018, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/how-some-foreign-ngos-failed-haiti/.   
61 This discussion of Wenar’s view is largely taken from my own unpublished paper, Tiffany Beaver, “A 
Discussion of Global Poverty and International Distributive Justice – What Does Justice Require, and What 
Are People Responsible to Do?” (University of South Carolina, 2014), 11. 
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The Global Justice Reader, edited by Thom Brooks, (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2008), 403. 
63 Ibid.  
64 Ibid.  
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Because this question often can only be answered by “informed, reasonable guesses,” 
part of our responsibility may be to advocate for greater transparency from organizations 
that redistribute aid. However, despite some of the implicit problems with NGOs and 
other similar organizations, there is evidence to support the idea that some of them are 
rather effective, and that some of them do accomplish quite a bit of good in the realm of 
fighting to alleviate numerous social injustices.66 
Additionally, there are ways of giving aid that might make things worse in the 
long run for those we are attempting to help. For instance, the methods of some NGOs 
may perpetuate practices that will increase injustice over time instead of decreasing it. 
Some types of aid may not actually work. For instance, practicing “redemption,” or the 
buying back of slaves from their oppressors, may actually make matters worse by 
profiting those who would enslave and giving them a reason to acquire more slaves…so 
these new slaves can also be redeemed.67 More needs to be done to figure out which 
methods of aid will actually help people, and then to promote such methods.68 We must 
walk in the tension of realizing we have an obligation to help these exploited neighbors in 
the developing world while also realizing that we must justify our actions to future 
generations.69 This represents a crossroads between the two main responsibilities we have 
discussed – educating ourselves and others, and giving money and resources. We can be 
maximally effective in the fight to eradicate modern slavery when we are armed with 
knowledge, and when we use that knowledge to contribute toward organizations, 
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agencies, and programs which are doing the best job of fighting slavery everywhere, from 
our local to our global communities.70   
I will close this section with one final thought. It is an observation made by 
Thomas Pogge specifically concerning our isolation from severe poverty. But I believe 
his observation speaks a great deal toward the situation in which most of us find 
ourselves in relation to the world’s slaves. He states,  
We live in extreme isolation from severe poverty. We do not know anyone 
earning less than $30 for a 72-hour week of hard, monotonous labor. The one-
third of human beings who die from poverty-related causes includes no one we 
have ever spent time with. Nor do we know anyone who knows and cares about 
these deceased – someone scarred by the experience of losing a child to hunger, 
diarrhea, or measles, for example. If we had such people as friends or neighbors, 
we would think harder about world poverty and work harder to help end this 
ongoing catastrophe.71 
 
Most of us can likely say the same thing regarding our isolation from the millions of 
modern slaves in our world. We do not know them. We have not met them. We do not 
know their family members who have been left scarred and broken. We do not personally 
know the children who weave our rugs or the men and women who mine the minerals in 
our phones. But we can get to know some of these people. Many of their stories are 
available. I have recounted several of them throughout this project. Books containing 
modern slave narratives, video documentaries, news stories, and even numerous 
YouTube videos bring their experiences into our lives and homes. Tools exist to help us 
trace our connections to these neighbors. If we truly make attempts to know these people 
– our neighbors – their stories will likely change our lives.   
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modern abolition movement. 
71 Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), 4. 
		 197 
II. Concluding Remarks 
 As much as we may loathe the idea, the existence of slavery in our modern world 
is a heartbreaking reality. These millions upon millions of enslaved people are our 
neighbors. Some of them live in our immediate communities. Some of them live around 
the world. Some of them harvest, mine, sew, manufacture, and produce items that we 
consume daily. Others are sexually abused in the commercial sex industry, being forced 
to practice prostitution and film pornographic videos. Some of them work in our service 
industries cooking food and cleaning our hotel rooms. They are right in front of us. And 
they are invisible to us.  
 My first goal in this project has been to bring to light the reality of modern 
slavery. In Chapter Two, I worked to rigorously define modern slavery and to explain the 
various forms it takes in our world today.  
 My second goal in this project has been to generally explore the demands that 
justice – both distributive and commutative – place on individuals. The demands of 
justice are rooted in our responsibility to favor and foster the common good of those with 
whom we share resources and with whom we share varying relationships. The story of 
our lives intersects and impacts the lives and narrative quests of countless others, both 
proximally close and proximally distant from us.  
Distributive justice requires that when we have more than we need, we use those 
surplus resources for the benefit of others. We must understand that when we hit the 
“distribution jackpot” so to speak, and find ourselves trustees over more than our share, 
we are responsible for using our excesses for the common good of those who were 
allocated less.  
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Commutative justice requires that we treat those with whom we share 
relationships – our neighbors widely construed – in ways that are fitting and fair. In some 
instances we are at fault or guilty for harming our neighbors. In others instances we may 
not be guilty of harming them, but we still carry some responsibility for their oppression. 
Additionally, when our actions do harm them, we may be especially obligated to take 
restorative steps for their benefit.    
 My third goal in this project has been to link our duties in distributive and 
commutative justice to the plight of modern slaves. Distributive injustice is a chief factor 
in rendering millions of people vulnerable to slavery because of their severe poverty. 
Greater justice in distribution would serve to decrease the number of people who find 
themselves hopeless, powerless, and especially vulnerable to slavery. Commutative 
injustice demands that we consider our varied relationships to the world’s slaves, and that 
we understand both when we may be guilty for the enslavement of others, as is the case 
when one views child pornography, and when we may bear some responsibility without 
guilt for their slavery, as is the case when slave labor is mixed into the global 
commodities market and finds its way into consumer product. Our multiple and varied 
relationships to slaves mean that we share some responsibility for their abuse, regardless 
of guilt, when we both have the ability to help them and especially when we have 
contributed to harming them. 
 My fourth and final goal in this project has been to empower us to action. I have 
not wanted to paint a hopeless picture regarding slavery, nor to level an intense guilt 
burden on global citizens who genuinely wish we lived in a slavery-free world. I hope 
that we all feel the freedom to discharge our obligations toward the world’s slaves in a 
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wide variety of ways. We can fight for modern abolition in multiple, creative ways that 
utilize our own spheres influence, talents, passions, resources, and convictions to 
mobilize us to action. We can become ‘conditional cosmopolitans’ in relation to modern 
slavery, truly evaluating when we should sacrifice particularist commitments for the sake 
of our globally enslaved brothers and sisters. We stand at a crossroads, and what we 
decide to do (or not do) will have historical ramifications. As David Batstone explains,  
My students at the University of San Francisco often remark that they feel as if 
they were born in the wrong era, after the important issues of history have been 
decided…They could not be more wrong…There are times to read history, and 
there are times to make history. We live right now at one of those epic moments 
in the fight for human freedom. We no longer have to wonder how we might 
respond to our moment of truth. It is we who are on the stage, and we can change 
the winds of history with our actions. Future generations will look back to judge 
our choices and be inspired or disappointed.72 
 
Batstone also pleads with all of us to take up the cause, however we can, in whatever 
ways we are led.  
It takes all of us. The original abolitionists were a varied lot, and their successes 
were due in part to their varied battle plans. From John Brown’s carbines and 
pikes [weapons] to Charles Sumner’s verbs and nouns [words], the antislavery 
vanguard used widely differing tools, but united in a common cause. Now, as 
then, all personalities are welcome.73 
 
And now, I will end where I began. In the words of the fierce British abolitionist William 
Wilberforce, I will raise my own voice to remind us all: "You may choose to look the 
other way but you can never say again that you did not know."74 I will not, I cannot, look 
the other way. The world’s slaves deserve my attention. They deserve our attention. And 
we are obligated to give it to them. 
ABOLITION!
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APPENDIX A
 
ORGANIZATIONS, TOOLS, AND RESOURCES  
TO HELP FIGHT SLAVERY 
 
This is by no means an exhaustive list. However, it should give those who are interested 
plenty of resources to better educate yourselves and your neighbors, and to begin making 
small changes toward fighting for the abolition of modern slavery. 
 
I. Anti-slavery Organizations 
 
- EndIt Movement: www.enditmovement.com 
A giant hub for fighting modern slavery; links to many other agencies and    
organizations 
 
- International Justice Mission (IJM): www.ijm.org 
Operates throughout the world fighting slavery; Focuses especially on 
prosecuting traffickers and slave-owners; Operates a gift catalog where you 
can give gifts of freedom in honor and memory of loved ones: gifts.ijm.org 
 
- Polaris Project: www.polarisproject.org 
     Operates a national (USA) human trafficking hotline 
 
- A21: www.a21.org 
“Together, we are eradicating human trafficking through awareness, 
intervention, and aftercare.” 
 
- Not For Sale Campaign: www.notforsalecampaign.org 
“A network to grow self-sustaining social projects with purpose-driven 
business to end exploitation and forced labor.” 
 
- Women At Risk Intl.: www.warinternational.org 
“…established to create circles of protection around at-risk women and 
children.”  
 
- Operation Underground Railroad: www.ourrescue.org 
“We exist to rescue children from sex trafficking.”  
 
- As Our Own: www.asourown.org 
Provides rescue, aftercare, and prevention for vulnerable children in India.  
		 212 
- Made in a Free World: www.madeinafreeworld.com 
     “Software that turns supply chain risks into rewards.” 
 
- Free the Slaves: www.freetheslaves.net 
     Focuses on labor slavery and consumerism 
 
- Stop the Traffik: www.stopthetraffik.org 
UK based, comprehensive anti-trafficking organization 
 
- ECPAT: www.ecpat.org 
Focuses on eliminating the sexual exploitation of children 
 
- Love 146: www.love146.org 
Works to eliminate child trafficking and exploitation 
 
- Project Rescue: www.projectrescue.com 
Operates in eight countries with various anti-slavery programs and initiatives. I 
have personally worked with this organization in Delhi, India, where they have 
safe homes for girls and boys rescued from the Red Light District.  
 
- Bombay Teen Challenge: www.bombayteenchallenge.org 
“With over a million children enslaved in the red light districts of India, BTC   
was created with a vision to break the cycle of trafficking through impact-
driven initiatives that help those rescued become productive and empowered 
members of society.” 
 
- The Exodus Road: www.theexodusroad.com 
Rescues sex slaves in Southeast Asia and India 
 
- Hope for Justice: www.hopeforjustice.org 
A comprehensive rescue and restoration agency operating in eight countries 
 
- Free to Run: www.freetorun.org 
“[O]perates on the basic principle that sport is a human right and not a luxury.” 
 
- Transparency International: www.transparency.org 
“The global coalition against corruption”  
 
- Lighthouse For Life: www.lighthouseforlife.org 
Agency local to Columbia, South Carolina 
 
- Out of Darkness: www.outofdarkness.org 
         Agency local to Atlanta, Georgia 
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- Florida Coalition Against Human Trafficking: www.stophumantrafficking.org 
Works to collaborate with and train law enforcement, federal officials, service 
providers, community members, and others 
 
 - Amazonsmile (gives donations to a charity of your choice): smile.amazon.com 
 
 
II. Tools and Resources 
       
A. Websites and Articles 
 
Consumerism and Product Supply Chains 
- Slavery Footprint: www.slaveryfootprint.org 
     Online survey you can take to discover “how many slaves work for you” 
  
- Done Good: www.donegood.co 
     “Shop hundreds of brands that make the world better.” 
 
- Assessing Atrocity: http://assessingatrocity.com/the-high-cost-of-cheap-labor- 
     how-to-buy-clothing-without-supporting-slave-labor-2/ 
     A few of these links are outdated, but there are still plenty of good suggestions 
     of ethically responsible companies in this article.  
 
 -  The Good Trade: www.thegoodtrade.com 
Suggestions for ethical clothing, travel, skincare, and other sustainable 
products 
  
- Fair Trade USA: www.fairtradeusa.org/products-partners 
The go-to place for information on Fair Trade in the USA, including   
suggestions of Fair Trade Certified products 
 
 - PACT Organic Clothing: www.wearpact.com 
Ethically sourced, Fair Trade, organic cotton clothing. (Half of my casual 
wardrobe is from this company).  
 
- Inkkas Shoes: www.inkkas.com 
     Sells Fair Trade sneakers and casual shoes  
    (my husband and I both own several pairs) 
 
- Senda Athletics: www.sendaathletics.com 
      Offers fair trade sporting equipment, especially soccer balls 
 
- Theo Chocolate: www.theochocolate.com 
     Fair Trade chocolate, ethically sourced “from bean to bar” 
  
		 214 
- Know the Chain: www.knowthechain.org 
“…a resource for companies and investors to understand and address forced  
labor risks within their global supply chains.” 
 
- The California Transparency in Supply Chains Act  
Requires large companies in California to disclose efforts to ensure their 
products are not produced by slaves.  
https://oag.ca.gov/SB657 
https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/sb657/resource-guide.pdf 
 
- Ann Taylor Loft: www.responsiblyann.com/ourExpectations.asp 
This is an example of a transparency statement as required by the California 
Transparency in Supply Chains Act. 
 
The Carpet and Rug Industry 
- GoodWeave: www.goodweave.org  
“GoodWeave works to end child labor in global supply chains, from the    
producer’s hands to the consumer’s.” 
  
- GoodWeave at Target - https://goodweave.org/brand/target/ 
     “The Eco-Friendly Evolution,” by Andrea Lillo: 
      www.hfndigital.com/news/eco-friendly-evolution/ 
 
- Rugmark Foundation: www.rugmarkindia.org/Rugmark/index.htm 
 
Conflict Free Minerals and Stones 
- Responsible Minerals Initiative: http://www.responsiblemineralsinitiative.org 
Helping companies make informed choices about responsibly sourced minerals 
in their supply chains. 
 
- Intel, “In Pursuit of a Conflict Free Supply Chain”: https://www.intel.com/ 
     content/www/us/en/corporate-responsibility/conflict-free-minerals.html 
 
- Intel, “What are conflict minerals and why does conflict-free matter?” by Joyce 
    Riha Linki: http://iq.intel.com/why-conflict-free-matters-in-your-everyday-life/ 
 
- The Kimberly Process: https://www.kimberleyprocess.com 
Process set up to certify conflict-free diamonds, although many are skeptical of 
its proposed success 
 
- Brilliant Earth: www.brilliantearth.com 
Source for conflict free jewelry and precious stones, although its 
trustworthiness is in question per the two articles immediately following 
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- Questioning conflict-free diamonds:  
- “Here’s Why Conflict Free Diamonds are a Hoax,” by Elizabeth Harper: 
https://www.dealnews.com/features/Heres-Why- 
     Conflict-Free-Diamonds-Are-a-Hoax/2030261.html 
 
- “Inside the ‘conflict-free’ diamond scam costing online buyers millions [Updated]”   
by Bryan Clark, https://thenextweb.com/insider/2017/06/17/shady-online-diamond-
dealer-proves-conflict-free-is-no-guarantee/ 
  
 - Canadamark: https://www.canadamark.com  
Assures diamonds are responsibly mined in Canada; May be safest way to 
ensure diamonds are conflict-free 
 
 Human Trafficking Initiatives 
- “This Girl's Senior Project Became a Law Enforcement Tool to Stop Sex 
     Trafficking,” by Kate Dwyer: http://www.teenvogue.com/story/senior-project- 
     stops-human-trafficking?mbid=social_facebook 
     Details Emily Kennedy’s (Carnegie Mellon University) senior project that “has 
     evolved into a world-class database that provides law enforcement officials 
     with the tools to combat human trafficking.”  
 
- Fight the New Drug: www.fightthenewdrug.org 
     Details links between Human trafficking and pornography 
 
 - Safe Place: http://www.nationalsafeplace.org 
“Safe Place designates businesses and organizations as Safe Place locations, 
making help readily available to youth in communities across the country.” 
 
 - QuikTrip partners with Safe Place: “This “Safe Place” Sign Saves Lives By 
     Giving Them Refuge In Emergency Situations,” by Emerald Pellot, 
     www.littlethings.com/quik-trip-safe-place/ 
 
- “Super Bowl Is Single Largest Human Trafficking Incident In U.S.: Attorney 
     General,” by Eleanor Goldberg: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/03/ 
     super-bowl-sex-trafficking_n_2607871.html 
     Explains the prevalence of human trafficking at major sporting events  
 
B. Videos 
- EndIt Movement 
     * Awareness and action among students: 
          https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iokqGOQmt1U 
* Slavery at major sporting events: 
   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qMyExi2q-ZI 
 
- Kevin Bales defines slavery: www.youtube.com/watch?v=qfCiQJE_sBg 
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- Fields of Mudan, The Florida State University College of Motion Picture Arts, 
     www.youtube.com/watch?v=IO204wuT9mc 
“A young Asian girl forced into modern day child sex slavery, dreams of a 
better life with her mother in America.” 
 
- The Abolitionists, a documentary film, must purchase to view:  
     www.abolitionistsmovement.com 
 
- I Am Jane Doe, a documentary film about backpage.com, which has since been 
                 shut down: www.youtube.com/watch?v=xshDkqB1rYc 
 
- “Is Consumerism Fueling Modern-Day Slavery?”  
     An interview with David Batstone of the “Not For Sale Campaign” 
     www.youtube.com/watch?v=4QrmOtuAZjY 
 
- “Modern day slavery – Supply Chains” 
     www.youtube.com/watch?v=YRu6CaXTAxA 
 
- “Human Trafficking: Modern-day Slavery in America”  
     www.youtube.com/watch?v=_tQDYvPrE6k 
     Slaves are forced to braid hair in Newark, New Jersey 
 
- “What's Porn Got To Do With Sex Trafficking?: A survivor explains.” 
     www.youtube.com/watch?v=FnPp0DPnb9o 
 
- “The Dutch Sex Industry’s Terrifying Underbelly” 
     www.youtube.com/watch?v=ht8wxROENdE 
 
- “Look Inside: Carolyn Duran and the Pursuit of Conflict-free” 
    www.youtube.com/watch?v=HZDsNXtM-rk 
 
- “Mystery Unboxing”  
     www.youtube.com/watch?v=CZkFdS8_Wfw 
 
- “Conflict Minerals 101”  
     www.youtube.com/watch?v=aF-sJgcoY20 
 
- “Conflict Minerals in Your Daily Life” 
     www.youtube.com/watch?v=n8Bq5R2RB6s 
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APPENDIX B
 
TOP-DOWN AND BOTTOM-UP APPROACHES TO  
FIGHTING MODERN SLAVERY:  
CASE EXAMPLE OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE MISSION (IJM)  
 
A helpful distinction we could make when it comes to determining how we might act 
toward alleviating modern slavery, both close to home and around the globe, is the 
distinction between top-down and bottom-up solutions.1 Top-down solutions include 
actions that governments and other larger institutional groups should undertake to fight 
modern slavery. Bottom-up solutions include actions that independently organized 
grassroots organizations and groups (as well as individuals) might undertake to bring 
freedom to modern slaves. Both of these approaches are necessary in the modern fight for 
abolition. This case study showcases how one global abolitionist organization, 
International Justice Mission (IJM) undertakes the fight against modern slavery using 
both top-down and bottom-up approaches.  
 
 
International Justice Mission (IJM) 
  
According to their website, IJM ranks as “the largest anti-slavery organization in 
the world.” Their claim is simple: “We know where slaves are. Your help is needed to 
rescue them.”2 The model which IJM uses contains three main components: setting slaves 
free, throwing oppressors in jail, and advocating for changes in the systems that make the 
slave trade profitable (with the ultimate goal of eliminating the slave trade forever).3 In 
explaining how these components have proven effective, IJM states:  
 
International Justice Mission is an organized group of advocates, donors, 
investigators, social workers, lawyers, and government leaders who are executing 
a proven plan that will stop the modern slave trade in its tracks. 
We rescue slaves by disrupting the slave trade. At IJM, we work with local 
governments to rescue slaves and throw their oppressors in jail. Once the 
immediate crisis is managed, we disrupt the business model that fostered the 
slavery in the first place. Disrupting the model involves prosecuting slave owners 
																																								 																				
1 I am indebted to Sheetal Shah, Ph.D. for pointing out this helpful distinction. 
http://www.webster.edu/arts-and-sciences/faculty/shah.html.  
2 https://www.ijm.org/ 
3 Ibid. 
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and dramatically increasing the legal, financial and opportunity costs slave 
owners must pay to sustain a slave-labor model.  
If we don’t disrupt the model, slave owners will expand their power and steal 
more lives. But the world is changing. Modern slavery can end in our lifetime. 
Our proven model works. Our only limitations are financial. With your help, we 
can throw slave owners and traffickers in jail, rescue those whose lives have been 
stolen and prove to the world every human life matters.4  
 
This is a helpful description of the work in which IJM is involved. I will use this to 
extrapolate how IJM employs both top-down and bottom-up approaches to eliminating 
modern slavery. We will begin with the bigger, global picture (top-down), and work 
toward establishing smaller-scale, more localized, and even individual approaches 
(bottom-up).   
 
Top-down approaches used by IJM  
 
One of IJM’s the three major components of fighting against slavery includes 
disrupting the business model that renders slavery profitable for those willing to enslave 
and exploit human beings. In order to do this, IJM works alongside governments to help 
them enforce existing laws, and to create new laws and policies that will eliminate the 
financial benefits of engaging in the slave trade. For this to be successful, IJM recognizes 
that governments must be willing and able to enforce their own existing anti-slavery 
laws.  
 
Furthermore, IJM recognizes that future agreements and legislation must 
undermine the profitability of the slave trade. Trade agreements between nations must 
discourage slavery. Governments that would be (and currently are) tempted to turn a 
blind eye to the slave trade must be pressured to end this inhumane practice. IJM 
understands this, and works alongside governments to encourage far-reaching, large-scale 
changes in policies to the detriment of slave traders and for the benefit of modern slaves. 
They do this by partnering with government officials who are sympathetic to the anti-
slavery movement. They also employ numerous lawyers and other advocates, who in turn 
use their influence and expertise to pressure non-compliant governments and corrupt 
officials to govern with the goal of protecting the vulnerable people under their 
jurisdiction instead of tolerating, protecting, and participating in their exploitation.   
 
These are some examples of how IJM employs a top-down approach in 
addressing modern slavery. IJM engages governments and systems in an attempt to 
systematically eliminate the structures that maintain slavery as a feasible and profitable 
industry.5 IJM engages with legal systems to ensure that those who enslave others are 
held accountable for their crimes, and that they are prohibited from enslaving others in 
the future. 
 
																																								 																				
4 https://www.ijm.org/slavery 
5 For example, IJM works closely with the U.S. Trafficking in Persons Office (TIP Office); 
https://freedomcommons.ijm.org/ 
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Bottom-up approaches used by IJM 
 
 There are at least four ways that IJM employs a bottom-up approach when 
fighting against modern slavery. First, IJM works on the ground to free slaves. They do 
this by working with local officials in communities across the globe to organize and 
execute rescue missions. IJM explains, “…we find the children and adults who are 
victims of violence, forced labor, or sex trafficking. We then support local police in 
rescue operations and help meet the victims’ urgent needs, like safe housing, food, 
medical care, counseling, and education. We create a plan for every individual to 
succeed.”6 Organizing raids and providing direct care resources for survivors most 
definitely exemplifies a bottom-up approach to fighting slavery. 
 
 Second, after rescue operations are performed and slaves are set free and cared 
for, IJM uses its involvement and influence to “…make sure criminals cannot continue to 
harm their victims. We support the police in investigating, arresting, and charging slave 
owners with crimes. We continue to fight until slave owners are behind bars.”7 Because 
these efforts are focused at the level of local law enforcement and criminal justice, this is 
an example of a bottom-up approach.  
 
 Third, IJM encourages small pockets of abolition-advocates to organize 
themselves in their local communities wherever they are.8 IJM specifically focuses on 
encouraging such pockets of locally organized, grassroots chapters on college campuses.9 
For instance, the University of South Carolina has a student chapter of IJM.10 This 
campus organization supports the work of IJM by meeting regularly, organizing events 
aimed at educating other students about the reality of modern slavery, raising money for 
IJM initiatives, and engaging in local community service projects aimed at fighting 
slavery in the communities surrounding the university. This provides a perfect example 
of a bottom-up approach to fighting against slavery.  
 
 Fourth, the primary way that IJM encourages support from smaller grassroots 
groups and individuals is through donating financially to the organization. IJM has 
proven that its comprehensive model works, but the numerous ambitious projects and 
initiatives that the organization has planned can only proceed if they are properly funded. 
Thus, the easiest, most straightforward, and most needed source of support for IJM comes 
from large and small donations, and from various individuals and groups.  
 
IJM maintains a gift catalog, detailing monetary values needed to accomplish 
specific anti-slavery initiatives around the globe. Giving the gift of freedom in honor or 
memory of loved ones, or as a fundraising initiative for a group of modern abolitionists 
such as a campus IJM chapter, is made easy by this catalog that details a plethora of 
projects along with the monetary gifts needed to actualize them. From giving $7 to 
																																								 																				
6 https://www.ijm.org/our-work  
7 Ibid. 
8 https://freedomcommons.ijm.org/ 
9 https://www.ijm.org/students 
10 https://ijmatusc.weebly.com/ 
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provide a hot meal to a survivor or $9 for a new blanket, to donating $35 for trauma-
focused therapy for a child sex trafficking survivor, to contributing $300 to rent boats for 
rescue operations, and on up to raising $6,850 to fund a rescue mission and provide 
restorative services to victims of sex trafficking, there is truly something for everyone or 
every group in the IJM gift catalog.11 
 
IJM also asks that individuals or groups consider becoming a “freedom partner.” 
This involves making a commitment to donate $24 (or more) on a monthly basis to 
support the various rescue operations, aftercare needs, legal fees, and other expenses 
incurred in the fight for modern abolition. This consistent support helps IJM to plan and 
execute properly funded rescue missions throughout the globe.12 
 
Giving financially to an organization such as IJM is another perfect example of a 
bottom-up approach to fighting against slavery. IJM could not continue its global or local 
initiatives without this financial support. And while individuals and smaller groups may 
feel as if donating money doesn’t seem like enough, IJM clearly points out that they have 
the knowledge and manpower to execute numerous life-changing anti-slavery operations 
if only they have proper financial support.13 In this instance, this bottom-up approach 
helps to actualize other bottom-up approaches (such as rescue operations), as well as 
numerous top-down approaches (such as advocating to governments and engaging in 
justice systems) in the fight against the injustice of modern slavery.  
 
 
																																								 																				
11 https://gifts.ijm.org/ 
12 https://www.ijm.org/partnerships 
13 https://www.ijm.org/slavery 
